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1. LI\ITRODUCTION 
B<>cltwouml to t-he £y a\uat inn 
1.1 Since 1990 BRAC has been receiving financial support for its :Rural Development 
Programme - Phase I! (RDP-II \ anti Rural Credit Prograrnme (RGP) from a consortium 
of nine imernational development assistance agencies comprising: 
Aga Khan F'oundat ion (AKF) 
British Overseas Developrnem Adrninistration (ODA) 
Canadian 1nternatiolla1I>evelopmen;. Agency (C!DA/ 
Danisb Lntern~tiMal Development Agency (DANIDA) 
Evangelische Zeno-alstel!e fur Entwicldungshilfe (EZE) 
Ford foundatton 
Netherlands Organisatl6n for 1mernational Development Cooperation 
N OV1B) 
Norwegian Agency Jor Developmem Cooperation (NORAD) 
Swedish !oteraa t'ional Development Auc.IJoril:y (SIDA} 
L2 The RDP-ll/RCP proposal was appraised.by theJ)onor Consortium during ;:he first 
quarter of 1989. The.proiect docwnear, dated December 1989, and forming the basis 
of r.he funding agreement, s?ecifie.d fo\tr mai.n mechanisms th.rollgh wnicb. (s} BRAC 
could discharge its fi nancia l accountability co the Coosortium, an.d (b) che CoiiSorcium 
could satisfy i tself that funds were spen' in rational pursuit of the mucual!y agreed 
objecth•es and activities. These mechanisms include: 
\) ,l'mdit\ng -The arrangements include the continuation of annual external 
<ludits paid for bY BRAC, but wirh provisions for the Donor Consortium 
to commission the smne firm to undertake 'spec ific audi ting tasks' with 
res])ec~ t.n ROP-!VRCP. 
ii) Reoorting - The common framework for BRAG to keep 1:he Consortium 
i.nf armed of substanl:ive ~rogress SJlecifies four main tyiles of report, 
eomprisiog: 
' iii} 
* q_uarte!'ly financial reports; 
* comprehensive semi-annual narrative and financial reports; 
" annual audited financial reporcs; 
* reports and studies complled by BR.A.G's Research and Eva!uacion 
Divis·ion and through its management informacion system. 
MonitOring. Evaluation and Jmoact A#P,ssmeo.,!; - The project document 
specifies ·a 'permanent core team' of four members to undertake 
moni toring visits at least: once per year. ft also provide~ for the 
commissioning Of short- term cor..suicants by c..IJe Consortiuni to undertake 
focused studies and, if necessary, to help E RAC in 'drawing up aod 
implementing a long-term plan for impact assessment'. In add ition, rhe 
project document specifies that a M1d·l'erm Evaluatioo (MTE) should be 
carried out during the first quarter -of 1~~2. 
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iv) Donor Lia ison Office !DLO) - The two main purposes of the DLO are 
specified as being (al to racilitat:e the necessary communicar10ns beLween 
BRAC and the donors, aod (b) to prepare and carry out fpl!ow-up action 
as required. 1 
l.3 This Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) has therefore been cal'ried out according ro rile 
schednlp fnrP~P..I:\P ;in ..cho tl;Ql.-L .J .. HS'O.f'[Jttulust:::;tllg. OJSrt.)J)tJorl to B~AC's ongoing work, 
parricular~y because \b) the Donor Consortium had already commissioned five special 
reviews of different aspects of BRAC's work. These rev iews focused in turn on 
insdtut!on-building; expansion of the Non-Formal Primary £ ducatioa programme 
(NFPE); training capacir.y; savings and creclit activities; and lending opet·ations for deep 
tube-we1)s a11d power tillers. 
Mission Composlrioo 
1.4 itle arrangement in the project document to rely on a permanent core team to 
uneenake regular monitoring visits, ('as mentioned in par!!. l.Z(iii) above) echoes a 
~ropnsa~ put forward in. .the Apr\11989 Appraisai Repert. The rationale for t.hls idea was 
that members o f the core team woutd be {or would soon become) familiar with 8RAC 
and would therefore not reQtlire lengthy induction into BRAC's ope~tions. ln t.urn, 
reviews could tie kept quite short. 
1.5 In assembling the MTE team, the Donor Consortium took a radically different 
·appruacb. 1t decided to select consulunts who were not faruillar in deta\1 with BRAC, 
including some who had not worked before· in Bangladesh, The aim was to avoid 
evahmtive judgements which rnight have been coloured 'ely experience of BR.AC:prior to 
the significant ~xpansion represented by ROP-U/RCP and instead to permic che most 
ob}ec.tive oossible a$Sessrnent of BRAC's current eerforrnance. 
. . 
i .S The evaluation consultants began to assemble in Dhaka on January. 31, though u.e 
team wes not complete until the arrival of the financial ana lyst on 12 February. Team 
meT!'.bers <>l>d ~:heir principal fields of responsibility comprised: 
Co\in Relf 
Stanley Gajanayake 
Mario Ganuza 
Janice Jiggins 
CHftcn I<e!log 
Desingu Setty 
&!end Si.gvaldsen 
Tearfl Leader 
Non-Formal Primary Eaucation 
Management and Training 
Gender Issues 
Finaneial Analysis 
!nstitutioo-Buildiog 
Sma~1 Enterprise Development 
Su;l!mari ·sed tJ,om: BRAC -RUral Pevelooment PJ::O<]ramme ( 1990-921 ana 
BR-'C Bank Pr oject: Proj ect Document .• December 1989 . (pase$ 18- 21) 
Terms of Reference anti Aporoach Taken 
1 _7 The terms of reference for the MTE. are rept"oduced al; Annex t to this r~ort. 
Tile approach taken by the team included the following main types of work: 
i) review of information, data and analytical work from a variety of sources 
within BRAC; 
li) rev!ew of secondary sour.ces or lnfor:nacion relating both ro BR.O.C and co 
the context in which jt is operating; 
Hi) Interviews with senior BRAC managers and progr.amme specialistS in 
Dhaka co ga theF additional information and to help in interpreting and 
analysing all available information; 
iv l fie !d visits to as many different p:m:s of BRAC 1 s operating area as 
possible; 
v) the commissioning of a Special Study on Credit Pisciplioe focusing on 
nedit tej}a)11nel)~ dUTing calendar l99t <><:\d covering 1:\~n re.ta~ively new 
RD? AOs and two older-established RCP Branches. 
1.8 Field visit$ In planning its field visits, the team took note of tlle policy of the 
Donor Consortium to ensUTe objectivity in the MTE anrl accordingly employed three non-
BRAC inrerprete:rs to accomp<tny different team ~ 1-groups. The aim was not m 
exclude senior and middle-!eve1 BRAC staff from assisting in field investigations: 
indeed, DRAC sUJff worked with the MTE sub-groups throughout their field visits. 
Radler, the noo-BRAC inteJ])reters served as objective, disinterested resource persons 
to permit the MTE team t o investigate any toptc through any inte.rlo.cutor wil:h minimal 
risk of intentional or unintentional colouring of questions and answers. 
1.9 The Districts covered by field visits wet:e selected to permit investigations 
among samples of \:loth new and o\der-ee.tab!.ished RDP Area Office&. as well as RCP 
Branches, and included: 
Jamalpur 
Jessore 
~arsing<li 
Natore 
Pabna 
Rangpur 
Satkhira 
Sherour 
1.!0 In each District visited, wide-ranging interviews and investigations were 
undertaken with BRii.C S.taff at aU levels; among Village OrganisatiOP-~ (VOsl, indud:ing 
VO leaders, sub-groups and individual members/borrowe!'S; at NFPE schools with 
teachers, pupils and at -paret\t meetings; and wit]; pa.nicipants at a Workshop 1n Ranwur 
organised by tile BRAC Women's Advisory Committee (WAC). In Paboa, members of 
the MTE team met with staff of the Pahn~ Sadar Upazila local government office to 
obtain background and contextual information{)n government programmes and activities 
3 
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L 
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ill the fields of education, livescock services, and infr-astructure deve lopment and 
maintenance, At the grllSS-roots level, interviews were also held with local residents 
who were not members of 1:.\RAC, includ1ng poor people and better-off \and-owners. 
t.ll Soecial St~ldv of .Credit Discio!ine The decision to commission this st:u<iy was 
motivated by questions raised by some representatives of tht! Donor Consortium about 
the methods u,s.ed by credit agencies in B~ngladesh, including BR..'\C, for ca!culatillg 
published recovery rates and the possible e.x:ent tO which these mechods might have a 
masking effect on credi t discipline. The scudy covered two relati"ely new RDP AOs in 
Jesson! and Mymenslngh, botl\ h<~ving st?Uted o~eratious in ~989, and t:.wo older-
established RCP Branche.s in R.angpur and Manikganj, having oeen in operat.ion since 
!980 and !98·1 respectively. Tile study collected data on accual repayments of credit 
dwingcalendar 1991 in velation to e1(])ected repayme nts for a sarnpfe of 100 loans irom 
~.s.~.W.F.n9vt1r?cn9!ltuJr 0'6\<Fo{v&s<fni·~"Pec'i"or ciibi"tal loan r~pay~enrs. anc a run~er 
SO individual borrowers in respect of operating loans. 
1.12 Umi'tn.tions of the ~'>'J<t\ua'tion BRAC has now become a 1al');e institution \nits 
own right widl operational program.tnes i n range of different fields. As a result, some 
of the issues against which it sl1ould be evaluated raise particular di fficulties. Three 
examples serve to illustrate the difficulty in under taking a definitive evaluation. 
1.13 F irst, questions of the viabilij;y and sustainabiHcy of the Income-generating 
ve ntures unden:aken by BRAC members with credit support are legitimate aspects of 
- e'laluation. Yet these 'lentm·es themsel.ves cover qui:te a wide range of secmrs and 
activities. For each ~ategory of venture, considerable c:!etailed investigation would be 
required at the level of individual enterprises to determine the indicacors against whidl 
aggregate measures of viability for the population of such enterpr ises, based on saonp!e 
surveys, could be under taken. Measu.r·es of t echnical and financial viabilitY, could then 
lead to tneoretical projections ·of susuL'lability. Beyooci this, as in all enterprises, the 
prospects for theoretical sustainabili ty to be achieved in practice woUld depend on 
separate a<;.~essment'l o( chc prudence, !u<igement ~nd managerial ability of those 
involved. Again, any such BR.AC-wide asse5Sment of the prospects for actual likely 
sustainability would require a _ml!jor investigation. 
1.14 Secondly, and rela ted to questions of viability and sustainablli,y, the assessment 
of th~ 'ttuaHty' of BRAC's leMing -portfolio piesents particular difficulties, especlaUy 
if monitonng dam do not pemut detailed analyses, disaggregated by category and 
location, of credlt repayment disdpline and trends in discipline through time. 
! .15 Thirdly, BR.AC's t raining activities cove.r 8. broad range of differ.eor subject 
matters, cypes of training., sets of trainees, and training loc;IciDns. Within BRAC, the 
different operar.ional progr<"Unrnes induding RDP, RCP, NFPE and WHOP, for example, 
are effectively in<:ienendent 'eustomers' of BRAC's trainipg service. Their liemand for 
training derives partly from their expansioll· plans and partly from periodic policy 
adjustme nts and changes in targets affecting such matters as the content of training, 
and the duration and venue of specific rrainiog courses.. This inherent complexity of 
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BRAC's u-ammg actJvttJes makes it diffictJI~· eveo to draw .clear conclusions about 
achievements against targets . Indeed, it is di:ficuJt even to measure BRAC's training 
capacity when overloading of the system can be coped wi th by mesns of increasing ~:he 
workload on existing training staff aod/or changing the location of trainipg activities. 
At a still higher order of evaluation, definitive conclusions about tile quality of craining 
present both conceptual and methodological difficul ties which neitiler BRAC nor 
external consultants have yet tac kled in any detail. 
1.16 Against this background, the MTE has noc been equipped nor has ·ilttempted to 
urtde.'"take either fundamental research or a detailed financial or· technical audit oi 
BRAC. !nstead, the MTE tearn has assembled wha t data ar1d in formation i t could and 
h<lS attempted to interpret and analyse it.. In doing so, it has exercised caution, 
recognising irs limited exposur~ to BRJ'1.C, it:s activities and member'S. ln turn, while the 
:V!T£ is reasonably confident about the broad thrust of its conclusions, the team urges 
tilat these caveats should be taken into account J)orh by BRAC aod by the Donor 
Consortium. 
5 
Z. SUMMARY RECOM:vtENDATtONS 
A. RecommendatiiOns t O BRAC 
..,,.._,.,umg ~ne stsaL~gy ol aiming for brea<k.l:, ef co.,erage among an increasing 
merobership as well as the wide range of complementary programmes in inscitution-
build!ng, savings and credit, enterpdse development, education, health and legal 
awareness. 1n all Lhis work, BRAC's targeting of worneJI has been both appropriate and 
effective. BRAC itself is a. well man~ged, competent institution which places a high 
value on the professionalism of its SEaff and has few peers in Bangladesh. Its 
programmes am achieving significant results within the social, cultural :md economic 
constraints of rural l3ang\<:>desh. Donor support to BRAC for RDP-n/RCP \s fully 
justified and the MT£ recommends continuatcion of funding. 
Resource flows and Utilisation 
2.2 Though BRAC has beuefi tted from rhe deval.ua rion of the Tal,a, thP..re have been 
delays in disbursements from the Donor Co!lSQrtium by US$4.6 million by the end of 
1991. BR..>..C should negotia~e with the Donor Conson:Jum any chang-.;s it feels necessary 
in d.isbtu"'...ement timetables. (para. 4.J) 
2.3 In aggregate terms, BRAC has exceeded operarional targets in all respects 
except credit disbursements and has adhered closely to the (rev!.sed) budget. The most 
· significant area of under-expenditure iii absolute arld percentage terms has been in r.he 
development of physic~! facilities for crsining. Closer coordination is required between 
the Training and Coqstruccion Departments to enable BR.AC co adllere to tl:e 
construction timetable it has set for itself. (.paras. 4. 7 and 7. 75-76) 
Credit Management 
2.4 There is eviden<;:e of slow repayment of principal in the credit portfolio. (par<l 
4.18) But J3RAC's current system for tracking loan q_uality does not provide it wid1 
sufficient iJJformation to ide ntify a deteriorating situation sufficiently early or io 
sufficient detail to take corrective action. Tile key improvement ;equired is the 
introduction of a more accurate, more se!1Sitive Ageing by Account system . (paras. 5.21 ~ 
23) In addition, the adopti9n of a policy on loan write-offs would begln to provide 
feedback for tbe 'J,leriodic re'liew llnd possible adjustment of t:Oe Loan Loss Reserve. 
(paras. 5.24-27) An important complemenra.ry measure must be to improve field office 
accountiJl& .systems and the ramlli~lty of Area/Branch Manager$ with how to use the 
.improved financial management system. (p.a.ra:;-5.28-29) 
Operational Programmes 
2.5 lnstitution-building VOs have shown themselves to be sustainable in tenns of 
their use and repayment of credit. Because of iheir responsiveness to the work oi GSs 
and P05 - and as long as they ha·ve continued access til cr.edi.t - they are also sustainable 
as organisations of the r ur<!l poor . Bu~ they c annot ye t be seen as instiwcions !n their 
own right. fn tllis r espect , the work of RCP is regarded a.s still to the early scages of 
true institut.ion<bullding. Only as it develops, with the reduction in separately-funded 
traioing and support: services, will it be possibl_e ro test VO institudonal suscainabi!icy. 
Meanwhile. c.I-Je MTE -reco!f•mends tha~ both BR."-C and the Donor Conson\u:n should 
recognise ~he long-term nature of institution-building goals. (para . 6.23) 
2.6 Credit activiJ:ies Rapid e xpansion ha.s been accompa.nied by increasing 
concentration of credit utilisatien in a timired number. of ac t ivities, most nowbly for 
rura! trading. P ossib le over-e;{pansion in rural trading could lead to sawracion of credit 
in some parts of {;be c.ounrry, especia1!y where there is over lap bee ween BRAC and other 
rural credit ag.ellcles: BRAC should maintain a waccning br-ief to identify a pocenc:al 
risk . (para.<>. 6.29-6.30) · 
2. 7 Colle ctive loans in general and for irrig_acion in particular constitute an area of 
real concero. Based on the general concerns deriving from its own as well ~.s 
international experie nce wi th collective loan s chemes, BRAC should be cautious in 
dec :diog how far i t can go in the cradc-off between i ts sod a! empowerment aims in 
coilective Joan schemes on the one hand while also aiming for a sound, d isc iplined and 
viable credit portfolio orr the other. (paras. 6.31 and 6.31-6.38) 
2.8 Non Formal Primary Educacion 6RAC's model for NFP£ is simple and effecrive 
arui we programme ls generat ing e.xceHent ~-'>\llts. The ptanned e:qJa!:lsion o f the t-.l"PE 
progr:mune in the c ontext of 1<DP- l1 tl>.rough the projec t period is feasib le and desir able . 
In the broader c ontext of BR:AC's overall e~-.:pans·ion l,ll;ans for Nff'E the main area 
.requiring C3reful planning and t he expans ion of c apacity well in advance is training 
facilities for new t £Jacllers and for t he growi.og numbers of existing teachers who will 
require ref~esher training. (paras. 6.56- 62) 
'2.9 The Paralegal Pr ogramme The PLP nas grown very rapidly {albeit from a small 
base) .:luring 1991. It is also based on a s imple and effective model and is giving good -
thoug:, as yet sornewh<l.t im:angi.ole - results. BRAC should contii\Ue to e~aud ch.e 
operational coverage of the programme on the basis of it being!! useful comp lement w 
its other activities and services on beba!f o f its membership. (paras. 6.63- 69) 
Suooor t Service.s 
2.10 Sector Programrpes BRAC's Sector f'rogrammes are making an important 
contribution to ensuring the viability of specific ent.erpr\ses 11r1dert ake n by BRAC 
memb~ by providing training, extension aod otiler suppor t services. Since the 
beginning of RDP- H/RCf' the p:rogrammes nav~ shown excellent a,therence to c:argec.s-
particularly in se c tors for which the BRAC model is already well developed , The main 
area of uncertainty lies in plails for the continuation oi Sector Programme services ro 
members in RCP .Branches. BRAC's policy of expecting members end VOs in RCP 
Branches to pay fees directly for Sector Prograrnn'le inputs bas no~ yet b·een fully 
developed or implemented. (p<ara. 7.8) 
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2.11 The "Rural Ent erpr ise Project REP, representing BRAG's own 'tnink-tank anti 
laboratory' is making an important contribution to diversifying the range of activities 
and enterprises tha t its membership can undertal;:e with credit. But REP must a!so 
tighten its performanct~ in res!)CCt of dte determination of its priorities and rasks by 
lncroducing annual platlning procedures. (para . 7.28} Notwithstapdil\g dle care and 
di1igence witl1 whkl\ REP tests the viability.oi new ideilS and activities, there is always 
t.'le possibility chat some ide as - or some borrowers trying co fo llow new ideas - will fail 
against: the real t-es t of local economies. REP needs co develop a policy for responding 
to w'1e failure of enterprises which it bas recommended to RDP/RCP f:or wider 
promotion amongst the membersh i9. (paras. 7.21-24} 
2.12 The Managemerit Devclooment ProEramme .'0DP h<ts a vital role ro play -
especially in dle context of continued expilnsiun - in etlSl,lring the highest standards of 
professionalism among !3RAC~ managers. But as yer it is far from being fully geared 
up. I.s first pr iority should b.e to build up a team of full- time 'faculty members'. (paras. 
7 .33-34) There is also more work to oe done in curriculum de velopment, induCing 
training m<!terial in support of che introduction of an improved credit portfolio 
managa-nent system. (par<Js . 7.35-36) N.eanwhile, MOP should not be axpecred ro 
provide a significant amount of tr<liniog for external agencies. The imvJic,ation {s that 
it wiU require separate funding for some time to come. (paras. 7.38- 39) 
2.13 Research atld Evalua tion RED has esrabtishP..d an international reputation for the 
quality of l.s wor!t. ft must CDntinue, however, to guard against 'the risk of its work 
programme being driven by an ageoea motivated by pure researc~ inte.r.ests. As a 
support service: to BRAG as a whole, RED should continue to strengthen its relationship 
· with operational programmes; ensure the re1evaoce of its research suhject matter co 
operational issues; ond improve t41e accessibility and usability of research results. 
(paras. 7.4tl-49) It would be advisable now co review an.d clarify the role and mandate 
of RED; to modify the procedures by which itS work programme is drawn up, in the 
interests of ensuring t.he relevance of subject matter and methodology; w circu!ate 
abstraCts of research StUdies, focusing Oil policy and operational implications, and 
including translations into Bangia; and experfmem witlabe development of a 'cuscomer-
concractor' relatioo,~nip with operadonal.programmes. (para. 7.50) 
2. 14 The Monitoring Department TJle .-.m is doing an excellent job wi:th limited staff 
in developing BRAC's m(lnagement information system. In tll is process, however, it 
must gUard against the introduction of changes in data collection formats and schedules 
at too freqUP..nt interval$. (para. 7 .65} The Department will have to cal<ce a lead in the 
introduction of the more sophis-ticated creclit portfolio managemenJ: system 
recommended by the MTE. This will involve not only r.'le data collection and analysis 
syscem but also working closely wlcb R.D?, R.CP, RED and the Training Department in 
ensuring th2t the syscern iS understood and used by HO and field managers . (para. 7 .66} 
The Depa..rtme.'l.t.shou!d ~\so wor~ dose1y w\ti\ RED to develoj) methodologies fo; ~doing 
to t.fJe qualitative dimensions of monitOring progress in institution-building among VOs. 
(paras. 7 .67- SB} 
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2.15 The Coosrruction Deoartmenr Having developed a r ange of standard designs for 
di.fferenc .BR.I\.C buildings> and baving bui!t up an ex.tensive team of engtneering 
suj')ervlscrs, t.he CD can nt)W handle the majority Qf I!.Rr\C's building prcgramme ;n-
house in what appears co be a cost-ef:ective manner. It faces two main problems, 
however, bat.'ll of which reflect on i.s working relationship with c\i.ent deparunents. 
First, there ar.e freQUently delays in acquiring sites for planned new buildings and this 
prevents cbe CD from oeing able to complete new work on schedule. Secondly, because 
lt is t.he client departments. which are responsible for land ·acquisitio!l, sites are 
sometimes irregular, low- lying or otherwise unsuitable and remedial work cao lead to 
cost iocre>.1Ses. Tbe MT£ recommeods closer collaboration, communication and 
coordioation between the· CD and its client departments and the co!T'.mencemeot of land 
acquisition procedures f\1rttw.r in »dvai\ce. (paras. ? .75-?6) 
Efiecrs. Impact and Sustainabi\ity 
2.16 There is ample evidence of pOSltJVe beneficial effects of BRAC's credit., 
education, llealth and o~er prograaune services. It is still too so.on, however, to assess 
~"le wider, deeper impac t of these benefi.s. The MTE endorses Il:RAC's policy that RCP 
should be fully self- financing but notes t.hat plans for achieving this have not yet been 
fully developed. A number oJ issues aod prob1em areas need to be addressed and the 
most important of tlies(>., togethec- with prapo~ed acuon ~e lb>ted in dte tex~. (Table 
8.3) While tackling these issues, BRAC should also move as expeditiously 2S the 
political environment J>ennits to sEOek a banlt charter for RCP. 
Management and Organisational Ctloacltv for Funhe1· Growth 
2.17 The <.:Out:lusiun uf tllt: MTE t:; char BR.AC !.las sufficient experience, m~mentunl 
and flex ibility to give i t a positive capadty for further growth. The yery rapid 
expansion that has <Jlready taken place since the. beginning of RDP-II/RCP has, 
nevertheless, produced sotne signs oJ strain. The strain manifests itself Ill BRAC's 
training services 3nd in issues of housing and other conditions of Sl:!rvice; rhe integration 
of fe.'llale St.<>ff; the criteria for promotion as between quuHficatioos and experience; 
uncenaincy about ensuring the ap!>Ucation of initiative and personal discretion among 
field staff; a11d different work schedules required io different programmes. 
2.18 Ore:anisational St:nlcture There are some aspects of BRAC's structure and the 
location of some departments and units l"hicb are somewhat unusual. (para. 9.5) They 
do not, however, prevent effec tive and efficient working re lat ionships. Of more 
concern iS mac. BR.A..C nas now outgrown its main HO building a nd has had to :;pi\! o'ler 
into a nell!'by rented annex·. Given t.lle impon:ance of proximity and interaction among 
tlli'ff;,-ent pans D'f the organisation, the MTE e!lcorses BRAC's p lans to build a new HO 
building which sho.uld be large enough ro accommodate all operational and support 
service units. (para. 9.7) 
2.19 Gender issues~ Recent e fforrs to increase the p roportion of fem:ale staff are 
wholly appropriate to BRAC's mission and to ct1e structure oC its membersl1ip, Through 
its 'high flier' promoci,on policy, BRAC is on track to promote more~ women to middle 
and senior le•,els cf management . A.r. junior leve!s BRAC should take care nm; to place 
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too much emphasis on che. academlc qualifications o( recent recruits but should also 
take account of exper ience and track record among wom~n who joined earlier with 
!ower qualifications. BRAC shoulc! <J!so begin LO develop policie.> with respect to the 
terms and conditions of service of femal~ sta.ff - particularly in respect of married 
women and macernity leav e arrangements. (para. 9 .11} 
2.20 Management issues Conceros about t~ ~ossible adverse effeccs of rapid 
e.xpansion on managemeot eificiency and quality are Jarg.ety unfounded. In its 
management culture, BR.i\C has been able w retain mocll of the openness and pers()tlal 
contact with which it. began. There ls no evidence of inc ipient bureaucracy in the 
management sys tem. On the other hand, expansion is leading to a well-qualified buc 
young, relatively inexper ienced te am of field workers. BRAC must gu~d against tbe 
risk of field s taff taking a mechanistic approach to rheir work in forming VOs and in 
supplying ~rerlit., motivated by a desire to adhere to targets. \!)aras. 9.22 and 9.27-28} 
2.21 Manag:e1Jlsm.t .. i)y~~<'Kl.U'<\! ilie!'UUty }• t i'!e Q'tlly"t~e or n1eetlng w!:\ose. fre.<tuency 
may have to reduced is the current monthly meeting of Programme 
Directors/Coordinators wich Regional and Area/Branch Managers, some of whom devote 
up to three days travelling and <:~ttending t:hem. (paras. 9.23~25) 
2.22 Tnuning BRAC's Inc.ernal training service, both for member·s and staff itlducJ:ion 
training, is showing signs of strain in respect of physical facilities as well as staff 
worsloau. 1'his ::.;::rain is not, however, discernible in any immediate effectS on che 
quality or effectiveness of operational activities. Nevertheless, the strain is due to the 
failure (a) to adhere to BRAC's own timetable for the construction of aew facilities~ 
and (b) to tncr.ease t!1e number of fu!ly trained crainers in IIOticjpation ot increased 
demand for training services. In the view of the MTE:, the most prt'.ssiog issue is to do 
al1 possible to Clltch up with targets to expand the physical capacity for training, in line 
with t.l}e recomrneodagons for in1provements in the working relatfoushfp between the 
Construction Department and i ts ln- house clients. There is also a need to select and 
train new C!'aining stilff much earlier - in anticfpation of need - to e nsure that the 
workload imposed op tnem dcres not ru.n the risk of fatigue and loss of quality. {Jlara. 
9.35) 
B. Recom.cnendatwos to the Donor CoDS(Ittium 
2.23 For furure evaluations, r;he Donor Consortium should ensure a balance in the 
composition of missions between consultants familiar wi.tb ·BRAC and those able to bring 
fresh perspectives to bear, based on international experience. SmaHer review teams 
incorporating specialisms in areas of acknowledged concern would be more e ffective . 
ln addition, the Coosort\um should !>\an w nold some future meetings at BRAC 
Area/ Branch Offices, with time devoted co visiting BRAC operations jn the field. 
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C. ISsues for the l 994 Evaluation of RDP-UIRCP 
2.24 Issues likely to be of importance for consideration by t he fin<~! evaluation of 
RDP- 11/RCP are: 
i) the evolution of RCP, Including the access of women to credit and Ehe 
internal f ioand a l suscainability of the programm(t - wich or withou' 
having obtained a bank charter; 
ii) the evolution of VOs as well-rooted rur'al institutions, including BR..>.C's 
ability to monitor institutional marurity and manifestations of 
empowe,·ment; 
iii) RED's prO&'T"ess in providing re!evanr and accessible resear.ch results on 
socio-economic effects, in particular the comparat ive experiences among 
sectoral pro!lrammes; 
iv) BRAC's progress toward incorporating women into middle and senior 
management positions, ana the development of organisational capacity for 
ongoing gender adjustments in programmes and $taff rela t ions; 
v} prQgre.!',s tQwards establishing serkulture and poultry as venica!\y-
integrated industries owoed and managed by wow en; 
vi) progress in p urs uing the techni~al, financial, managerial and $0Cial 
viability of collective lo;uJS, -parc.lcularly for deep t ubewel!s . 
1! 
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3. BR.AC lt\' CONTEXT 
3.1 BR.'\C h~s defined its role in terms of its composite objective of poverty 
ill leviation and emPQwe.rment. This Section of the repor.t provides a brief contextual 
analysis of the issues of poveny, alfena<ion and lack of power among BRAC's cart:t>r 
Poverrv in Bangladesh 
3.2 Poverty in Bangladesh is endemi<; - ?nd has been so s ince long before 
illdepettdence. As such it presems cwo fundameotal development challenges. First:, it 
presen!S the scruccural challenge of devising a comprehensive national development 
strategy cap<lble of holdJng out SOFl\e pra&pect fqr overcoming t he inter woven factors 
which have not only beer1 the causes of poverty but which still perpetuate it . Such a 
stra<egy woultl need w· inclutle dimensions m agricultural a nd inunstriat deve!opmeoL; 
social policy including population planning; institutional development; education and 
human resnurce development; and many other fields, e ven including an equitable, 
rational sysrem of local government. SCC<:~ndly, even s.hort of cackling the causes, the 
endemic, pervasive and chronic nature of poven:y presents the sin1u!taneous need for 
an inunedi..Jte and continuing response in an attempt co mitlgate the wors£ of irs 
effects. 
Economic and Social lndiclltors of PovertY 
3.3 Economic indicators The first, most crude, yet widely used indicator of poverty 
in Bangladesh is chat GDP per capita in 1989 was as low as US$180 the same as in 
Nepal, ~tour half the level in India and only about 4{)% of the level in Sri Lanka, as 
shovm io Table 3.1 be!o.w. Population densicy is extre.rne ly high, at alrnosc 800 persons 
per s~uare kilome.tre. - nearly 3.5 times the population density of i~:.S. neighbour, India. 
Tn terms of cultivable land, the population density is about 1,100 per sq.km.- 11 people 
~Dr every hectare. Meanwhile, t:he population continues to grow un;:~cceptably rapidly, 
with esrlmates as high as 2.4% per annum demonstrating the rn:.'lgnitude of the challenge 
in economic growth and dev·elopment even to begin to make progress in lifting per 
ca~ita GDP. 
3.4 An obvious corollary of population de!lsity is low average land-bo!ding$. f.leyom! 
this, the inequitable distribution of land ml'..ans that functionally landless households 
(defined as owning less th?tn 0.5 acres) accoli!lt for up to 65% of the rural population. 
Given the dominant role of agricultural production in the rural economy and the paucity 
of non-agricultural employme nt opportunities, this h~s knock .:on implicatioJlS for 
nutrition, 1n terms of income, the Bangladesh lnstiture for Development Studies {BIDS} 
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TABLi:. 3.1: Com9arat.ive Soclo--Economic [ndicato(S - Souch Asia 
JND!CATOR 
Income per person (US$ I 990) 
Population ! 990 (millions) 
Share of Governme nt Expenditure (%) 
Health 
Eliucation 
Defence 
V5MR1 
AJ!uh;. Li>:eracy Ma!e (%) 
Female(%) 
Primary School Enrolrrient2 Male(%) 
Female (%) 
f Life E;q;ectancy 1990 (ye<!rs} 
ODA inflow US$ mi!Hcns 19€.9 
(disbw-semen~ basis)3 
ODA per pe rson US$ 
Debt Service Ratio (% of Exports in 
1989) 
SOURCES: UNICEF 1992 
World Bank !990a 
NOTE: I Under five moraHty rate. 
BANGLADESH 
180 
115.6 
10 
ll 
10 
!80 
47 
Z2 
76 
64 
. 
52 
1,191 
. 15.50 
14 
2 By age cohor t , rates can exceed 1 00% 
3 Official Development Assistance. 
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NEPAL 
180 
19.1 
6 
9 
7 
189 
38 
13 
112 
57 
52 
4SB 
25.50 
1:3 
NOlA SRI 
L".NKA 
340 430 
85:l.l 17.2 
2 6 
3 l1 
19 7 
142 35 l 
62 93 
34 84 
114 1{)8 
83 105 
59 71 
1,B74 5SB 
2.20 33.00 
19 13 
• 
-- --- ~ 
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has esri.mated that in 1989 some 55% of the popul~tion were living in absoJure poverty-
wit:h !ncomes below the leve l needed to be shle to consume 2,122 calories per day, tlle 
widely recognise(\ cruce minimum le-se\ ior subsi$tence} 
3.5 Labour force growth, at about; one mi!Uon persons per annum, is probably an 
um!er-esrimate, ma~king rbe real demand for employment and income among women and 
adolescentS .. 'iever theless, i t overwhelms annuaJ growth in employment opporrur!iries, 
estimated at be·tweetl 600,000 and 750,000 new jobs per ~mnum . l n practical terrr.s even 
the concepr of an equivalent full- time job hardly applies in rura! Bangladesh where for 
~~e rura! poor it ls a matter e ither or putt:ing r.oge~her a ):D.osaic or ~asonal, shore- term. 
part-time jobs oo a cont inuing basis or, probably increas ingly, of s eek:ing income through 
self-employment in trading and services. The corollary of th is is r.hat real wages in che 
rural areas - as indic a ted by the agricultural wage rate - have stagnated over the past 
decade, as shown in Table 3.2. 
3.6 Social indicators Inevitably, the economk indicacors of poverty oriefly oudined 
above are reflecte d in a range of humru1 and sociaJ indicatOrs. 1'he infant mortality rare 
in Bangl~desh, for example, is 110 per 1,000 - the second highest rare in Sour;h Asia, 
after Nepal. Severe malnourisl>.ment is estimated to affect f O% of children under 5 
years old, while a f u.rt her >10% are mildly or mode.-ately malnourished. Moreover, che 
incidence of msJnouris hment, stunting :md infant mortalitY is signific;:~ntly higher among 
gir\s - an lmtirec~ but ne'ilerthe1e.ss clear ref\ect,10t\ of tbe\r percei-,ed \ad"' of -v~lue 11\ 
the cultural and economic framework of ruraJ Bangladesh. 
3. 7 Other social indicators, interwoven with those of population growtl'!, economic 
· hardsllip, malnourishment. and infant mortality, show bow broacliy, bow c omprehensively 
auu bow intrk<ll .. ly p overty is perpetuated. Adult liter<"-"Y is very low, at aboul 43% 
among men and only ·22% ·amo ng women. .Here again, tbe low female literac)" rare 
reflecrs r.be low status of women. Yet. inr.eroatlonal experience sl1ows that as long as 
cbe literacy rate remains so low ~he prospects either for lifting lhring standards or for 
reducing population growth are ble ak. One of the starting points is obviously education, 
where enrolment rates in public sector schools are only 71% for boys and again 
significantly lower for girls, at 50%. Not only this, but drop-out rates are extremely 
hlgb. More encauragiilgly, however, as this evaluation will show, low enrolment and high 
drop-out rates do not reflect a fundamental lack of interest in education among the 
poor nor even a lack of willingness to make sacrifices in hou>e bold survival strategies 
to perntit children t o attend school. Racber, they appear to refle>c t the ineffect.iveness 
of most public sector s chools and the p.erceived poor value for money and time t!ley 
represent. 
H.Z . Rahman and M. Hossain ($&;) : Re-Tr.:inki ng Rural Poven:y - A 
Case f or Bangladesh . B:!DS, Dhaka. Jan uary 1992. 
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TABLE 3.2: Rea l Agricultural Wage Rates in ·Bangladesh 1980-1987 
{T~/day, without food, !973/74 prices) 
1 1980/Bl J 1984/85 !985/86 1 
"iationa! Average 
I Districcs 
Rajshabi 
Khulna 
~ Dhaka 
11 Cb!ttagong 
SOL"RCE: World Bank 1990 
6.53 ! 
5.83 
6.65 
6.46 
7.44 
I 
15 
6.93 
6.25 
7.02 
6. 12 
8 .70 
9.00 
7.1! 
7.60 
7.44 
9.87 
1987/ 88 l 
7.06 
5.67 
6.33 
6.71 
8.88 
L 
Qua~ita.rive Characr.eristics of Poverty 
~.8 1'he combin?..tion of a!rei>dy. p~rvasive ~o•1etty <1\\d hign l}opulat\on growtti on the 
one band, with the severe paucity of new QPporwnicjes, even new ideas <>nd visions for 
economic development on the ocher, constitutes a o:ap from which the existing and 
iurure popula tion wi ll find it dif ficult co break free. Even in the best of circumstances, 
the poor and near-poor are highly vulnerable to successive ra~chets of impove rishment. 
ln additiOn, bo th they and rhe counrry as a wh(lle ace highly vulnerable to ex{emal 
shocks beyond their control. These range from floods, cyclones and other natural 
dlsas;::ers to the volatiHty and inherent insecurity of export mark:e r..s for agricultural 
commotlities, exemplified bes t, perha.ps, by jure. 
l 3.9 Pover cy also. leads to al ienadon. Social, political and even government scn.rccw-es 
are perc-eived by the poor to work agail'.sr their interests. Alieriat ion is clearly revealed 
by the conclusions of one fi.ehl-basen study: 
'They {the rural poor) seem to take it for granted ... that it would be the rich 
who were the first tO re~n ;mv h"o"rd·F r.-<>~ ~~--,_~--0- - "- -' ·• ~ _ __ ._,0 . .... . ... ~ ,...... .... l' u .... :l'.t-"lO'WX't:Cgt::: u.!JU UU< erst..-anOlO_g WU!Ctl t e poor :rave u-! w}e 
nature of the government is bssed on the experience they nave from meec.ing 
government offic iaJs in the rural areas. These meetings have generally resulted 
in their being exploited aad discriminated against by tbe officials. . .. they know 
how oificia1s nave ;;ided and be.en aiigned wkh the rich il) cases of conflic.:. ln 
shon, !;hey believe that there is nothing they can gain from the government 
officials and that tl!P. best thing is to avoid them. The 1JOOr $re ... (also) •.. too 
disorganised ;>ad split through alliances with their different rich patrons to be 
able to uni te and prote.st against m isallocations in general. J3 
3.10 At tile heart of the issue, poverty means lack of access to and cono-<Jl over 
resources, which itseli has s~eral dimensions. Data on landlessru;:ss nm:ed earlier 
demonscrm:e bow tbe poor }aek access co this mosT; important economic. a nd productive 
resource. UNICEF hils a lso estimated that on!y about 13% of tbe rural population have 
effective access to goverr.ment health servjces. This Jack of acce$5 also applies to 
oche!" important services such as agricultural extension ar1d· credi t. More gene ra lly, the 
poor have lltcle direct access to or influence on tlle s ocial and ooHtical srruccwes oi 
rural sociecy. They are instead highly dependent on those who ~r~ better off, including 
hoch l andowneYs and trailers, g.iv\ng ri5e to me well-known networK M client-pat.ron 
relationships. 
3.1 1 Charact~rlstics of ROveny among women Against this background of what 
poverty mear>.s and how it affects the poor in general , women are particularly 
dlsadvancsged. As already noted, the national fem<:~le literacy ra:te, at about half t..l!at. 
of me.'l, is one yardstick. In teFIIls of employment, however difficult it may be for men 
3 3irik G. Jansen: Rural Bangladesh - Competition for Scarce 
Resources. Vnivaosity Press, Dhaka . 1987. (pp 264 ,255) 
16 
to find job opportunities and to complete what has been d·escribed as the mosaic ;>actem 
of employment., it L~ certainly far more difficult for women. Even when women can find 
ecr>.l)toymem:, t.he wtt~es_ they t"ece\ve are generaUy lower t han those of men. Nor is ic 
just. me cbar(lcteriSEics of the ru~a! economy in general that jJUt: women at such a 
disadvantage. Within their own households, women face a second- often more poweriu! 
- disadvantage bec aase they generally lac!< access to and control over family resources. 
They also have at best on1y a m inor role in household decision-making, i{l(;ludiog such 
bas1c decisions as tne number of children they have and whet\lt~r or not they ::~re sen~ 
to school. 
3. !2 A disproportionate number of poor women are divorce d or abandoned without 
access 'o land or any other means or opportunity to earn an adequate i!lcome. 
Inheritance Jaws discr iminate against t.'lem when their husbands di(>,or leave them. And 
wich cu!civable land unser so much pressure of population it is difficulc to see how this 
might cbange. Approximately 23% of aU nouseno\ds are headed by women <inc~uding 
widowed, divorced, separated and never-married). These, then, are among: the poorest' 
of the poor andsbould rank high in the target groups of many governn1ent services. Yer. 
ag!lin, while the poor in general are alienated and poqr!y served, poor rural women are 
even worse dff. 
Recent Trends and Windows of Success 
3.! 3 Detecting and interpreting trends - let alone projecting them - requires extreme 
caution. At one level, Bangladesh has maintained balance and equilibrium, albeit at a 
vert low !eve!, ilespite r.apid population growth, .a weak institutional structure to 
. respond til poverty a.TJd a series of natural disasters over the past few years. Indeed, the 
resiUenco of the rural poor b remarkable. During 1:he mili- l'.)SOs there Wa5 ~.;ven some 
evidence of rises aot only in foodgraLro production per person but also in real agricultural 
wage rates. Since then, however, both have either staguated or fallen. But it is be yond 
the scope of tbis eva!uatfon to enter the difficult and conrentious deb01te about detailed 
trends in the incidence or depth of poverty. lt is instead sufficient to r ecognise tllat 
in absolute rerms the problem of poverty is enonnous, affecting not less than 45 million 
people. 
3.14 There have, nevertheless, been some notab!e:>uccesses. Ia the roid-l970s, before 
the introduc tion of directly-targeced food aid programmes, wheat was hardly grown at 
aU in Bangladesll. Now it has grown to be an important winter crop, particularly in che 
north-west of the country, having reached an apparent plateau of annual production of 
about one Tnilllon tonoes. 
3.15 In tbe heal th fie ld, oral r€.hydration t.her-a\}y (ORT) whic u was flrst developed in 
Bangladesh has been ~hown to be an effective and inexpensive method of cresting 
diarrhoe al diseases and has sprea d throughout the councry in as little as cen years. 
Child immunisation is a.Jso now better LJnderscood and reaching a significantly higher 
proportion of the rural popufat.ion than it. was a decade ago. 
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3.!6 One of me fastest-growing services for che rural poor over c:he past fifte.en years 
has been credit, providing new income and employment opportunities, much of it 
targ~ed on poor rural women.. The main innovacor in th.is field and now the largest, 
b~-known agency is the Grameen Bank. Today, however, there many agencies 
inc!uding both government and nofr'ogaverr>.ment pTognunmes providing rural creC.it 
services reaching in the order of 2.5 million households - equival~nt to about 1•1 miHion 
pet)J>\e. 
The BRAC Aporoach 
3.17 Fvolution of the BRAC aoproach The most significant deve lopment. of BRAC 
since ir.s incepr.ion has been not. so much its growth in geographical coverage, 
membership, Scaff s trength and the like, rapid chough this has been in recent year.; . 
Radler, it is impor tant to note how BRAC's strategy has evolved through time. lc 
began, with its post- war relie f work In !972, by responding to the most immediate 
effects of poverty, deprivation and destruction. Tbis developed into? more sa:uctured, 
programmed approach, though still focusing on the e ffects of pover.cy through such 
initiathres as the s;:>read of O£a1 re~ydrat\on ther-apy and child im m m\iSati<>n. 'this wol':' 
a !so brought BRA.C into the field of functional education b ecause the success of these 
programmes depended closely. on the way in which rreaanents were discussed with and 
understood by the targe t group. Thereafter, with the introduction of the Outreac'n 
Programme, BRAC begnn ro work even more closely with g:roups of tbe rur?l poor, 
helping them to develop $Orne institutional cohesion and to overcorne Lhe alienation Lhat 
deep and chronic poverty brings with it. 
3.18 ~fore l"ecently, rbrough its work in credit services, NFPE, family plannitlg and 
health education, BRi\C has clearly moved even further· towurds t :lclding' the = of 
poverty. J3R..A.C 's access to resources from the RDP- II/RCP consortium and other 
donors has enabled it to ~;~ass on that access to its memter.s. In this jlrocess it na:; 9y 
no means abandoned its e arlier, smaller scale and more narrowly-defined work. Rather, 
it b~ attempted to p reserve and build on its own e.:~tperience as well as that of orher 
agencies and pmgram.LleS. An example of tills is the way ln which. the devetopmenr o! 
understanding of women 's particularly disadvantaged position, both in society as" whole 
and within be house bold, has le d BRAC to give the.rn pr iority within i ts overall target 
group. 
3.19 Currem: strategy BRAC's current strategy, already revealed by Jts composite 
objective of poverty alleviation and empowermenr, recognises that economic benefits 
accruing from the use of credit are not alone sufficient to overcome poverty. Credit 
servic.es do make a contiihuti<>!:l to em~wennen~ a.nd to reducing alienation becaus.e 
they provide access to resourc es and opportunities whic h otherwise would have been 
denied to the rural poor. But io BRAC's. perspective and strategy cr edit services must 
be complemented by addi~lonal specific measures for empowerment . This is why BRAC 
retains institution-building as an explicit field of work in combinat ion with l','FPE and 
its ot..<Jer operaciooal programmes and why it also stresses social c hange as one of dle 
downstream effects of itS work. A key part of ai! this work is to provide mechanisms 
through which BRAC members themselves cao enhance their awareness (a) about the 
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causes of their poverty and of tbe inequity ij) economic and social rel'<ltionsili~, and \b} 
about how to overcome th_em. BRAC recognises that social change can be ach ieved only 
by those within a society, noc prescribed or imposed from outside. 
3.20 Povertv aHevia~ion and e moowerment in I'IR:\C's s trate'gy For BRA.C, then, 
poverty alleviation and e.mpowennenc are inseparable, mutually ceinforcing aspects of 
its srn•tegy. One canno·t be achieved wit:hout the OL~er and each objective has equal 
value ?:'ld imponaoce. 1'his much is clear among most BRAC staff. Unfortunately, 
however, we concept of empowermeru is n01: e~pHcidy defined tw BR.AC and itS 
meaning can otily be discerned through discussions with senior managers. These show 
r.il:'tuu€$"ilil:feasea· <Jcc~s to ana corio-o! over economic resources; increased influence 
in che political process; re -negotia tion of production relations; reduced dependence aod 
e.ntra!lmem. imposed by itwidlous patron-die..'\~ .-elat:iot:~ships; and, for women, tile 
effec;:ive re- Ilcgoci<ltion of cheir staws within we household. The second element of 
e.'l1powcrment: - derived from tlle combination of re-negotiated stucus and access to 
credit - is the ability of the poor to generate addit ional income through the productive 
use of new resources. 
3.21 The intertwining of poverty alleviation and ernpowe n nent CM be illusr:rated 
dlr:ough the key steps in the application of BRAC's basic model which can be 
characterised as: 
il Mobilisaticm: This invotves identifying and selecting new members and 
jlrQmoting and facilitating group formation. 
ii) Organisation: Organising the new members into small, -self-contained 
strUctw es of sub-groups iorming VOs is intended to promote solidarity 
an<! cooperation. BRAC's orgmlisa~iona\ modet, involving su\>...g>OUj)S of 
typically 5 members amalgamated into VOs with an average of abouc 50 
member.s is rather diffe.rent from the models used by many other 
agencies, whose village- level groups commonly range from about 12 to 25 
members. The BRAC model is interesting because (a) ft r ecognises the 
i.mport'o\nce of cohes\veness"?>nd;;hared interests ami res:pt~nsibihdes in the 
very small sub-groups, while (b) it· makes it easier and ch~aper for 8RAC 
staff to reach and provide assist:ance to the second tier of the 
organisational structw-e, tbe larger Village Organisations. The model a lso 
provides for separate organisations of male and female ruembers. 
iii) Awareness- raising: This fs where BRAC works with new members, to 
encow-age and help t hem w uadecscand and articulate the I:eJlsons for 
their poverty and to begin co rh:ink about their potential for growth and 
development as individuals and -as groups. Functional education and 
uaining are panicularty imJ>Ortan& in thls early patt of the process, the 
a im being to progress seamlessly from awareness-raising co the 
development of leadership, planning, managernenc and practical skills 
among the VO members. 
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iv) 
v) 
Credit and Technical Training: Access co credit as a rea!, tangible 
resource is not provided ill11IlC(!iately but only when new groups are judged 
to be sulficient\y wet\- faO!'.e-d and sufflciencly pre{)ured to use it 
effecc.ive!y and re.liably. 
Tbe RDP-RCP Transition: The last step in c:he current model is (he 
rransition of an Area Office \lOder RDP, with all ius members and VOs, to 
become a ~tancb Offi~ under ~he self-sustaining rural banlt\ng c~erat:\on 
of RCP. Even more than rbe original delay between VO formation and 
t.l-te provision of access co credft, each RDP AO !las to meet clear criter ia 
to qualify for the t:rl!nsit:ion, including a minimum of four years in 
operation, a minimum membership of about 6,000, <1nd a threshold of 
sav\ngs and ct-emt actiyk\es. 
3.22 The sequence of steps in the model surnmadsed above incorporates whac BRAC 
expects to be different levels of empowerme~ The second and third steps of 
organisation and awareoess-raising, even without credit, are expecred to promote 
empowe...'"!llen~: rh:rougl:i the process of gel:ting new members to think about ilieir 
pocem;ia!, rbeir rights and their reasonable e.oqJectations. This is consistent with rbe 
first element of empowerment discussed above. Access to credit - more specifically, 
the successful utUisation of credit - then becomes a confJnnation of the second element 
of empowerment. The provision of technical ~:raining, endowing members with new 
ski\ls, is an equally 1m'\)Ortant. pr.act.ical ferro of empDwennent. 'These aspects of 
empowenneol: are e xpec.r.ed to be felt first by individual members and sub, groups and 
~o be appreciated particularly keenly among women. Thereafter, as VOs become more 
secw:ely established, BRAC hopes ~:hat t_hey wi!! feel empowered to take wider 
initiatives on behalf of their members, uicl..uding negotiating imp~:oved production 
relations in the loci\\ economy and imp'!'Oved access to resources beyond th~e suppiied 
b! BRO. C. In the transition from RDP to RCP, t.I-Je focus of empowern')ent js even more 
clearly on t:he higher level of the VOs, for t:he success and sustainabilicy of each RCP 
!3ranc~ depends ve.:y closely on che cootinuee successful use of credit, and the exerCise 
of empowerment that goes with it, by all the YOs within rbe B.ranch . 
Ooerational Po!ic_y 
3.23 Where overall st rategy _spil:ls inro operational policy is on questions of che scope, 
duration and intensity of direct work with the membership. Here, BRAC has an explicit 
poHcy of expanding its activitles ro new areas rather than intensifying l ts work and/or 
irlcenslf}ing tl1e benefits that can be derived from it$ assi,stance among a limited nUJ;flber 
of members. The r~tionale for this seems co have three main dimensions. First, and 
most importantly, BRAC simply sees the need to reach as many of t,he Illl'a! poor as 
possible even if this means that most wi!! only be able to raise their level and security 
of livtng quite modestly. Secoodly, BRAC is still learning about how rapidly their 
members can expand their horizons of choice and scale in setting up more ambidous 
ventures using higher levels of credit and involving more complex management 
decisio!l.S. k ~ also learning how to discern differences in entrepreneurial potential 
among different individual members, sub-groups and VOs.. Thirdly, senior BRAC 
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managet'1> are also aware of t l:te risks of distOrLion and M tab much. dependence if ic 
inrei'Vened roo deeply in the rural economy or if it were to intens ify itS work co s.uch 
an e;(tenr almost to create a separare 'BRAC' component of the rural economy. 
lmoH.cations for Evaluation 
3.24 The evaluation endorses BRAC's strategy and poli'cy in aiming for breadth rather 
than depth of assistance and benefits. The implication, howev.er, is tha~: it would be 
uru-eaHstic to )udze the ef fectiveness of BAAC's work in terms of the elimination oi 
poverty among its members. Moreover, as yet it would be unrealistic even to assess 
BRAC in terms of its contribution to the alleviation of poverty ~Jnd inequity nationwide. 
BR.AC ls al!"eady ·a very lar.ge NGO. But against the magnitude of the rural poverty 
problem in Bangladesh its capacity is stlll limited. Even at a st e ady compound rar:e of 
growc!l in membership as high as 15% per annum from its CWTent base it would c~ke 
BRACsome 25 y ears to extend its coverage to 22 million people. This is why BR.A.C 
wants its operati0!1al work not just m besuccessful at the int erface with itS members -
on whatever scale its resources prumit . lt also wants to provide models rhat can be 
used oy omers, influencing the sy.stem as a whole, including other NGOs and government 
programmes and services. 
3.25 1n sum, BRAC is ~t!ready showing that a comprebensi'Ve anti-poven:y strategy for 
Bangladesh must at least c-.ombine income generation wtth tmproved wcia! servicE".s in 
the fie!ds of education, bealtb, family planning and law. And to be effective, all tbis 
must be accompanjed by social change within and beyond chc household. Buc given the 
depth and magnitude of the task, BR.'\C alone caooot be expected to make a difference 
at the macro level in the short or mediwn term, no matter how e ffectlve!y it readtes 
its cargec g>"OUp. This is why BRAG must; continue 1:0 show itself a.s a centre of 
exceHence so that Jt can exercise the moximum possible influence on the work of othP.r 
government and non-government organfsatio[IS with similar aims and objectives. 
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4. PERF ORMANCE INRESOt.!RCE UTILISATION 
Overview of Programme Costs and Rf'-'>Ourre Availalliiity 
4..1 Budge1:s At t he inception of RDP- ll/RCP, the Donor Consortium had committed 
~ roral of US$49 million. This comprised lJS$18.2 million for RDP-U and US$30.8 
million co est ablish RCP. The RDP-n bud~ec h;;s been revised twice, in May and 
December 1$91, the most r.ecent having risen to just over Tk.920 million. This 
reprP...seots almost 60% more than the original approved budget of Tk.57 7 .7 mil!ion. In 
dollar cenns, devaluations of the Taka have reduced the effect of these upward 
revisions. The or iginal budge c was based on a Taka/US$-excbange rate of 31.7:1. Since 
then the Taka bas lost jusr. ove r 20% of it.~ value against the US$, the rate now used 
being 40:1. Hence, the budget inc rease calls for a total donor allocation equivalem; ro 
US$23 million, some 26% higher than t.!Je original budget. The RCP budget has been 
revised once, in De <:embet: l S9 l. 
4.2 There have been several reasoos for we upward revisions in budgets. These have 
included plans to op en \\ll arlditicnal \0 new RD? 1\0:> during lS9l/92; incrl?.~&. \n scope 
of work in the fisherle-~, irr igation, sericulture and other sec~oral programriuis; increases 
irl capital 8-'<pendit ure owing partly to higher chan expected unit.costs in opening new 
A.Os ana partly t.o the opening of an additional Regional Off1ce; higher than expect.oo 
cDSLS associated wicb the MDP centre at Rajendrapur; and an increase in t!Je forecasred 
number of 1oaos to m embers. 
4.3 Disbursements For both RDP and RCP, disburserne!}ts have fallen behind 
schedule. For RDP-D, over t.tJe t wo full years from January 1990 to December 1991, 
disbursements were 11<.85 million (US$2.13 million) behind schedule wh ile [or RCP the 
shor tfall was Tk.99 million (US$2.47 million) . 
4.4 Cumula tive loan disbursements through ROP-II/ RCP had risen f rom Tk.4SO 
million in December 1989 t o Tk. l ,4S4 million by the end of 1991 - a.n inc rease of 218% 
in 24 monct)s, equivalent to .an annual average growth of 18.4%. Over the same period, 
gross loans outstanding rose by 229%, from Tk.l85 million to Tk.609 million. 
Oaeratio•lal Per forrnans:e and Adherence ro Budget 
4.5 Operationa l Derformance Table 4.1 below summarises BR.A.C's operational 
performance io resp:!Ct of the key indicators of n umbers of RDP AOs and RCP 
.Branches, village coverage, membership, credit disbursements, savings and gross loans 
ourstaoding. This shows that in every respect except credit disbursements, BRAC has 
exceeded forecasts. Perhaps the twQ most enCQura.gU\g in.(iicators of over-achievement 
are the !.3.3% higher than planned le vel oLtnembership by the end of 1991 and the 
27.8% higher than forec.aste_d ]e ve! of savings. Together , these seem to confirm nor 
only the scr<lng grass-roots demand to join ~RAC b"'t ~he wmingness of the rural !;lQOr 
put in wh~t they can. More encouraging still is to examine the change in average 
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'f!lflU~ If .I: l'l.DI~ II and RCP Oper·atlons, CrediL anrl Savings J?er f'orrnance J anua1·y 1, 1990 cbrough necembcr :n , 199 1 
-
RDP ll 
December 
1989 Target Actual 
Area Offices 80 80 90 
Villages 4,238 3,600 3,51•6 
V.O.'s 8,263 7,200 7,689 
. Male 40% 34% 
Pemale 60% 66% 
Member s- 41)(),'7()4 37\l! ()()() ~9'7 ,005 
Male 36% 33% 
Female 64% 67% 
Disbursements (Tk million) 460 757 672 
Gross Loans 0/S (Tk million) 185 314 321 
Savings (Tk million) 45 90 Il l 
SOURCE: RDP and RCP Statistical Report (Dec 1990) 
Monitoring Depanment Dec 1991 Preliminary Report 
Finance Departmonc Dec 1991 Qu!lrtetly finance report 
RCP 
Target A<;tual 
30 30 
1,500 1,682 
3,000 3,687 
35% 
65% 
I 50,()\)0 20 1 ,\ll~ 
31% 
69% 
431 332 
291 :288 
72 96 
RDP and RCP BudgetS Prepared Nov 1991 ; approved by Donor ConsorLiurn Dec J99J. 
TOTAL 
TargeL Acr.ua.l 
JJO 120 
5,100 5,198 
I 0,200 11 ,:376 
52~,000 o;.9S, 123 
32% 
68% 
1,1 88 1,004 
605 609 
162 207 
savings per member since Dec~mber 1989. At: rchat time , average savings were jusc 
under Tk.lOO per member while over just cwo years ;~verage savings had climbed to 
Tk.346 9er member. 
4.6 Adherence w budget. in RDP- !1 ln overall terms, RDP-!1 has adhered very dose!y 
to bueget, wit:h a level of underspending of just 1.04% by December 1991 > as shown in 
Table 4.2 below. Looking more c1ose~y aL tRe dlHerem components of expenditure, 
howe,rer. rP....liP ..... "l.l,_sllJ'),).P .D.q }tR-. ..lv.id;:o ..... ·~ ..... ;iru:;-g,t-&dctS<:''<.u--u-crm ·ulib:~r"-expen()lture, ootn 1n 
absolute and percemage terms has been in the construction of T ARCs, some Tic 17.8 
mH!!on or 45% below budget. This is accounted for principally by the. long delay in 
commencing the construction of the new TARC at Comilla, scheduled for J anuary L S9 l 
but })Ostponed for more than a year owing principally to the. need for structunll re -
design. In more detail still, although BR."'-C is keenly aware of the risk of innacion in 
prices wiHm ir. is known to be seeking !and for new premises of any kind, leading it to 
cake a caur;.ious $pproach which itself can cause delays, the land procuremem: and 
development component of the budget for new TAR.Cs was a !ready overspent by Tk.2.7 
million. 
4.8 The second most significant area of under-expenditure, again both ill absolute and 
percentage terms, is the MPP, at Tk.l1.8 million or ne<Jrly 20% below budgec. Here the 
situation is quite complicated because on the one hand the new MDP centre at 
Ra}endrapur was some ik.l::\.1 million over-budget, while on t he ot her, <.he planned 
Principal ~fanagernent Training Centre in Dh;lka was not begun owing to delays in laorl 
procurement. Not only this, but MOP is still far from being fully operacional, not 
having yet assembled its planned complement of core, full- tln1e training staff. The 
<o:;,;ult ha:; been onder -expenditure in d:!e recurring, operational budgec. ProJecting 
forward, however, if the experience with Rsjendrapur construction costs applies to 
other capitaJ items in the MOP budget and when MOP's operational capacicy becomes 
fully developed, the net uoderspeoding so far could well be reversed. This cal!s for 
close monitoring of the tqcal MOP budget. 
4 .S Areas of over-e;.coenditure Tbe main areas of over-expenditure in RDP-ll have 
indudedtnstic.ution-building, em!)!oyroent and \ncome-gene~ating activities;, {GVGD, and 
the operating costS of Area and Regional Offices, as shown in Table 4.2. The f irsc three 
of these four areas are not major budget items and their rates o f over-expenditure, 
rar~ging from 10- 12%, account for a total of Tk.I2.5 million or 1.8% of total 
expenciture. Office operating costs, on the otller hand, represent the third largest item 
in the RDP-ll budget after the revolviro.g loan fund and NFPE. The 12% over-spending 
on this item alone accounts for Tk.l4.2 million. There were two main reasons for the 
over-spe nding. First, salaries and benefits were .over budget owing· to higher than 
expected owing to start- up costs. This is something which should be taken imo account 
Jn modifying the budgets for further new field offices. The second main <trea of over-
spending was on sta tionery, largely owing to the introduction of new collecting forms 
and the associate !!. instruction manuaL 
2'1 
'I ABLE 4.2: R UI'_[JJ~Ifl!t!tC:IAI Perf01mance to Bt@.:.et: Funrlltlg S1111 Cml'nt...l anu11ry I. l Q!l_Q_tltrouj~h I),•C"t•tnlie~:_3 l , I !)!) l (Tk million} 
Dudget1 Actual Over/Under Vurloncc 
1\mOIIt\t 
A. Core Prograrn 
A. I lnsLilutlort l3ulld!Ttg 28.'2 31.2 O·H;r 3.0 II% 
A.2 Eutf!Yml & Inc . Gcnenalon 50.7 57.6 Over 6.9 14% 
A.3 Flranch, R.O. Op. l':x 114.3 128.5 Over 14.2 12% 
A.4 DrBnch, R.O. and 11.0. 
Capital Inves tme nt 56.7 56.6 Under· (0.1) 0% 
A.5 Loan Revolving F'und 177.2 169.4 1Jnder \7.8) -4~'c. 
A.6 Support Service: 
A.6.l Expansion Existing 
TARCS 9.5 9.4 Under (0.1) - I% 
.... 
A.6.2 TARCS 39.2 21.4 Under (17.8) -15% 
\ft A.6.3 REP 8.8 8.0 Under (0.8) 9% 
A.6.4 Re~;:orch & Evohtatlon 5.4 5.8 Over 0.4 7% 
a. Sectoral Pt ogr'llllHOC 
6.1 NvPE 125.5 129.5 Over 4.0 JOI '0 
13.2 MOP 59.3 47.5 Under (I I. B) 20% 
B.3 IGVGD 26.8 29.4 Over 2.6 10% 
Total F t;nds Expended 701.6 694.3 Under (7.3} - I% 
Net Interest Income (48.5) (50.2) Under (I. 7) 4% 
Funded by eRAC (3.9) (3.9) Over 0.0 0% 
Total Funding Required 653. 1 6·10.2 Unclcr ( 12.9) -2?'u 
=a 
I. This Is the D~cernhcr 199 1 budget used by 8RAC for r<..port lng purposes. It reflects the orlt.;lna l budget [llus t\\'0 r evision~ 
HJ)proved by tile donors In Mny uno Dccernbet 199 1. 
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4.!0 Adherence to b ndger. in RCP The RCP.Balance Sheet to the end of calendar 1991 
is presented in Table 4.3. The avera!! balance is I!% higher than expected and on the 
asset;; side this is alrnost wholly accounred for by the line for Curren t assets of Tk.19.6 
million which was not included in t..lle original budget. Among ocner budget lines, as 
with RDP-1!, there are wide variations, ranging from 8% ov.et budget on the liabilities 
side forth~ BRi\C loan to 52% under budget on the assets side. for cash in hand. Thes-e 
are discussed in summary terms below. 
4.l1 RCP Balance S'neet Wblle there are .several lines under budget in the Balance 
Sheet, there 1s almost an inverse correlation between their magnitudes in aP5olute and 
percentage terms. The grea test percentage variation between budget and actual, for 
exa:mple., of 52% applies to cash <~SSecs, the ~maUest of <tll line items, budgec.ed ac 
Tk.6.! million, and repres enting ooly ! % of the total expecced assets. The second 
greatest variation of 37% under budget applies to depreciation, the second smallest 
budget line at 1'k.6.7 m illion. On the ocb.cr nand, the cwo largest line rrems on the 
assets side - investments and net loans - account for 16% and 45% respectively and 
since r.l!e former was over budget modestly at abouc 3% while the latter was ~nder 
budget: by 2%, together they have little effect on che overall picture. 
4.! Z If it were not for the Tk. 79..6 million in currer1t assets shown in Table 4.3 (which, 
as noted in para. 4.9 above, hud not been included 3$ a line item in we original budged 
the variation ber.ween budgeted and acma\ amuunts would have been only- 1.1% under 
bud,get. In fact, some Tk.68. 1 mi!l ion of this current asset ;;!mount is cash in me Bank 
while the remainder comprises advances to staff for operational expenses and cash in 
traosit. This is another learning ·eXQerience, showing that BRAC should include a 
- current ass~t line itJ future budgets. 
4.13 The majority bf me Tk.69.0 million over budget amourlt shown on che ~ssets side 
of the Balance Sheet is assigned to current liabilities and to the .ElRii.C loan on rf:le 
!labilities side. 1n addition, higher than eJipected members ' savings, already noted 
above, shows in the RCP Balance Sheet as the highest over-budget amount on die 
liabilities side, at 11<.10.9 million. 
4.14 RCP Income Statement The borxom line of RCP's Income Scacement, presented 
in >able 4.4~ shows an actual net operating prof\t of !'>t.17.S n"lmion, some 12.S% higher 
than expect-ed. This was derive\! not from income, which in filet f ell s hort of budget by 
a modest 2.4%. Nor was it derived from savings in operating expenses which, as in 
RDP-II, were over budget by 5.7% for·Branch and Regional Offices combined. Rather, 
it can be traced principally to significantly lower than budgeted deprec iation allocations 
at Head, Regional and Branch Offices. There aFe two main reasons for this. First, 
lower than expected capital expenditure has obviously reduced t he value of assets to be 
depreciated. Secondly, however., BR!I.C has lengthened the time-scale for depreciating 
furniture and fixcures ftom 6.6 to 10 years. While this obviously benefits the Income 
Statement, in practical terms it may be over-optimistic. Finally, die s ignificant over-
achi~vemeot of nearly 27% in interest on deposits can again be traced back to the 
higher than expected build up of savings by .BRAC members. 
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TABLE 4.3: Il.CP Fluancial Performance co l3ndget: Balance Sheet as o r Dccembel' 31, 1991 
-
Budget.1 AcLUal Ovcr/Unde1· Variance AtnounL % 
Asset:> 
Cash 6.1 2.9 Under (3.2) -52% 
ln'-'esl!nent,s Z8 l.l 2.89.2 Over 8. l :J% 
Current Assets 0.0 79.6 Over 79.6 n~ 
Net Lo<! ns 275.0 272.4 t,JndHr (2.6) -1 o/o 
Fixed i\ssets 53.9 38.4 Under (15.5) -29% 
Ace. Depreciation 6.7 4,2 Unoer (2.$) -37% 
Net Fixed Assets 4-7 .2 34.3 Under (12.9) -27% 
Total Asse~s 609.4 878.4 Ove1· 69.0 11% 
' 
L!s\I!Ht\es 
Memhcrs Suvings 86.2 97.1 Over I 0.9 13% 
Cil:ou(> 'fax 25.4 24.7 Under (0.7) -3% 
Tote~J .Deposits 111.6 121.9 Over 10.3 9% 
Current LlabJl itles 0.0 15.3 Over 15.3 na 
BRAC Loan 487.0 5.28.3 Over 41.3 8% 
Total Liabi11tles 598.6 6G5.6 Over 67.0 11% 
Equily 
Excess for 1990 (5.1) (5.1) na 0.0 0% 
Etces$ for t99l L5.9 l7 .!1 011er 2.0 [3% 
Tota l Capit al L0.8 12.8 Ove.r 2.0 19% 
Tota l LiaiJJli ties & C!lplta l 609.4 678.4 Over G9.(l II% 
SOURCI~: RCP. 
l. This Is ~ltc December 1991 budget used by 13Ri\C ror r eporting purposes. I~ rcrlec ts the origil1al budgeL plus om! rov i ~iou 
fipproved by llu;~ donors In l)ecembc•· 1991. 
r--
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Ti\BLE ~.4: f(CP JiinanciQI Performance to Bur.l!let: fucome Sl:atement January J, 1900 rl ~tough December 31 , 1991 
Oudget1 Actuul Ovcr/Unc.lcr Variance Amount % 
lllcorne 
lnvestmer1t Income 22.8 21.3 Under (1.5) - 7% 
LQ<JI'\ lr\ter~t lllCQme 38.L 4.Q.l O'!er ~-0 5<}~ 
Total Income 60.9 61.3 Over 0.4 I o• /(} 
Interest Expense 
1 nterest on Deposlts 6.3 !3.0 Over l.? 2/ o/o 
Net Interest tnc<~me 54.6 ":>3.l Under ( t.3\ -2% 
. 
Operating Ex11enses 
Branch Operot l11g l!xpenses 22.!'! 211.2 Over 1.3 6% 
R,O. Operating Expe11SCS 1.5 1.6 Over ' 0.1 ' 7% 
11.0. Operating Expenses 2.5 2.3 Under (().2) -f.l% 
Branch Depreci~Lion Expense 3.5 LO Under (2.5) - 71 % 
[U), Depredat ion Exl}enst>, 0.6 () ,2 Un<!er ((] .4) - 67% 
I 1.0, Depreciation Expense 0.9 0.3 Under (0.6) -67% 
LoM Loss Provision 6.<1 5.0 Under (1 .4) -22% 
Staff Tra!Jling 0.4 0.7 Over 0.3 75% 
Tota l Oper·alftlg Expenses 38.7 35.4 Uncler \3.3) - 9% 
NeL 0 \)erating Profit lS.\1- !'7.9 a ver 2.0 13% 
SOURCE: RCP. 
L ' f'hls Js the December 199 1 budget used byl3RAC (or· reporting purposes. IL refleCLs Lhe origina l lmd!leL plus 011 e rGvi$ion 
approved by t.l l(l. 1.l0nors Jn Dncentber 199 !. 
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Perfnnnance 1n Loan Disbursements and Om.stamlir.gs 
4.15 For RDP-Tl and RCP combined, Table 4.1 above :>hows an aggregace shortfall of 
15.5% in disbursements ov~r the two-year pefiod co the end of calendar ! 991. For RDP-
1! alene the shortfall was l l.2o/o while againSt the smaller RCP t arge' the shortfall was 
i) in 1991 a new requirement was introduced rhac all pocenrial borrowers 
should receive functional education before qualifying for access to crediz; 
ii) the new 1991 re.gulation restricting membership of BRAC (hence credit 
entitlement) to a maximum of two members of .an immediate family; 
iii) another new rule stipulating that a J3RAC member may take out only one 
general loan at a time (e.-.-cluding housing and coUectlve Loans); 
iv) the budget assumed that aJ1 new AOs would become operational at. the 
very begirJning of each year in which they were scheduled to open whlle 
in practice, late openings have implied delays itJ the build-up of credit 
activity. 
4.16 The first and 1ast of these factors clearly affect the timirlg of new !lisbursements 
but. should qllicl<1y become \es::. influential &.rcugb time. Moreover, they har.dly apply 
to RCP Branches except in respect of the modest turnover in membership that has been 
observed in the field. 'fhe second and third factors may be more significant in affecLing 
the absorptive capacity for credit among members, But it bas not been possible to draw 
:irm conclusions because of the difficulty of identifying what proportion of pest 
disbcrsemem.> have been issued (a) to mo<e than two members of the same family O< 
household, and {b) simultaneously to members aiready having outstanding loans from 
BR.A.C. 
4.17 On t .!1e other hand, Table 4.1 also shows a higher tiJan e xpected levei of loans 
outstanding by the end of 1'991, albeit very modestly at less than 1%. The November 
1991 review of savings and credit activitY already dr.ew attention to t!Je gap in 
achievements between d'isbursements and oUtstandings, concluding that this implied a 
hlghershare ~f lon-ger- term loans andfor s\owe£ than expected repayment rates. ln fact, 
although there are. greater numbers of longer- term loans than forecas~, che volume of 
short-term loans is also higher than forecast. Meanwhile, the pic ture has become more 
polarised following the de-emphasis on medium- term loans, reducing them to less than 
5% of disb.ursements in the third quarr...er of 199!. 
4.18 The de-emphasis of medium-terti'.s loSI'.s has led to a disproportionate incre<lSe 
in short- term le.oding with only a very small incre~e in the volume of credit in lorlg-
term loans above the revised budget. This 1s reflected in the weighted aver-age loan 
duration baying fallen from 85 weeks, as foreseen both in the original and revised 
budgets, to 82 weeks for actual disbursementS over the two years to the end of 1991. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that the increase in the value of outstandings while 
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disbursementS have bee n behind schedule. is wholly due t~ slow repaymel)t of principal. 
fl.ny such trend calts for careful monlt<lring and manage.rnent for it. <:an easily b.eC<ltne 
worse. Slow repayment obviously reduces the veloci""Y vJith which exist ing funds can be 
re-drcu!at:e.d. Without fun her inject\Qns <lf new flll\ds to maintain ·1!. ghl/-ll disbursement 
schedule rhe imbalance can fuel its own growth. This r aises the question of credit 
portfolio managemen.t which is taken up in t.he fie.Xt sec~ion of· tnls report. 
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5. CREPlT \1ANACEMEN1' 
Background 
5.1 E>qJe<ience in Bangladesh over the past 10-15 years has done much w restore 
international confidence tllat rural credit programmes can be viable. More than 'his, 
it has developed a new awareness rhat even the poorest of the rural poor are 'bankable' 
in terms of their ability to use credit e ffecdvely and to repay it. Credit recovery r~res 
of 97% or 1nore, based on the published resu.lts of the Grameen Bank and BRAC - rhe 
larges~. best-known credit services in Bangladesh - have become the goal for other 
credit programmes both within aod beyond the counu-.r and the yardstick by which they 
are now judged. 
5.2 This restaFation of confidence has been the mo;e !mportilnt because i~ scands in 
ciear contrast to the- widespread disappointment and disillusion created by earlier 
experience in channelling rural credit through, for example, cooperative structures 
under government regulation. Within Bangladesh a 1989 study on goveroment-sponsoreti 
cooperatives found that the C1.!1:!llllative recovery r~te for shnrt-~er.m l&aos was 59% up 
ro M<trch 1986 while for 'term credit' {typic!lHy over three years), accoun ting to abouL 
half of total cumulative lending, the recovery rate up to March 1988 was as low as 
2~% .4 
5.3 Against this qackg:round, the international CXJmmunity, particularly the 
international dev.elopJUeot assistance agencies wllich cbannel funds to rural credit 
services in !3ang!adesh, a.re understandably eager to be reassured thaL the very high 
ilUhl.ishe.d recovery rates are (a) real, and (hl will be maintained. Concem ove:r the 
realitY of recovery rates does oot mean questioning the arithmetic of tfleir calculation. 
Instead it focuses on the methodology that is used, especially when early success on a 
small scale leads to the Injection of new funds, hence rapid expansion in the value of 
outstanding loans. For the credit services themselves there are commensurate conce!"P.s 
that any reduction in published recovery rat.es could have disproportionately damaging 
effectS on the international reputatioa and confidence they have eamed. For these 
reasons, the MTE has lo.oked as closely as possible at cre!{it management in BRAC. 
The Curren~ Credit Management Approach and Its Limitations 
SA BRAC currently tracks the quality of its loan poFtfolio by· mear!S of (a) four 
ca tegories through time, and (b) monthly cbecks on repayments received compared with 
those e.-qlected. Tne (ow categories <>t l<>an are.: 
i) C!I!Teni:: all loans are current during their original term for repayment, 
irrespective of repayment performance; 
Study on Cooperatives, Sponsored ~y GOB (Pl~;ing CommissLonl, 
CIDA, DA..'l"IDA, UNDP and the Wor ld Bank. Dhaka . March 1989. 
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ii) Late: Joans are re>-Ciassified as late when their original repayment term 
has expired Md the remaining outsLanding balance has bee re-amortised; 
iii) Ove<due: a late loan becomes overdue if the re-amortisec! amount bas nor 
been fully repaid; 
iv) Not Yet Traosfel"refi {NYT): tnis ap?lies to !oQ.ns whose borrowers ref~d 
tO re-affirm their repayment obligations when BRAG introduced more 
rigid credit volicies some years ago. 
5.5 Under this system, in theory a borrower could make no repayments ac aU bur 
while the Joan in question was succe-Ssively re-d2!>sified through the four categories it 
would nor be registered in the recovery rate calculation. In otheF words, the recovery 
rate includes an attetmation fac;tOI' for as long as it. takes finally to register defauitc. 
5.6 Credit recoverv and credit. di-s<,Joline The question of time - the att:enuation 
factor referred to above - is of critical importance in calculating recovery rates. In 
this respect it is important to distinguish betw~ credit discipline and credi t recoverY. 
Borrowers show perfect credit discipline when they adhere fully to repayment schedules 
agreed in sdvance so thl!t repayments are complete when loans reach the end of their 
respective terms. 1f credit discipline is less than perfect during the term of a lot.n 
rne-e can still be full recovery on schedule provided that lapses early in the ternl of the 
lGan ar~ mai~ Ul) by the dosing uate. If, o~ the Gther l:iand, 1acK Gf fuU di:;cil)line 
means that loau maturity is reached without full rep.ayment this may still not be 
incompatible with full recovery if there is still confidence that the outstanding amounts 
due can and Will be recovered, albeit la~e. T.hrough time, it is only when there is no 
longer any confidence that outstanding amounts can be or are likely to be repatd that 
they are written off as bad debts and ellteFed into recovery rate calculations. 1n sw:n, 
full credit discipline guarantees full recovery while lack of discipline is no t incompat:ible 
with full rewvery until the le:nding agency draws the line. This is why monitoring credit 
discipline through time is such an important aspect of credit management. 
5. 7 As noted ~bove, BRAC f ield offices prepare monthly pr<;>gress reports showing 
what has been received in credit repayments against what was expected to be received. 
This does give some indication of credit discipline. In pr03ctice, however, field studies 
during the -r.ITE have suggested that field staff do not uniformly apply the same 
definitions in determining expected receipts eac)l month. Even if they did, the 
methodology itself is not sufficiently sophisticated t:a provide an adequa r;e .indicanon of 
portfolio quality . For exarnpie, the monthly reports do not show how l~te the late 
payments are. Nor do they relate lack of credit discipline to the magniwde of 
outstanding -principal in affected loans- ~n mportant indicator o£ risk and vulnP..rabllll:y 
in the portfolio. 
SDec.ial Studv of Credit Discipline 
5.8 Limitations of the study Against the back_.!;TOund of the distinction between 
credit discipline and cre,Iit recovery outlioed above, the study commissioned by the MTE 
set out only to assemble data on d\sc1pHne. As such, no concluslons can be drawn about 
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h·ow lack of discipline· may or may not work 'its way through eventually inro failuce co 
recover the loans concerned . ln add\ticn, as also men~:\opeu in t.he terms o{ refere;\Ce 
for LIJe swdy, the aim was not to cacry out a statistically repr~emative analysis, nor 
to permit any grossing up of results to draw BRAC-wide conclus.ions. The aim instead 
Wl'..S simply to provide a ~oentative glimpse at credit discipline and in turn to assis~ the 
~!IE in framing any recorrunendattons it may feel necessary to put forward for credic 
monlcoring and management. 
5.9 Scooe of work Section l of this repon has already indicated that the study 
covered two relatively n.ew RDP· AOs and two longer-established RCP Branches. Data 
were co!lectedon a cotaf of 400 individual loans (100 from each AO and Branch); on 50 
individual components of deep tube- we11 collective capital loans (25 from esch of the 
two RCP Branches); and a further 56 individual components of DTW collective operadng 
loans {again, 25 each from the srune two Branches). 
5.! 0 1'he 400 individual loans >elected were all issued during the rnonl:h of January 
!991. The in.iormation collected was simply the repaymerlt amounts actually co!lect:ed 
each month and the amounts t hat were scheduled for collection. The same infar.nation 
was col lected separately for the DTW loans. This information permits the ca!culadon 
of credit discipline over any period ranging from one to twelve montlls as follows: 
Amount actua!!y collected bv oedod end "' 100 
Amount that shoul-d have been coUecte1i ty period end 
Results of the Study 
5.tl Summary There are 1:wo fundamental results of the study. First, there are wide 
varta.tions ln credit disci1)lLtl~. But secnnd.ty, it i~ <ilfflt:ult to discem many clear 
patterns in the varle~tions according to AO/Branch, loan category or :;;ize. These two 
results together achieve the airn of the study in demonstrating the importance of 
comprehensive and detailed monitoring of discipline as an aid to credit management. 
5.12 Credit discipline bv Office/Branch and laan size Table 5.1 shows credit discipline 
runong tbe four Offices/Branches for tha whole of 1991. For the full 400 sampled loans 
the average discipline rate was 76.75% bm: the first revelation of variation is in the 
discipline rate amon)! Brancnes/Qffices, ranging from a high of 99.73% (in Kotwall 2, 
Mymensingh) to a low of 49.81% (In Pag!apir, Rangpur). It might be supposed that there 
would be some sort of pattern in discipline rate according to loan siz.e, with smaller, 
short duration loans showing good discipline because borrowers woufd be keen w ensure 
that they would qualify for an immediate follow-up loan. Larger, longer-term loans 
might be expected to show weakel" discipline simply because maturity dates are further 
ahead in time. But. the results show no such pattern. 
5.13 Credi:t discipline· bv Offic~/Brancb and loan categorv Table 5.2 does seem to 
show a pattern. Individual and asset loans show relatively similar discipline rates while 
collective loans (fourtd only in the t.wo RCP Branches) sbow s igriifieantly .lower rates. 
This patcem is stroo~er in RCP Daragram than in RCP Faglapir which is the worse-
performing of all four Offices/Branches. ft; is likely that most, if not all, of the 95 
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TABLE S. l : Credit Discipline Rare - By Branch and Loan Size 
. 
Tk3,000 co 
r 
Branch Up to Tk1,000 to Tk5,000 
Tk999 TK2,999 Tk4,999 and above 
RCPD~g:ram 
Number of Borrowers 86 !2 2 
Amount: Due 101,212 37,265 5,841 
Amount Collec ted 60,261 23,847 5,310 
Rare% 59.54% 90.91% 
RCP P~glapir 
Nwnber of Borrowers 37 58 5 
Amount Due 12,202 86,129 15,303. 
Amount Collected 6,999 41,264 8,342 
! Rate% 57.36% 47.91% 54.5!% 
RDP Korwali-2 
Number of Borrowers 98 2 
Amount Due 185,108 6,370 
Amount Collected 184,591 6,370 
Rate% 99.:72% 100.00% 
RDP Je;;so•e Sadar 
Number of Borrowers 6 65 23' 6 
Amount Due 2,300 1 Il,778 52,816 16,298 
Amount Co!!ecred 1,320 95,026 41,646 10,560 
Rate% 57.39% 85.01% 78.85%· 64.79% 
TOTAL 
Number of Borrowers. 43 . 307 42 8 
Amount: Due 14,502 484,227 111,754 22.,139 
Amount Collected 8,319 381,142 80,205 15,870 
Rare% 57.3o% 78.71% 71.77% 71.68% 
Note: Credit Discipline Rate = Actu<i!l amount of instalments collected up ro 
December 3!st 1991 divided by the \ns<;alments due in that pe1·iod (x HlOI. 
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Total ' 
100 
144,318 
89,418 
61.96% 
100 ' 
113,6341 
56,605 
49.81% 
100 
19J ,478 
190,961 
99.73% 
100 
183,192 
148,552 
81.09% 
400 I 
632,622 
485,536 
76.75% 
TABLE 5.2: Credi1: Discipline Rate - By Branch and Loan Catego,-y 
I~ Branch 1ndividu3L Asser Collective Total 
RCP Daragr:un 
~umber of Borrowers 49 1 50 100 
A.rnount Due 101,282 2,8Sl 40,14'5 144,3-18 
I A.:mounc Collected 74,106 2,832 12,480 89,-!18 Rate-% 73.17% 97.96% 31.09% 61.96% 1 
RCP ?aglapir 
l\'urohcr of Borrowers 54 1 45 100 
Amount Due 93,481 2,303 17,850 113,634 1 
Amount: Col1ected 48,525 1,081 6,999 56,605 
Rate% 51.91% 46.94% 39.21% 49.8!% 
RDP Kotwali-2 
Number of Borrowers 100 100 
Amount Due 191 ,478 !91,478 
Amount Collected 190,981 \90,961 
Rate% 99.73')6 99.73% 
I RDP J essore Sadar 
Number of Borrowers 51 49 100 
Amount Due 86,575 96,617 !83,192 
Amount Co!Jected 70,357 78>195 148,552 
Rate% 81.27% 80.93% 8 L 09% 
TOTAL 
~umber of Bonowe-rs 254 51 95 400 
Amount Due 472,816 101,811 57,995 632,622 
fu.-nount Collected 383,949 82,108 19,479 485,536 
Rate% 8-1.2\}% 80.65% 33.~9% 76.75% 
Note: Credit D\sci_pline Ra te "' Actual amount of instalments collected up ro 
December 31st 1991 divided by the instalments due in that period (x 100). 
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collect.ive loans sam~!ed a~e for dee!> t.uher-we!!s (D1'Ws) whic\1 are <iiscussc.d in more 
derail below in the conrext o f the special sub-sample of capital and operating loans for 
these schemes. 1'he value of their inclusion in this tabte is ro show what a depressing 
effect the ir poor discipline can have on aggregate discipline rarP"'. The amount due on 
collective loans represents o·n!y 9.2% of the total due. But their low discipline rare of 
33.59% has the disproportionate effect of depressing the over a ll rate from Sl.! 1% for 
indivicual and asset loans combined ro 76.75% for the whole sample . 
5.\4 D\sr:ribut.\on of b<>nowers by credit discin\ine· ann loan size Given t'ne excellent 
overall discipline rate in RDP Kotwa!i- 2, the clustering o f all borrowers in the highest 
two columns of discipline rar.e shown in Table 5.3 is only to be expected. Among the 
ower three Offices/ Branches a loose pattern can only be discerned if the previous 
cliscinction becween co!le.ccive and other loans is taken into accounr.. Initially it: is 
surprising co observe an apparent. dear diffe~e{lce becwee\\ the broadly U-she.ped 
distribution shown by the two RCP Branches (ie. a cl:Uster ing of borrowers ac each end 
of the distribution) and cne t ailing-off of the distribution in RDP J essore -Sadar. Taking 
into account the poor perfonnance of collective loans, however, whlch appear only in 
the two RCP Branches, .the difference becomes easier co underst and. lndeed, the 25% 
oi borrowers in Dara&'Tanl and the 23% of borTowers in Paglapir with discipline .-aces of 
less dlan 1% are consistent with the tables and histograms pr-esented la ter in this 
sumroary of resu1Ls. Although these histograms relace to ~ . different sample oJ 
exc\u$ive!y DTW loans, tht~y shew zexo recovery for DTW capit al loam in Daragram z.n<l 
a discipline rate of only 31.22% for operating loans. in Paglapir . 
5. 15 Distribution of borrowers bv credit diScipline and loan cace,~ The conclusion 
dcawn above tha t ~hei:e are distlnct!y different dis1:ributions of borrowers by -discipline 
rare for mainso-earn and conecc!ve loans (£nalnly DTWs) Js confirmed by 1'a!Jle 5.4 
(which is restricted to th~ RCP Branches because tlrere were no collective Joar>.s in the 
newer RDP AOs). The U- shaped, polarised dis::ribution is clearly shown co a pply only 
for coHective loans, with some b.orrowers having excellent discipline and the remainder 
having very poor discipline. For the individual loans, RCP !)aragram shows a tailing-off 
distribution while for RC? Paglapir, the Branch with the poorest credit discipline of all 
four Offices/Br anches sarr1pled, there is a clustering of borrowers in the credit discipline 
range from ZO% to 79%. 
5.16 Seasonal trends in ,~redit discipline rate Table 5.5 "nd the histogram in Fig. 5.1 
show seasonal variations in cred it discipline for the main-sample of 400 loans. For r.'le 
four Offices/Branches t aken togeth.er, t..l!e highest discipline rate is in June, as shown 
in Figure 5.L The lowest rates are clustered in the months of September, Ocwbe.r and 
November. Throughout mqst of J3angladesh this period is known r.o be the; most difficulc 
for me rural poor, coming at the end of the monsoon (flood Miters usuaily peak in 
September) and be fore the main aman harvest.. Look-ing more closely Gtt •he seasonal 
rat.es among the different Offices/Branches shows that the worst-perfonning Branch, 
?aglapir, has discipline races as low as 8.71% in October a.nd 19.91% in November. It 
fs also interesting to note that the discipline rate at this Branch rises to as much !lS 
96.20% in the following month of December. 
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Panic11l at·s 
RDP l)ru·agrurn 
Up LO Tk9!J!:l 
Tk I ,000 to 2,9$9 
Tk3,000 to Tk4,999 
Tk5, 000 and above 
RCP f'aglapJ1· 
Up to Tk999 
Tkl ,OOO to 2,999 
Tk3,000 to Tk4,999 
Tk5,000 and above 
RDP l(ocwaU- 2 
Up co Tk999 
Tk 1 , 000 to .2, 999 
Tk3,000 LO Tk4,999 
Tk5,000 and aiJove 
RDf' J essore Sa dar 
Up to 1'k99~ 
Tkl,OOO to 2,999 
Tk3,000 to Tk4;999 
Tk5,000 and above 
TOTAL 
Up to Tk999 
Tk I ,000 to 2,999 
Tk3,000 Lo ·rk4,999 
Tk5,000 and r.bove 
Credi t Disc!p!Jr'le Rat<: Percent 
7t:o & ov_er 80 to 99 ~~LQ 79 J 40 to 59 '20 to- 39 "'!=l==LO=:::;;l9 Less than l I Total -
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0 
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0 
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12 
2 
JOO 
37 
S8 
5 
0 
LOO 
98 
2 
0 
100 
6 
65 
23 
6 
,!00 
43 
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42 
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Note: CrediL Olscipliut.! R11tC = Acluai amouriL ()[ lrtsta inlcuts collected up to Dccenl l;er 31st 199 I d ivided lJ)' lire lnsta lmcnls due In 
Lhat period (x I 00). 
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T ALlLE 5.4: Distdbutlun of Borrowers - by Credit Discip line Rate and Loan Category 
Credit Discipline Rate Percent I 
Particulars 
!00 & Over 80 to 99 60 to 79 40 to 59 20 lO 39 I to 19 Less ~han 1 Tota l 
RDP Oaragram 29 10 7 <1 8 17 25 100 
Collective Loans 10 . IS 25 50 
lndlvld\lal Loans 19 \\) 7 3 B 2 '1\1 
Asset l~oans l I 
RCP Pagleplr 23 9 12 14 10 9 2~ 100 
Collccclve Loans 17 5 23 45 
lndlvi(lual Loans 6 4 12 13 10 9 51 
Asset Loans l 1 
TOTAL 52 19 19 18 18 26 .48 200 
Collective Loans 27 5 0 0 0 15 48 95 
Ind ividua l Loans 25 14 19 16 18 I I 0 103 
A.~set Loans. 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Note: Credle Discipline Rate = Accoal amount of Instalments collected up to December 31st 1991 divided lly t he instalmcnls due in 
Ll •ot period (x 1 00) . 
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1'/\DLE 5.5; Credit Discipline Rate - by Ell'anch and Mon,ll 
Crod t\ OtootpHne Rote (X) TAKA 
I'Onth RCP RCP RDP ROP ro--~J RCI> RCP RDP ROP. 
{)ar.;gra.1'1 Pa.gla,p1-r Kotwal l-2 JesSci·e Daf"af)r"<)l'C. Pag)uplr ~(>t~o;a 1 i -2 Jessore $adar T01AL 
Sada;r 
0:.:-a C<>ll O;,JC Cpll Due Coll Ol:C. Coll c .... e C<>ll 
-
J:snuary $3.09 (;5.27 100.00 10~.33 0.: . 60 4,996 31 15:? 7, l 00 4.~ ~. 586 5, S!'!6 B,OJS 0,3!}5 ?..$. 720 21 , 7<;8 
f £:bY.ue.ry 65. 9S 58.51 100.00 98.89 64 . 51 11 , 193 7.~s 9, ?.16 5,392 15, 435 l5, 43G 14~468 )4, 307 50, 313 ·~l . S20 
t1nrch 64.117 46. 17 100.00 99.20 B2. 62 12,663 8,164 9, 589 4,619 17,01;1 11, O•ll 15,926 1s, n9 55,219 45,623 
~pr l) 71.39 ·•0.01 100.00 91.05 01.34 12,556 8 , 064 11, 147 5 ,441 l7, !JlO 17,910 1S.B$t, H, 3!19 57 ,<17 ·~. 70< 
H~y 54. '' 30.77 100.00 90.02 75.65 12,936 7, 043 0,216 3 , 5'13 1~. 217 1&,217 15,291 13, 1&5 ~3.050 ,,o~ ~'9a 
J\IN,I 101.01 11.93 100.00 84.59 9 1. ?.3 ,10,1 03 .18 , 285 11,416 6, 211 17,041 17,041 15,926 13.472 62.486 ~7.000 
Ju1~ 66.50 46.33 100.00 80.25 71.12 1J,e54 e,sas 10,850 5,021 18,383 18 , 383 16, 627 1 3, 3~3 f>O,SZ; ,$, ·~ 1 
AVI)u't. 5$. 00 66. 45 100.07 76.60 76.99 13,0'13 7,321 9,431 6,267 16,Ml6 16,4&9 14,960 11 ,465 ~3, 920 ') , 512 
SepLOO'·bcr' 11'4.55 ss.•o 100.00 64. 45 66.09 11 ,eo; 5 , 170 10,085 3,570 17,727 17' 272 1 s. 961 10, 287 54,922 36,299 
October' 46.97 a. 71 100.00 59. 68 60.62 13,945 6, 550 9, 275 006 17 ,448 lJ I 446 16,092 9,&03 S6,i'60 34,t.09 
"woo.~r· S0.2'ol 19.91 1<:11>.00 n.41 ~1.€>4 '\ '\,~'\S S,5~~ e.,tSS. 1 ,ns ,G,4<;'B \ 6 ,4<8 IS, I~· \Q, S\\'l 5'.~'' l4.1~1."'> 
Dece:nbel" $4 .43 95. 20 96. 75 67. 35 74.96 9, 170 3, 157 7, 62~ 7 , 33~ 15 ,240 15,720 18,927 12. 747 51' 959 38,958 
61 .96 49.01 99,73 8 1. 09 76. 75 14"i,31B 69.~18 H3,63·; 56 ,605 1 191, 478 190,961 16~ 192 140, 552 632, 62'2 ¢8S.'S35 
Note : Credit Disc irline Rate e Actua l amount of lnstahne11ls collected up to Oecernhcr 31st 1991 dil'lded by the instalments due in that per·i 
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5.17 Credir discipline among deeo tube-we!lloans Table 5.6 shows the discipline ~ates 
and L~e distribution of borrowers by discipline rate for capital and operating loans for 
the two RCP Branches c:oncerncd. These data are perhaps the most difTicult w 
understand and interpret. In RCP Daragram, for example, the credit discipline rate for 
capita! loans is zero while for operating loons it is a relatively healthy 87.69%. On the 
other hand, in RCP Pag!apir, whose overall discipline rate is significantly worse than 
::>aragram (35.3i% as compared with 59.04%), capital loans show a higher discipline rate 
than operating loans. The data on the distribution oi borrowers again shows a polaris~. 
t:-shapee pattern for Daragram, with capital loans at one extreme and operating loans 
at the other. In Paglapir, there are two peaks in the distribution, with 38% oi all DTW 
!lorro"'-ers clustered with a discipline rate of zero and 48% in the range 50% ro i4% 
cred:t discipline rate. Distinguishing capital from operating loans, this pattern is 
broadly repeated for each category. 
5.18 Seasonal trends jn crP.dit: discipline among DTW loam; Table 5.7 :~nd Figure 5.2 
suddenty show a very clear seasonal pattern In the repayment of DTW loar.s. 
~otwithstaoding the difference between the two Branches in overall credit disci;>line, 
Table 5.7 shows that the discipline rate Is zero in both Branches for a period of 7 
months In the year. Repayments are clustered in che period :vtay to july, with very 
!arge repayments in September for Daragram and some very small repayments ln 
December for Paglapir. The clustering of payments coincides with the marketing of t.l-te 
harves: from the crops irrigated by DTW water. It confirms the generally held view 
that the nature and pattern of income flow from DTWs has a marked effect on the level 
and pattern of loan recovery. In Daragrrun there is clearly something seriously wrong 
wic.'l capital loan recovery while in Paglapir repayment is very poor overall. 
Irrrolicar:ions of the Resulr-~ 
5.!9 As noted In para. 5.11 above, the results of the special study confirm bow 
impon:aot it is to monitor t-'le health and quality of r..l)e lending portfolio. It also shows 
that monitOring should not be restricted to aggregate, BRAC-wide or even regional 
data. It must distinguish not only among individual Offices <md Dranche.s but: among 
loan C:ltegories and s izes. Beyond this, the study shows that financial/numerical 
monitoring can certainly r eveal where there are particular problems with credit 
!!iscipline. Yet monitoring data alone cannot show what those pr·oblems are, why they 
have arisen or what might be done to overcome them. This is where the Office/Branch 
:\lar•agers' role is so critically important. For when monitoring data begin to show a 
problem somewhere in the credit portfolio it !s they who must immediately get ro grips 
with il: and take remedial action. The fact that the special study has thrown up what 
seem ro be serious problems with DTW loans and less serious but noticeable variations 
in credit discipline among other Offices and types of loans suggests that at: present 
BRAC is not sufficiently well-equipped on all fronts ro take early remedial action. 
Pronosed Improvement.~ in Portfolio Management 
5.20 BRAC's current system for tracking loan quality does not provide it - either at 
Head Of!":ce or the field !eve! - with sufficient infonnation to identify a deteriorating 
sirua'-!on suf!"icient!y early or in sufficient detail to take corrective action. Instead, i: 
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T.-.BLE 5.6: DTW Loans - Recovery by Branch and Loan Type 
Particulars 
RCP Dardt;Tatn 
Taka Due 
Taka Collected 
Credit Discipline Rate % 
Distribution of Borrowers by Credit I Discipline Rate % 
! 00% and over 
75% to 99% 
50% to 74% 
2a'lr> to 49% 
1% to 21% 
0% 
Total 
RCP Paglapir 
Taka Due 
Ta.<;a Collected 
Credit Discipline Rate % 
Distribution of Borrowen; by Credit 
Discipline Rate% 
100% and over 
75% to 99% 
50% to 74% 
25% tO 49% 
1% ~0 24% 
0% 
Total 
Total 
Ta.'<a Recoverable 
:-aka Collected 
Recovery Rate % 
Distribution of Borrowers by Credit 
DiscipiU:-:! Rate % 
100% and over 
75% ro 99% 
50% to 74% 
25% ro 49% 
1% to 24% 
0% 
Total 
Capital 
Loan 
12,836 
0 
0.00% 
25 
25 
8,751 
4,032 
46.07% 
3 
2 
10 
2 
8 
25 
21,587 
4,032 
18.68% 
3 
2 
10 
2 
0 
33 
50 
I 
I 
I 
Operating 
Loan 
2G,450 
23,194 
87.69% 
21 
4 
25 
22,550 
7,040 
31.22% 
14 
11 
25 
49,000 
30,234 
6L70% 
21 
0 
14 
4 
0 
1 I 
50 
! ora! 
39,2S6 
23,194 
59.0-l% 
21 
-1 
25 
50 
31,301 
11,072 
35.37% 
3 
2 
2-1. 
2 
0 
19 
50 1 
70,587 
34,266 
48.54% 
2J 
2 
24 
6 
0 
44 
100 
-
-l'ote. Credit D•sc •phne Rate = Actual amount.of •r.st.alments collected up to 
December 31st 1991 ~ivided by the in:;t.almcnts due io that period (x !00). 
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TAIJL.l~ !i. 7: 0 '1'1¥ Loans- Recovery by Brauch fJnd Month 
- -
Crodi< Obc!pHoo P.ato (%) TAKA 
r-'Qnth RCP O•ra~tMl RCP p._ql::tph• 
RCP Darugram RDr) Pagl bp1r T<)TAL 
Total C.plt<>l OPQrot!on Capital O~f'at:iotl 
C•pH:al Oper-at to.o ~pit.al o,:-e .~at1on 'Dve Coll Oou Coll O~:e Col i o •• Coll DvO- Co11 
Jbtll,ti'H ';r' 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 o.oo 67S 0 1 , 13::!4 0 552 0 1,004 0 4,B35 0 
Fcbrocu~.Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 1 ,028 0 ?.,zoo 0 684 0 1, Allol 0 s. 7l6 0 
Mnrc~ o.oo 0,00 0.00 0.1)0 o.oo 1,028 0 2 ,376 0 744 0 , '93.5 0 6 ,004 0 
. 
/~pi" I 1 0.00 0,00 0,1)0 0.00 0,00 , ,109 0 2, 4~· 0 786 0 2 ,1 23 0 6 . ~02 0 
"•v 0.00 10, ,46 0.00 0.00 S9.44 1 , 2Q4 0 4,1!e6 s .. , 1).1 693 0 \ ._fiOfl 0 o.se? 5,104 
J 11toO o.oo 13 7. 51 305.00 56. 02 1?.6.66 1, O?.fi 0 6,'/44 9,:nJj ,,. 2,865' 1,936 l , 100 lO,t.S'l 13,239 
Ju1r 0.00 176.04 145.26 279.79 171.9? 1,265 0 3 ,272 S, 760 795 1, ISS 2, 123 5,940 ? , 475 12,855 
AvQu'st 0.00 o.oa o.co 0.00 o.oo 1,1)26 0 7~2 0 732 0 1, 804 0 <,JSG 0 
SGpt~~bar 0.00 323. 73 o.oo 0.00 59.85 1, 109 0 S44 3,056 798 0 :?,?SS 0 s~ 106 3,056 
0ct..OI)Qr 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 1,20oi 0 352 0 693 0 1,804 0 • ,053 0 
Novombel" 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0.00 o.oo 1,028 0 352 0 732 0 1 . e~· ·o 3,916 0 
Ot-crober 0. 00 0.00 1.50 0.00 Q.J.I 1 ' 109 0 a•• 0 798 \ 2 1.,::!53 0 3, 524 12 
' l1lTt;L 0.00 87.69 0Q.07 31. 22 48,S4 12,836 0 26,450 23, l!i'l 8, 751 4,032 ?.2, 550 7,040 70,507 30 ,266 
Note: Credit Dlsclpllrlc Rate ; Actual ammJnt of Instalments collectefl up to December 3IsL 1991 divided by the ln~u•lrncnts clue in 
~lt<Ll Ilerlo<l (x l 00\. 
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relies mainly on its field staff - in practice, mainly Regional Managers - to scay in dose 
touch w!d1 their Area Offices and Branches and to be aware of problems as they may 
emerge. This is essential and should continue. But as BRAC expands, over- reliance on 
the exyerience and judgement of senior managers will become more risky. What is 
needed is (a) an Improvement in the quality and usefulness of financial monitoring data, 
and (b) greater re liance on Area/Branch Managers ~:o use thai: 
<!ata and w take their own remedial measures. 
5.2! Ageing by Account: The key methodological improvement required is the 
inrrocuc~:ion of an Ageing by Account system. ~ior to the MTE, BRAC had already 
begun to develop a format for loan ageing analysis. This would show missed ins~lment 
payments by AO/Branch, with ageing categories showing when payments had been 
missed. As in so many aspects of its work, this initiative shows that BRAC itself has 
the ability to spot where improvements are required. The MTE suggests only that the 
ageings system being developed by BRAC has two maio shortfalls . First, it does not 
trac.l< the outstanding principal that is at risk in eac.':l age category. This is important 
because !ate or missing payments on a small number of large loans can imply a 
subs!:alltial risk to the total portfolio. Secondly, the ageings system would record the 
same borrower for payments missed in each age category. This would nor reveal 
wl:ether several borrowers might be late or perhaps the same borrower might be 
appearing in several age categories. 
5.22 The main ways in which BRAC's Ageing by Account system con be improved are 
that it should show: 
i) the amount of risk to the entire portfolio - which means that within each 
age category the amount of outstanding principal which is late should be 
shown as a percentage of total principal outstanding in the porctolio; 
ti) the repayment discipline of borrowers - which means that within each age 
category and period the amount of repa:rmeots actually received should 
be expres~ed as a percentage of what should have been received in that 
period according to the original schedule. 
5.23 T3e next step that must be taken is more difficult and will be more time-
consuming. It is to make Area/Branch Managers anrl their Regional and Head Office 
supervisors familiar with the system in detail and able to understand what the financial 
data are signalling. Even more importantly, those using the data must be able to take 
management decisions for remedial action when problems are revealed. This represents 
a new - and quite major - task for the Management Development Programme. 
5.24 Write-offs ;md Loan Loss Reserve In the third quarter of L99L, !:he share of 
Overdue and :>lot Yet Transferred loans in cumulative disbursements rose from 1.3% to 
1.6%. In Taka terms, as cumulative disbursements under RDP-11/RCP had :-eached 
Tk. l,276 million by the end of Seytember 1991, the rise to 1.6% represented TI:.20.42 
mil!ion. For reasons mentioned earlier in this Section, this does not of itself imply that 
calls will have to be made on the Loan Loss Reserve (LLR). Much depends on (a) how 
much of the due amounts might be collectable, and (b) when any write-offs might be 
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mace. :--leven.l)eless, this is a significant rise in the space of one quarter and signals a 
serious decline in loan quality. 1f the rise were to conLinue, it could come close to t.'le 
LLR, cu..rrently set at 2% overall. It is also llnked to tbe conclusion drawn earlier in 
this Section that the higher than expected !eve! of loans outStanding in the conrext: of 
below target disbursements is being caused by slow repayment. 
5.25 Linking the aggregate rise in the share of Overdue and Not Yet Transferred loans 
to the Special Study on Credit Discipline is difficult because the study was noc designed 
co !le stat:!stically representative. Nevertheless, if the study's conclusior>.s with respect 
to co!!ecdve loans in general and DTWs in particular are a pointer to possible similar 
prob!erns elsewhere, BRAC should look carefully at itS LLR. As a maner of prudent 
accounting, a policy should be adopted for tbe timely write- off of bad dcbcs. Linked 
to this, BR.<>.C should also be able to establish the reasons for bad debts. They may, for 
example, be due to the unre liabilicy of individual borrowers. In such cases, no doubt 
eligibiiicy for future credit would be denied and membership of DRAC would be 
w!thdravm. Alternatively, delinquency may be due to the lack of viabi!icy of the 
ente.t·prises or activities for which credit bas been used. Here, the borrowers may not 
be at faul: but instead BRAC would need to be cautious about future lending for similar 
activities. 
5.26 The adoption of a policy on write-offs would immediately begin to provide feed-
back for the review and possible adiustment of the LLR. Indeed, through time, it would 
become possible to introduce d ifferent levels or rates of LLR for different components 
of the portfolio according to their proven degree of risk, as indicated by write-off rates. 
From ~ie resultS of the Special Study on Credit Discipline, for example, it may be 
necessary to introduce a higher LLR for DTWs. 
5.27 These questions of write-Qffs and LLRs are important because they would end 
the speculative concerns sometimes expressed by the donors about the 'real health' or 
qualicy of the BRAC credit portfolio and the adequacy of the current overall 2% LLR. 
5.28 Branch-level accounting At present, BRAC uses a 'cash-flow' form of 
accounting. At the end of each month, each AO/Branch prepares a statement which 
includes such diverse items as loan disbursementS and repaymentS; interest collections; 
savings balances; operating expenses; and even depreciation charges. These reporcs 
serve me purpose of showing whether tbe AO/Branch requires more funds. But the 
repor.s do not show operating profitS or losses and there is no balance sheet to carry 
forward the accumulated financial resultS through time. 
5.29 There is room to Improve field office accouncs by introducing a system-based on 
simple £nternat!onally-accepted principles. This would contribute significantly m the 
achievement of several objectives both of BRAC icself and the Donor Consortium: 
il AO/Branch performance could be measured through time in absolute and 
relative tenns, including measures of efficiency in resource m;ilisation; 
ii) trends in the cost-per-member of providing ROP services could be 
monitored, providing a useful management and planning tool; 
46 
iif) plans based on measured trends would simplify the design oi new reques;;.s 
for medium- cerro international financial assistance; 
lv} it y.>ould become easier to form objective> assessments of the financial 
condicion of RDP Offices as rhey approach e ligibility co become RCP 
Branches. 
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S. OPER."-.TIONAL PROGR,'>.MMES 
A. lnstitution-Buildin&' 
Back{!l"ound and Context 
6.1 Since about the mid- ! 970s there has been exr:ensive - and largely succE!$Sful -
imernational exper ience in providing development assistance, including credit, directly 
to tile rural poor in developing countries. ·A comtnon feature of thls experience has 
been tbe formation of groups of the poor, serving both as 'receiving mechanisms' for 
o.t:tside assistance and as units for se!f-help action. Bangladesh has been in the 
vanguard of such initiatives and is today probably the richest source of international 
exper-ience in working directlY with groups of the rural poor. The Grameen Bank bas 
been a lead agency in this field, specifical!y in tbe provision Of credit services to the 
rura! poor. But since t he mid-!980s many other agencies in Bangladesh - including 
:>~GOs and even the govenunetlt-sponsored national cooperative movement - have drawn 
on and applied this experience. 
6.2 Though group formation has been the single common thread in these initiatives 
witb the rural poor, as different agencies bave developed their. own programmes of 
assistance, most have im.r·oduced their c.wn adapta'Lic.ns, both in CO!\Ceptual fran\ewo~k 
and in ;;he practical approach, substance and scope of work. There are, for example, 
differences in the membership size of the groups promoted by different agencies; 
differences in ;;he type and range of assistance provided; differences in the intensity 
with which that assistance is supported; differences in the planned duration of 
assistance; and difference>.s in what the agencies themselves e:xpe·ct of the grou9s they 
promote and help to form. It i_s this that has generated the richness of experience in 
Bangladesh. It has also shown that the re is no single definitive model in providing 
development assistance directly to the rural poor. BRAC has made a significant 
contr!budon to rhis r ich experience and today, owing to the scale on whi.ch it is 
operating, the BRAC model is an important reference point and yardstick in assessmentS 
of directly-targeted poverty alleviation measures. 
The !3RAC Aporoach in Institution-Building 
6.3 The appro<!ch taken by BRAC has not been designed in isolation or at a single 
point in time, but has rather evolved - and is still evolving. Withln sLx years of tbe 
beginning of relief work in 1972, BRAC had launched its Outreach Programme, whose 
principal focus was on forming groups of the rural-poor. At this stage, and without 
access to the level of international financial assistance it has today, the rationale for 
group formation was to strengthen the rural poor, to promote a new sense- oi idendry 
among rhem, and to· encourase them to re-negotiate their collective and individua1 
production relations. Between 1978 and 1986 tbe e-xperience gained through the 
Outreach Programme fed into the design of the Rural Development Programme- RDP- l 
- in 1987 which added a stronger element of substantive assistance, including credit. 
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The main principle on which RDP was based, an.d which still lies at the heart of BR.<\C's 
approach, is that group formation and access to e:a:ernaJ resource)l are equa!ly necessary 
and mutua lly reinrorcing ~lements of its poverty alleviation and empowerm~nc srrateg"f. 
6.4 Distinguishing- features in the BRAC approach There are tbree fearures of 
BRAG's approach which, though not all unique, together distinguish cbe RDP/RCP 
approllch m institution-building from the models adopted by ot her agencies in 
Bang1l!desh: 
i) first, BR-AC now includes t wo tiers in its institution-building m odel - the 
Village Organisation and its coostitueot sub-groups; 
ii) in wrn, secondly, BRAC's two- tier model incorporates group sizes which 
are different from those adopted by most other agencies, the BRAC VOs 
with an average size of about 50 members being larger than the 15-25 
typict.l membership in prograrr<.rnes using a single- tier approach , while Ule 
BAAC VO sub-groups of about 5 members are considerably smaller in size; 
iii) thirdly, BRAC's approach to tbc 'graduation' of VOs away from direcc 
reliance en external assi~t.ance as a !ree ser~ice steers a middle course 
berween the approaches used by some otller agencies. 
6.5 BRAG's ~we-tier model has two main advantages over the single-tie r approach 
1.\SeU by many other agencies. f irst., hecause VOs are Ule c>ganis::rdona\ units on wi\i-ca 
its e.xtension and technical advisory support se..rvices ilre targeted, their larger than 
usual size m eans that BRAG can reach large numbers of its members withour heavy 
penalties in sraff, logistical and other overhead costs. Secondly, based on inrernatienal 
e.'qlerience of tileimportat~ce o{ g:t0\1!.) cohesi.,eness in maint.mning credit disd~line, tile 
lower tier in BRAC's model, with very small sub-groups sharing jo.inr liability for credit 
repayment, can be expected to permit good recovery rates. (This does not , however, 
apply in the larger collective Joan schemes which must still be regarded <'.S 
e)(}le>\mental.) 
6.6 On the question of 'graduation' of groups ilf the rural poor away from direet: 
external assistance and towards fu!lse!r~reli<mCe, the range of approaches among other 
agencies can be musu·a~ed by comparing the Rangpur-Oinajpur Rural Serv\<;.~ {RDRSl 
and the Grameen Bank. The RDRS model incorporates a five-year period of quite 
intense 2$Sistance tCi its groups (of typically 2.5 members). Thereafter, its policy is co 
negoti<:<te with an existing commercial bank to provide continuing access t o c•edlt, then 
ro wi~hdraw direct assistance from 'mat.ure' groups. Tne Grameen Bank, on the other 
hand, not only assumes that those who joill it will be members for life huL a lso expectS 
tha~ the great majority of its members will continue to cake out small, short-term loans 
and 1:0 use credit for the same or similar 1)u.rpt>Ses as when they first.joined. 
S. 7 The middle course adopted by BRAC permits its car get group tei remajn as 
membe•s indefinitely, but lucorporates two main e lements or levels of graduation withiJl 
the framework of continuing assistance. The first level iS represented by the transition 
from RDP to RCP. Of itself, this bas only minor implications for tbe indiviliual BRAC 
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member. Ra~her, it imposes a higher-order collective responsibilit-y on the whoie 
membeJ"ship of each RCP Branch to keep both the volume of credit transactions and the 
standard of credit discipline ·sufficiendy high 1:0 achieve RCP's objecc,ive of seli-
sustainability. The second level of graduation, twa years after the transition f r{)m RDP 
to RCP, is an extension of the transfer of responsibility onto the membership through 
t'ne policy of charging fees for the provision of iurrber rechnica\ training, advisory and 
suppon sen ices. 
6.8 Another reason for BRAC's .policy <~gainst total withdrawal after a pe!"iod of 
close assistance is its expectation that some of i~ members can - and should - move on 
irom a narrow range of simple, \ow-risk, low-return activities to more ambitiouS and 
more rewarding enterprises . This is where the work of the Rw-al cntcr!Jrise Project 
(discussed in the next Section of this report:) and the large~. longer-term, more 
ambitious collective· loan schemes fit into the BRAC approach. 
6.9 This aspect of the policy of permitt:lng ic;definite membership has two maio 
morives. FirSt, and most fundamen tally, B~'\C recognises that if the rural economy of 
Bangladesh il; to grow and to de velop it must show greater diversity, including ll.igber 
value-added activities. SecondlY., BRAC is concerned that a proliferation of essentially 
marginal activities at the fringe of the rural economy could constitute a new poverty 
trap for its members. hl pursuing this policy, "BR.-\C fee ls it is irnporti!Ot not to impose 
some arbitrary deadline for the graduation. of members from direct assistance (a} 
because there .is still much to be done to explore what •ypes of more diverse, higher 
value-added opportuni ties might be feasible, and {b) because only same of its members 
can be expected to have or to deve!op the necessary entrepreneurial flair to pursue 
them successfully. On both cou11ts it will take time, beoce the characterisation or 
<.;olle.;uve luau;; as being still at the exper!meoral s tage. 
Growth and Dvna..rnics of Membership and VO, Formation 
6,10 Since the beginning of RDP-ll/RCP, BRAC's membership has g:rown by about 
60%, to a weal of over 6'17,000 by the end of 1991 - an equivalent annu~ average 
groWL.IJ rate of over 26%.5 Within the main.o;tream of R.OP/RCP, m~bershiQ by the 
end of 1991 had reached over 598,000, comprising 11,376 VOs in nearly 5,200 villages, 
as already shown in Table 4.1 in Section 4 of this report. The table also shows that 
women accou(lt for nearly 68% of total RDP/RCP membership. lrt addition, after only 
two years of operation, RCP already accounted for one third of m~instream membership 
by t:he end of 1991. 
6.11 Recent policv changes The design of RDP-fl/RCP placed considerable emphasis 
on the need for group coherence and bornogeneicy among t,he BRAC membership in the 
inreresrs of forming viable rural insdcutious.. It alse emphasised the importance of 
gt"OUp discipline, pan;icu!ar!y in tl:ie interestS of the credit component of BRAC's wo<k.. 
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and Sericul ture 
of the ROP/!<C? 
As a reflection of che evolut ionary nature of BRAC's models and operating procedures, 
since the inception of ROP-U/RCP it has introduced five main policy changes or 
refinements af::ecting eligibility for membei'Ship and t:he organisational arrangements 
for VOs: 
n in the interests of group cohesiveness tlle size of new vos has been 
restricted to a maximum of 50 members instead of up to 70 in the past, 
and the succ<'..ssful application of this policy is revealed in Table 4.1, 
showing that for RDP/RCP together, the average size of VOs in 
December !99! was just over 52 members; 
[i) t:he focus of collective respoosibillry for credit: discipline and eligibility 
for continued access to credit has been shifted from the VO as a whole to 
the constituent sub-groups; 
iii) completion of the functional education course is now obligatory before 
new members are g"iven access to credit; 
iv) not mo}·e than two members or the same household can be members of 
13RAC (one 01an and one woman from a male-headed household or rwo 
women from a female-beaded household); 
v) rotating leadership of sub-groups (hence of the· membership of VO 
ma11agement committees) and of VO leadership through biennial election> 
(wich no rights for re-election). 
6.12 The MTE endorses tbese policy changes. The only uncertainty surrounds the last 
oi the cl1anges listed above, with respect to the rotation of leadership and managemenc 
of sub-groups and VOs. It could be said that the imposition of rotating leadership 
unrea!isticaUy assumes ·equality of leadership qualities among a ll BR..<\C members. Bu~ 
on balance, it should have the benef icial effectS of (a ) preve nting the entrenchment of 
teade.rship and the development of vested self- interests which have done so much 
damage in the cooperative movement and other n.u:-al institutions, and (b) giving all 
BRAC members in tum the exposure to leadership responsibilities - and ro t:.IJe 
opportU!lity for self growth and deveLopment that goes with them. 
6.13 !,.asses and additions in membership lt was only in 1991 that the Monitoring 
Depa.'"Ollent began t o collect data on losses among members, dormant VOs, and the 
disbamLrnent of entire VOs. It is not therefore possrble tO trace ear lier trendS in these 
and other aspects of the dynamics of its membership, let alone to a~tribute them to r.he 
sort of recent policy changes outli ned above. Nevertheless, sueh data as are available 
show mat during 1991 some 29 VOs were dissOlved, v,ijth a loss of 1,375 members 
(though Wis represents an insignificant proportion of less ~:han a quarter of one per cem 
of total membersbip). These losses were shared amoeg four RDP Offices !accounting 
for 12 of the dissolved VOs) and five RCP BranChes. More signific3ntly, of the 29 VOs 
dissolved, as many as 25 were male g>oups. This is imcerpreted by senior BRAC staif 
as one among several indicators r.har men and the VOs chey form are less responsive, 
less compliam: and lP,.ss adaptable thart those formed by women. 
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6.14 Changes in the composition of membership and the formari"on of new VOs are not. 
conflned, as m\gh.t be expected, to recently- formed R.DP Offices. Field obsen.<ar!ons 
during theJ .. fTE showed that even after the tr-ansition to RCP, not only are new VOs sri I! 
being iormed bur; there can be signiiicant turnover in membership. For example, at t.Pte 
Nar.singdi S:;dar RCP Branch the:-e are apparently explicit targets for 1992 co increa:>e 
me!Jlbership from 6,005 to 6,805; for the number of Branch- level borrowers to go up by 
more than double, from 4,360 to 9,360; and for the. number of VOs covered w go up 
from 115 ro 120. 
5.15 Closer investiga tion reveals that some of these targets were e xpressed 
misleadingly. RCP Branch-level membecs.hip !s, in fae!:, expected to remain more or 
less constant. az arotmd €.,0\)0. \n the case of Nars\ngdi 'the difference of 800 members 
between December 1991 and December 1992 is apparentlY the expected level of 
membershio turnover. At m.ore thl>r1 13% in the course of one year, this !eve! of 
turnover is Quite considerab le. In the case of the target for borrowers, the toea! of 
9,360 involved double countiog of the 4,360 borrowers at the end of 1991 end the actulll 
target toral for December 1992 of 5,000 net. Equally, the target f.or growth io numbers 
of VOs is noG to accommodate growth in membership but rather to redistribute existiP.g 
members among a larger nun1ber of VOs, hence ro bring down the average sil!e of VOs 
to t.lte po-licy calling for an aver.age of 50 members per group. 
VOs as Rurallnstitution~ 
6.16 Data presented so far show impressive physical achievements by .BRAC in 
expanding \~ membership and it>. the corresponding growth in. VOs. tt is considerabiy 
mon~ difficult - both for BRAC itself as well as for objective observers - to evaluate 
these achievements against the inherently qu<>litat!ve yardstick of institution- building. 
To be t:rue rural institutions, VOs would be expected to have - and be seen to bave -
identities, roies and :pertrranence in their own right, qUite independentlY of any external 
sponsorship or support . . They would be expected LO be recognised as part of the fabric 
of the rural society ::md economy irr' whicb they are based. Their social and economic 
significance, and the respec t in which they are ~eld as _gy:oups, acting co1lectively, would 
be expected to be greater than the re$pecr in which their constituent members are - or 
were - he ld a:> individuals .. Internally, self-confidence within VOs would be expected to 
bereflected1n a range of spontaneous initiatives t!:ley might t<ll<e such as, for example, 
in re- negotiating share-cropping, tenancy and" even casual employment arrangements 
wit.'l land-owr1ers; lobbying politicians on behalf of the individual or collective interests 
of ct>.eir members; or even s-ponsoring tl:>.eir o'>ln )}oti~ical candidates to the same. ends. 
6.17 Field observations during the MTE have confirmed that BRAC members are proud 
of being part of their sub-groups, VOs end Q[ BRAC 1tse!f. They regard BRAC as a 
lifeline, holding out possibilities and opportunities that would have been inconceivable 
without BRAC. Beyond this, there is a range of evidence from the field showing that 
some VOs do display some of the qualitative characteristics of rur.al insritutionsj that 
they do sometimes take initilltives of the sorts outlined above; or at lease t!lar they 
have done so at some stage ln the past. On the other hand, most of this evidence 
confirms the pivotal role of BRAC st:lff - usualLy PO,; - in promoting, soppo~ing an<i 
guiding such initiatives. This rs equally true of the mainstream actiY.ltles in RDP/RCP, 
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where the r~le of G&. .and POs is v ital in ccnvel'l\ng weekly and moi'\~My n1.ee~lngs, \n 
supervising and managing the savings scheme and credit activities, and ln ocher aspects 
of the BRAC model. 
6.IS This view of the continuing dependence of VOs and their members on strong 
suppoH from BRAC was ecnoed in a l imited number of oiscussions with cepresemacives 
of the so-cal!ed 'rural e lite ' during the MTE. Larger land-owners admit that the 
intervention of BR.'\C makes a noticeable difference at the viltllge level. Buc in geoern1 
t.hey st.\11 regar d BRAC members as be!ongmg w tim vulnerable, marginal or 'dis~es.sed' 
sector of the rura! society and its economy and do not yet see that BRAG has dooe 
much more than co provide another source of dependence - even another form of 
patronage . 
Ei.l9 VO susr.a'it'labilit v ln thi"> conue.xt even the transition of VOs from RDP co RCP 
cannot be regarded as implyitlg anything ;vitb respect to their suscainabilicy as rural 
:nstitutions. Only through time, and as RCP develops, including the withdrawal of 
separately- funded support services, wm lt begin to be possible to test VO !nstitutional 
sustainability. In this proC!'.SS, two a..9Jeccs of BRAC's objectives and operational 
activities will provide some indication of the prospects for sus tainabilfty. F"irst is the 
test: of time on the sustainability of the financial benefits a t the household level brought 
about by tile credit prograrr>.mes and the various encer.prises seC up by individuals and 
gn:~ups. Secondly, to the extent that BR.JI.C can induce soda\ change thrcugn its 
education services, access to credit , the paralegal service and other programmes, only 
time will tell if these changes can be sustained and if they can be passec;i on more 
widely beyond the direct membership of BRAC. 
6 .20 VO fe<lerarjons tlRAC dls ptays considerable amll!valence over the quesdon of 
groupings - federations - of VOs as p.art of its institution-building targe,[S. 
Conceptually, BR.".C recognises that in the Interests of helping its members co be part 
of strong rural institutions there is a clear case for extending the links of association 
upwards from sub-groups to VOs to federations of VOs. Most af the experience with 
federatiOP.S is concentrated i n Manikganj, eating back co the days of the Ourreilcb 
Programme, when federations of VOs at the Union level took out leases on rural 
markets, negotiated access to kbas (government-owned) land, and escabUshed the 
Sromohidji brlck field proiect. 
6 .21 On the other hand, as is clear from the work of tbe recent internal Task Force 
on chis issue, if the first expression of greater strength and independence by VO 
Federations were to level criticisms at BRAC or to demand more - or different -
assistance from J3R.>\C, they cou!d present maier difficulties in the continued 
implementation of RDP/RCP. They could even confront BRAC with the need ro change 
its basic models for providing development assistance co the rural poor. BR.AC's 
dilemma over this issue can be seen as a typical reflection of t.'le situation of an 
organisadon which fully subscribes co the need for participatory, bottom-up 
development Initiatives, yet which is nevertheless busily engaged in channelling 
resources and support in an interventionist strategy, 1ncluding responsibilities to 
internationa l donor agencies for accountability and adherence to programme design. 
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6.22 The dllemtna chllracterised above can be traced even in the detailed proposals 
on fecerarions put forward by the rntemal taSk force. These include specifications for 
federations at r.he Union leve1; rheir organisationa~ sr~ucture; leader~htp acrangemencs: 
frequency of meetings .and rhe like. In other words, the approach being taken is similar 
to that adopted ~n the case of VOs and the regulations <!nd policies .surrounding them. 
And this could be ·anti thetical to the underlying o·bjective of helping BR:AC members to 
be part of rural institutions in their own right. 
6.23 Time-frames for institution-building In sum, the conclusion of rhe MTE is that 
BRAC VOs liTe efficient, generally well-disciplined organisations of the rural poor. Buc 
they cannot - at least, nor yet· - be regarded as well-rooted rural institutions in their 
own right. This is not 9 criticism because it would be a, misca!<e to prescribe a time-
frame for the achievement of full iostituuonal sr.atus (or VOs, however tha:c. may be 
defined. BRAC is an agency which intervenes at the local lev(~l, and. its interventions 
have to be based on predetermined model.s, albeit models which <tre fairly f!exi!l!e, 
adaptable and evolu tionary. !t is tllerefore BRAC which t akes the. lead inicittlly in 
forming VOs as organisations of t.~e rural poor, mainly as receiving mechanisms far the 
assistance c.hat BR.A..C cat\ Su\)p!y . Thereafter, if c.hese organisations are tu ttecome rrue 
rural institutions, it will be as a result of thescrength, confidence and initiative of their 
members. lt probably cannot be induced from outside. Similarly, if VOs wanr co 
strengthen thei-r institutional foundations and role, it sbould ·in principle be they who 
should decide when, wb)r and how to form federations or equivillent higher- level 
grou9ing1>. lt i.s tm?ort:ant that BR..A.C should facilitace and perm\t this 9rocess. But: 
BR.J\C should not be held solely accountable for the time it may take. 
· B. Credit Activities 
Overvi.ew of Credit Utilisation 
6.24 Sectoral distr ibution of cr~dit util~<;at:ion BRAC's system of classifying the uses 
of credit covers 10 sectors . Un~i! recently, the sectoral distinctions were broken down 
further into ll Hst of 131 specific activities. Eveo this was not suf ficienrly detailed to 
avoid unccn.ainty ttmoog field staff ;~.bout how to classify soq:~.e uses of credit. Tne 
Monito~ing Department has therefore expanded tile list of specific ac tivities to 500. 
Table 6.1 below shows the broad sectoral pattern of rbe use of credit for RDP/ RCP 
combined up to the end of 1989, for the whole_ of 1990 and for the first three quarters 
of 199!. There have been some notable changes in rbe diso·J!)ution of credit among 
rlle.rn. Agricukure nas declined consideraMy, from l. 2.1% cumulative by the end of l98S 
to an average of on!y 1.6% since then. Food processing, too, has declined in popularity, 
from over 15% of pr.e- 1990 cumulative dtsbursemeots to a subsequent a verage of 5.8%. 
Livestock showed a significant rise in popularity during 1990, accounting for 29.5% of 
disbursements, but has subsequently revened to its pre-RDP-11/RCP share of just over 
l7% Gf c.ot al disbursementS. The MTE has no~ been able to form a conclusion about the 
reasons for these changes with any coafidence. 
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TABLE 6.1 RDP/RCP LOAN DfSBLJRSEM£1\T BY SECTORS 
Thousand Taka 
Cum ill. 1/1 -90 1/1 -91 
December % 31/12-90 % 31(9 -91 % 
89 
A_g:tcu!t.ure 57,330 !2. L 5,253 1.3 7,691 1.9 
lrrJgadon 34,038 7.2 29,203 7.4 3.5,63-1 8 .7 
Fisheries 4,810 1.0 2,002 0.5 5,279 !.3 I 
Uvesr:ock 81,999 17.3 115,924 29.5 11,983 n.& 
Rural Industry 26,147 5.5 21,046 5.3 18,850 4.6 
Rural Transport 15,223 3.2 29,169 7.4 21,669 5.3 
Rural Trading 181,366 38.3 164,758 41.9 226,284 55.3 
Food Processing 71,714 15.1 25,i19 6.5 20,779 !7.6 
Healr..l) 0 0.0 353 0 .1 619 4.6 I 
Miscellaneous 820 0.2 Z7 0.0 237 5.3 I 
. 
TOTAL 473,447 00.0 ~3,454 ro.o 409,025 p 5.3 
Col!ecdve Loans 43,571 9.2 35,521 8.3 .33,344 5.1 
SOURCE: BRAC Sta tistical Reports December 1989, December 1990 and September 
1991. 
6.25 Rural trading is, as before, the single largest sector for the use of credit and has 
increased its share of tot.al disbursement still further, from 38.3% prior to 1990 co 
55.3% during the first three quarters of 199.1. This can almost certainly be attributed 
to the rapid increase in the membership and in the rate of credit disbursementS. RUr-al 
trariing is perceived as a low ris~< activity - albeit usually with low returns. ft is 
unders~andahle th<it when new BRAC mernbe.rs qualify for credit they have a p1·opensi.ty 
to choose what they regard as a safe, manageable way of using it. Throqgh time, as 
t:lle!r familiarity with BRAC grows, as they develop more confidence, and as their 
horizons of choice become broader, it would be expected that rural trading would 
account f6r a progressively lower shm-e of credit u~;i\isation (t t,ough probably only down 
to some plateau level) . This is subs&antiared by distinguishing between RDP and RCP. 
T.he average share of ru.ra.l trading for RDP-IT/RCP combined s ince the beginning of 
1990 was 48. 7%. Within RCP alone, however, itS sh~Ue was significantly lower, ar 
3~. 5% over- r.he same period. Even so, the dynamics of the rapid eXpansion of RCP seem 
to be leading to further concentration. Over the first 12 monchs of RCP, rural crading 
accounted for only 28.9% of diSbt;JTSements . During the next 9 monehs to the end of 
September 1991, new RCP disbursements had increased by a factor of near-ly 2.7 and the 
share of rural trading h<)d risen dramlitically to 42. 1%. 
6.26 Concentration of credit urilis;>tion The sectoral concentration in credit use 
shown in Table 6.1 !s conr.inued in th~ use of credit by specific activities. Up to the 
end of 1989, ~he 12 most popul:u- activit-ies accounted for 87.2% of all disbursements. 
During .he first 21 months of RDP- fi/RCP, the share of these_sllrne activities had risen 
w 92.2% of new disbursements. Within these 12 activities, the five most popular 
accounted for 86.9% of new RDP-!1/RCP disbursements. These five included retail 
trading, the !"earing of cows and· buff:Uos (for wbarever purpose), paddy husking, deep 
tube-wells, and ricKshaws. 
6.27 During 1991 there ))ave in fact been three factors which have fuelled the 
conce ntration of credit utilisation in rural trading. As noted earlier, the rate of 
expansion of mem bership and !ending is one. Another .is the reduction in medium- and 
long- tenn lending t€1 individual borrowers. This has meant that al though such activities 
as livestock-rearing al)d r ickshaws remain in the iive most popul'ar, because tbey require 
bigger 1oans wit.b longer repayment periods, the y have actually reduced. their share of 
tbe distribution in favour of rural trading. The third factor, based on MTE field 
investigations, appears to be on the s~ply side, namely that in a rat>idly e.lCJ)aoding 
portfolio BRAC staff find rural trading loans easier and Jaster to appr.aise and approve. 
6.28 :vtale/iemale preferences in credit utilisation As might be expected, within t.<te 
uverdU >t:<.:toral <.lisrribur!on of the use of credit , tht<re are some different preferert<.:es 
between men and women, though there is considerable overlap in the field of rural 
trading. Rural trading, rickshaws and deep rube-wells, for example, <'!Ccount for 68% 
of borrowing by men. For \vomen, when rural trading is combined with livestock and 
paddy husking, these three activities accoun£ for .'30% of their use of credit. 
Areas of Potential and Actual Concern 
6.29 For BRAC there are two lnterllnked are(~$ of potential concern about the rising 
share of rural trading in the portfolio. First, unlike such sectors as rural industry, 
fisheries, irrigation and the like, trading is not productive in the sense of ·contributing 
to incremental ouqmr. r.if tM rural economy: ics value-added component is rescric~ to 
the trading margin retained by tbe trader. lf the rural e conomy of Bangla desh were 
growing rapidly through rising production, generating increased disposable incomes, the 
mark& for ruial trading would itself probably expand. 13u~ this is at best questionable 
in most areas and the growth of rural trading serviees in a stagnant or only slowly 
expanding marl(et could \\ave a depressing effect on returns. 
6.30 The risk of over-expansion in rural trading, leading to over-competition spills 
over into the .second area of potential concern, n!liDe ly the possib ili ty of reaching 
saturacion level for credit in some parts of the country. This is likely to occur firs.: 
where there is geog>?>phical overlll? among di!fe;-ent agenc'ies offering s imHar access 
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co credit for similar purposes. BR/I.C staif regard rur<tl t rading as 'craining loans' -
serving et legitimate purpose in helpJn.g new borrowers co develoP good credic discipline 
n•ady for future, more ambitious <JCrivities. Neverrhe!e5s., tlle.~e areas of potencial 
concern are legitimate issues for t.l>e Rese<rrch and £valuation Division (RE.Ol t<l 
investlgat~. RED bas already carried out one studi but should consider up-dating it 
in view of the continuing trend for further concentration. 
6.31 Collective loans in general and lending for irrigation in particular constiwre an 
area of real concern. ·Table 6.1 shows a r ise in thE" Share of disbursemencs to irrigation 
but a modest decrease in the share of collective loans in the entire portfolio. In tenus 
of loans outstanding, the share of irrigation has risen from 11.5% iil December 1~90 to 
12.7% by the end of September 1991. Loans for DTWs accounted for 93% of all 
disbursements to collective schemes since the beginning of RDF- II/RCP. The 
milnagement and organisa tional problems io the more ambitious, more complex ventures 
sup~on.ed by collective loans can he er.a<:et"baced hy greater d ifficulcy in 1lreserving 
credit discipline in the~larger, potentially less cobe:>ive groups of borrowers. !ndeed, for 
these reasons, BRAC has reduced its commitmem:s to collective scbemt?.s other th:m 
'D'l"Ws. The reason it has continued to expand lending to !)TWs seems. w be based more 
on BRAC's commitment to the pote.ntial value of these schemes in promoting social 
change rather than on confidence in their financial viability. This iS wholly 
understandable. But: based on the geoeral concerns deriving from international 
e;>.-pedence with collective loans, BRAC must be C<autious in deciding how far it can go 
in the trade-off between the value and. importance of its soci!!1 change aod 
empowerment objectives on the one hand while aiming for a sound, disciplined and 
viable credit portfolio on the other. 
lndkators of Performance 
6.32 Tbe 1dent\fication of areas of potentia\ and actual concern points up. the 
importance of monitoring the performance and quality of the credit portfolio as closely 
as possible. Unfortunately, prior to 1990, there were no records of overdue loans by 
sector and activity, making it impossible to identify detailed historical trends. 
lndjcative conclusions can only be drawn by plausib-ly assig-ning progressively higher risk 
of non- recovery to the value of !o;ans in the Late I.Ll, Overdue (0} and Not Yet 
Transferred (N) cat:egories. This is the purpose of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below for RDP and 
RC? respectively. 
6.33 Each table shows t/le. sectoral distribution of the value of outstanding .loans at 
the end of September 1991. The second column expresses the share of late loans as~ 
~rcencage of outstand1ngs in each sector. Overdue aod NYT loans are -.'teo shown 
together, followed by the share by value of all loans behind schedule (LON), again as a 
percentage of rhe value of outstanding loans in each sector. The penultimate coiUfllll 
of each table then expr~ses tbe value of each sectoral LON as a percentage of total 
LON while i:he last column shows each sectoral value oucst:anding as a percentage of 
6 RED: lltibsation of small Trading Loans undeJ:" RDP/RCP of BRAC . 
Dhaka. December 1990. 
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TABLE 6.2: IU>P Outstrtlldlng/Ovcrdue by Sectur, Sc,,temher 1991 
Out.st.endlng I . Late I Overdue ,. Jl==-===-=+==~·==}!_ ==~='I NYT --=-
J 
~+Over + I NYT (LNO) 
Agriculture 5,921 12.3% • 2(). 7" 33.0% 
1rrigution 35,178 2.3% 6.6% 8.9% 
Fisheries 3,835 4.3% 20.9% 25.2% 
I..lvestock 55,1 20 8.6% J.7% 10.3% 
Rurnl Ind. 5,938 4.3o/o 5.3% 9.5% 
Rural Transport 16,302 4. 1% 0.7% 4.'7% 
Rural Trad. 115,842 5.1% 2.1% 7.2% 
Food Processing 15,7:34 8.3% 5.8% 14.1% 
Health 484 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 
Miscellaneous 128 1.6% 12.5% 14.1% 
TOTAL 254,482 5.7% 1 = .. G% 
il=~==='"-'-..,1.:==-~=cb~==~=~;= -===~ .___ = -:=== 
9.3% 
r-
=- l LNO of Total Out~tanding of 
LNO Total Outs tand ing 
8.3% 2.3% 
13.3% 13.8% 
4.1% 1.5% 
21.7% 
2..1% 2.3% 
3.3% GA% 
35.3% 45.5% 
9.4% 6.2% 
0.0% 0.2% 
0.1% 0. 1% 
100.0% 
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-
-
Outslaud I ng Late Overdue+ Late+ Over+ LNO of Total Outstanding of 
NYT NYT (LNO) LNO Total Outstanding 
Agrlcu1 ture 13,443 8.2% 8.0% 16.1% 7.6% 5.3% 
Irrigation 30,636 4.6% 6.0% 10.6% II .4% 12.0% 
Fisheries 2,375 4.6% 14.2% 18.8% 1.6% 0.9% 
Llveulocl< 84,149 •J.9% 1.3% 6.2% 18.3% 32.9% 
Rurol Ind. 19,398 3.9% . 8.0% 11.8% 8.1% 7.6% 
Rul'al Transport 16,751 6.9% 2.9% 9.8% 5.8% 6.6% 
Rura l Trarl. 74,535 8.7% 5.2% 13.9% 36.4% 29. 1% 
Food Processing 14,093 12.4% 9.3% 21.7% 10.8% 5.5~0 
Heall.h 243 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 
Miscellaneous 102 l.O% 14.7% 15.7% 0.1% 0.0% 
-
TOT/\L 255,725 6.6% 4.5% 11.1 % 100.0% 100.0% 
-== = - ~ 
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total outstanding. The second and third columns of each t able give a first indic:'!tion 
of risk of non-recovery. Tbe share by value of Late loans in outstandmgs for a given 
sector is a clear indicator of slow repayment. Then, if Overdue and NYT show a higher 
share oi outstandings than Late, this gives a second, more serious cause for concern. 
li, on the other hand, the share of Overdue and NYT is lower than that of Late, the 
conclusion is more encouraging. In the last t.wo cciU!Tms of each table, if the seccoral 
LON share of total LON is greater than chat sector's share in total outstanding, it is 
performing below aver11ge for the whole portfolio - and vice versa . 
RD?/ RCP Comoarisons 
S.34 Comparing the two tables, RCP seems no t to be per forming as well as RDP. 
Overdue and NYT values, representing the highest.risk of non-recovery, constfwte 4.5% 
of outstandings for RCP and only 3.6% for RDP. Adding in the value of Lace loans, the 
gap between the two programmes increases; with LON accounting for 9.3% of RDP 
outstandings and t L l% for RCP. 
6.35 Rural trading In terms of value, because rural trading accounts for the bighest 
single share of total out:standings for RDP, i t also stands ouc as showing the highest 
share In total LON. NeverthelesS, it is performing better than average for the whole 
RDP portfolio. Another indication of thls is that within .the rural trading sector 
Overdue and NYT loans constituce only- 2.1% of all outstandings, a ffgure whic h is 
bettered only by rural transpon, health and livestock. In RCP, on the other hand, rural 
u-ading is-perform\·ng worse than average, its share of LON in totn1 LON being higher 
than its share of outstandings in rota! oucstandings. This could indicate not so much a 
difference between RDP and RCP but rather, a reduction in credit discipline c!:>.rough 
time Ji, 2S is likely, those borrowing for rura! trading in RCJ> have been borro:wmg 
consist.en~y for t he same purpose ever since joiDing RDP. 
6.36 Seqors with poor performance For botb RDP and RCP che sectors showing the 
worst performance are agriculture, fisher ies and food processing. In agriculture, pa..-.: 
of the explanation is J)robab\y that there ha\le beet: two success)ve bad crop seasons. 
For fisheries, most ·of the difficulties relate to loans which were taken under collective 
responsibility before 1990 and which BRAC has not been able to convert to individual 
loans when col!ective lending for these schemes was ended. In the case of food 
proc=mg - principally paddy husKing - the bad crop seasons could l-1ave filtered down 
to affect rhe supply of paddy. At the same time, questions are being raised about the 
capacity of the rural economy to absorb credit for this very simple, low return activity. 
6.37 Once again, irrigation is a particular source of concern, though superficially, the 
data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 may not suggest t.bis . For both RDP and RCP rhe data show 
that loans \n this sector ·are. j)erforming better than average while -the share of LON \n 
total outsrandings wfthin the sector are in the !llidd!e range, at 8.9% for RDP and 10.6% 
for RCP. But DTW capital loans are repayable over 3-5 years so any loans alre.ady 
showing in the three LON ca~g0ries were taKen out some time ago, when disbursements 
and outstandmgs were considerably lower ~an Lhey are now. Hence, if the LON 
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amounts now shoWit:Jg up in fact indicate very l)OOr performance on earlier loans, and 
if that poor per formance remains a characte~istic of rnore recent loans, the share of 
LON could grow considerably over t !te next few. years. 
6.38 The general conclusiops drawn above are broadly cornpattble with ~:bose of a 
smdy by RED in 1989 and covering six regions.? This study calculated cumulative or.-
scbedu!e reCovery l)etweeo t he beginning aJld the .end of the year, simi!ar to the credit 
disci9line rate used in che MTE spectal swdy discussed in Secdon 5 of this repon:,. The 
results of the RED study estimS.ted recovery races of 47% in fisherjes; 59% in £rrigacion; 
76% in agricul ture; and 78% ill livestock. AJI orner sectors· were esc!mated w have 
recovery rates of 85% or more . The same study also showed better recovery rates 
among female borrowers than among males in a!l sectors exCJ!PC the residual 
'm{Scellaneous' category. 
C. Non-Formal Primary Education 
6.39 BRAC's relatively recen1: eo cry into che field of primary education is sec against 
a background of very poor performance in die public sector. 13etween 1982' and 1986, 
primary gross enrolment averaged about 65% i n Bangladesh as compared with 92% in 
[adia and 79% evert for Nepal. There h<.>.s a!w been a chronic male/female imbalance 
in enrolments, the rate for girls oot having risen much above 40% during the first half 
of the 1980s. High dropout and repeater rates are also chronic characteri$tics of the 
primary education system. About one third of 1:he students who enrol in the first. grade 
do not continue into the second grade. Repeater rates throughOut primary educauon 
are in the order of lO% J.lSt" year. Only about one fifth of firs t -year enrolmentS go on 
co complete the fifth grade. Again, there are. gender disparities in dropout races, !2% 
fewer girls dian boys completing fhe years of primacy education.8 These sunt01ary 
daca do much to explain the low average race of literacy among the adult population of 
Bangladesh and the very low literacy rate among women. 
The BRAC Model 
6.40 BRAC entered the education fie ld only in 1985. The aim was to develop an 
approac:h to educational services based on a better understanding of c hild psychalogy 
and mo~:~vation; a~j)~O~r\a~:~ curricula and t~C-~\ng rnatetia\s; and \nnovative teaching 
methodS. BRAC 's general objectiVes ~ere eX])ressed in retms of: 
7 RED : Loan Recovery Performance of Ru;ral .Poor: Var iations and 
!nterrelations. Dhaka . September 1991 
Al l data taken from I.BRO : llatlgladesh- Poverty and PuDEc 
ex~enditur~s : A.~ Eva:uat~on of th~ I mpact of Selec t ed Gover~~n~ 
1?rogr ams. Report No, 7946- BD. iiorld Bank, Washington DC. 
January 1990; and UNICEF: '!'he state of the World'-s Children -
1992 . Oxfo.-d University Press. 1992 
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i) re..spooding to the needs, the :real- life sitUations and the socla!, economic 
and cultural env\ronn'<et~t. -of til~ ru.-al 1)oor and the\T children; 
ii) overcoming the proven shortcomings of the existing system of public 
sec tor formal education, tnc\~:<!lng :retalnlng childl·en in school long enoug!\ 
to achieve (It least basic literacy and numeracy. 
6.4\ There are now. two distinct com';}Onents of the BK.<\C model for NFPE: 
i) NFPE proper - a three-year period of access to primary education for 
children aged between 8 and 10 years; 
Primary Education f.or Older Children (PEOC), also known as Kishor 
Kishoree (KK) schools , origjnally offering two years schooling {now 
extended by policy decision to t!lree years} for children and adolescents 
ranging from 11 to 16 years old. 
6.42 Distinguishing characteristics of the NFPE model The MTE has identified ren 
char.acreristics of the BRAC NFPE model which not only. distill&'lliSh it from the public 
sector system but which a lso explain its popularity among parents and students: 
i) attendance at BRAC schools is .genuineiy free of charge; 
ii) physical access is maMgeable, no student having tO crave.! more than 
2.5kms to school, the average distance being about I km; 
Iii) the duration of the school day is only three bOurs (in rhe first year, only 
2.5 hours},. the timing of which can be adapted to suit !;he collective 
decisioa of parents, while the need for adequate total duration of 
attendance is made up-by six scbool days per week and a coral of 270 
au:endance days per year (ne3rly 23% more than the 220-day year for 
public sector schools); 
iv) teaching staff are all chosen from ru:nong local residents, the majority 
(some 70%) being women (a5 compared with over 90% male reacher.s in 
the public system; 
v) the teacher/student ratio is set as a matter of policy at 1:30 and is nor 
exceeded even under sr.rong demand for places; 
vi) there is an explicit poHcy to reserve a minimum of 70% of school places 
for girls; 
vii) there are no formal examinations but instead there is a system for 
<~nt\nuous assessment, including periodic tests, on the bas1s of wbicn 
special help is g iven to childrea wit.IJ learning difficulties; 
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viii) the school day is broken up by sucli co-eurricula ac tiVities as physical 
exercises, singing, dancing, drawing and supervised games, a!! of whicn 
add tO t he sense of fun among students; 
-
ilc} each school is superv-ised and guided c lose1y by PO level BR.-"\.C staff who 
visit usually twice per week; 
x) there is c lose consultation •Nir:l1, incJuding l!n element o f managemen~ 
decision-making by parents through monthly meetings ac the school itself, 
and by mean.<> of a managen>-ent commkt~e comp~:lsing two \)a!"et'lts (one 
male, one female), the teacher, and a local volunteer. 
Srrareey_ TargetS and Achievements 
6.43 BR-"..C's $trategy in ~he educadon sec>or has two main c omp-onem:s. First, mosr: 
:;pec:fically, it wants {ll} w endow as many children as possible with ~:he ba:;ic skills of 
literacy and nwn-eracy, and (b) in doiug so, to etJurp them c-o go on through successive 
levels of primary and secondary education_ To this end ics curr.en' overall target is t~ 
nave IOO,COO NfPE schoois op.en by the end of 1997, accommodat tng some ~ m \\\ion 
children, and financed from a variety of different sources. A.mbitious though k is, this 
to BRAC is very much a short-term target. Secondly, BRAC's strategy is based on 
ilringing influence to bear to improve me education system throughout the country, 
principally t:he public se<::tor primary system_ 
6--44 From a 1985 base comprising tlte first batch of 22 P..Xper imenca1 schools, BRr"\C 
-had increased this to 2,204 by clie end of r..l!e fiTI.t year-of RDP-IL Its target for the end 
of 1991 was to have 6,000 NFP:£ schools in operation, a f igure whi<;h it slight:ly exceeded 
wiE-fJ a total of 6,003. Of these, some 4-,180 are reported as having been f inanced by 
RDP- n . For 1992 the plan is to open ::t further l ,500 -schools under RDP-II, though the 
BRAC-v.'ide target, drawing on other sources of financial support, is to have 12,000 
schools open by the e nd of the year. The only possible internal impediment co achieving 
this target could be the capacity of BRAC's training s}'litern co supply the aecessar.1 
numbers of schoo.lteachers. 
6-45 In terms of the performance of the school and reaching staff, every single 
indicaror signals a very high degree of success in NFPE- The model is s imi!le and it 
works- The dropout rat e for .CourSes completed in 1991 was only 1.37%. Of the 21,029 
girls enroled in BRAC schools i.n 1989, some 9R67% we nr: on to be l!dmitted to fonnal 
schools to complete their prtmary educatiOn- Looking st ill or ore closely, ¢ai!y 
attendance rates in BRAC schools are currently in excess of 94%, as compared wicll an 
attendance rate of about 50% in public sector schools. 
6-46 There see ms to be little difficulty in attracting an adequate supply of teachers 
for NFPE schools or in retaining them- There are rigorous procedures for the initial 
se!ec:-J.on Qf candidates 'Nho are then given z, 1'3-day basic t eacher training course, 
usually at rhe T ARCs. On completion of this tl'aining, less than 5% of the candida res 
fall out or are rejected as unsuitable. Thereafter, the first tfu·ee months of serving as 
a teacher \s regarded as a probatloo:<.-y period, U!ough fewer than 1% fail to be 
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confirmed. The dropout rate among confirtncd teachers is also mana!ieab!y low, at just 
under 4. 7% for 1991, the most common reason reported as be in~ the reachers' 
households moving away from the area. 
6.47 In terrns of educational achievements, the record is equally successful. Literacy 
rates after course completion are consistently 95% or more. Rev iews of the evaluation 
records of students in & BRAC schools during the :\liTE showed that more than 95% of 
students achieved rnarks of BO% or more in egch suhject area. The very high proportion 
of c-.'FPE students being admitted to formal schools is ano ther confirmation of success. 
H!lving heen adrnitoed, the fact that their subsequent dropout rates are re lat ively high 
(4:2% of those enroled in G!"ade IV in 1989, 26%. in 1990, and 14% of U1ose enroled in 
Grade V in 1989) probably speaks more of dissatisfaction with the pubHc sector system 
than of lack of inter~-">t among !)arce{lts or of ability on d1e. !)arc- of tne students. 
6.48 Collaboration with government Though it is part of BRAC'-s strategy to influence 
the educational syscem a,s a whole, its acl1ievements in this direction are as yet 
understandably quite modes~. The public sector education system is not only very large 
and very run down but is also at the s.ame time very set in its ways, making it difficult. 
to penetrate. Neverthe less, a modest start has been made through the Facilitadon 
A.ssistance Programme (FAPl cover\rrg a t.otal of 16\l government pr\mary scMols in 
three Upazilas. The FAP provides arrangements for BRAC NF'PE staff to collaborate 
with government education officials and teachers in seeking to improve supervisory 
syste.rns and capabilit ies; increase student enrolment and retention races; raise the level 
of daily attendance; strengthen the eff!ciency and motivation of teache1·s; and increase 
parent participation in school affaiFs. So far, tbe FAP is too small and coo r ecent to 
judge its success or to project forward a model tor further, wider-scale collaboration. 
6.49 In addition, BR.O..C has put forward an application for the s ingle largest 
cornponentc of the NGO budget line in the General Education Project being supported by 
the World Bank/IDA and a varie ty of other internat:ional agencies . The significance of 
thiS could go well beyond gaining access to the financial resources for the 3,000 NFPE 
schools !n the BRAC proposal (which willlo factc be quite modest in relation co BRAG's 
overall targets for expansion). Instead, BRAC should attempt to negotiate a role for 
i<Seli in this J)TQject not j us.t a!~ an implementing 'contractor' for a port) on of the NGO 
component but as a te chnical advisory agency for all aspects of the project relating to 
i:he development and refinen1ent of the primary education system. 
lnter-Cvc!e Continuation 
6.50 In the early days of N"FPE, when attendance at a BRAC school was regarded as 
an end in ie>-e\f, lacK of synchronisat\on between the BRAC and public sector school 
calendars was not an issue . Now that so many NFPE children do pass on to goverrunem 
schools - itself a reflection of the scren~h of demand for education - !3RAC is faced 
with the need co make the transition as easy as possible. In a s teady state, with a more 
or less constant number of BRAC schools in operation, BRAC would be able to adjust 
its school calendar co match that of government schools quite quickly and easily. But 
in the conte-"t of v~ rapid expansion, it becornes more difficult for two main reasons: 
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j) before each new school can be opened there is much preparatory work to 
be done - including surveys and selection of scudents, the idencification 
and recruitment of teachers :md the identification of suitable premises 
for new schools - all of which has to be done by BRAC POs; 
iil new teachers have to be trained, ideally not more than abouc cwo months 
before the opening of the school ro which they are assigned. 
6.51 If all new BRAC schools were to open simultaneously at a time to iic best with 
tlle goveroment sc!lool year, t he workload onNFPEPOs and on the T ARC-based training 
staff would probably becorne uoma11ageab!e, given the racte of expansion envisaged to 
1997. BR.i\C has been trying to deal with t:his issue for the past few years an(! is now 
followLrtg a timetable which limits the opening of new schools (and the r e-opening of 
schools after batches of children have completed their courses) to two periods in the 
year - around March to May and frorn Seprerober to December. The government school 
year begins in J anuary. Thus, s cudencs completing their colll"ses at schools which opened 
ducing the last quarter of a Year will not have lpng to wait before they can pass into the 
next intake co a government school. BRAC studenrs who complete the ir courses dur:ng 
the first three to five montbs into the government school year can be registered aE their 
new .schools on schedule but ctat accually take their 1lhl.Ce5-until later without, it is said, 
missing ve->:y much. 
6.52 For new schools, the MTE endorses the approach being adopted by BRAC. 
However, once a school is in operation, whenever it may have opened, it should be 
possible to adjust the duration of the ·courses taught so as to bring it more close~y in 
· pht~Se with the government school year. A gradual increase or reduction in course 
duraJ;;\on o!, say, u0 to one month per year over a three-year course would impose rew 
educational penalties but would do rnuch co help synchronise 13RAC students with the 
sc hools to which they want to be admitted later on. 
Issues in the Future Expansion of l\'f'PE 
6.53 The demand for expansion The demand for expansi-on of NFPE capacity can be 
snown bo~!t numerically and (luaiitative!y. Government data indicate that in t 990 there 
were some 15.1 million children between the ages of 6 and 10 years in the country. Of 
these, 7.5 million enrol but subsequently drop out of the public sector primary education 
system while a further 3.5 inillton do not enrol at all. The potential demand for the 
type of free, effective education offered byBRAC's NFPE programme,. therefore, could 
be as high as ll million plaees.9 QualiEatively, discussions with &'Toups of parents 
during the MTE revealed not a single case of ambivalence or criticism ave!" the NFP£ 
l;ervice. Ainong p2rents of children a\ready at.tenil\ng l'o'FPE. scnools, a common answer 
w the quest"ioo of wbat BRAC could do to improve the service was simply thaE it. shonld 
Dat.a from GOB: Population Development and Evaluation Un~t . 
? lanning Con~ission, Db4ka, and GOB: Office of the Director of 
Primary Education, Miniscry of Education, Dhaka, and GOB: 
Bangladesh Bt;reau o f Ed.c.ca~ional Information at"~d s tatistics 
( B~~E!S) , Dhaka, 1990. 
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extend the duration of school place entitlement from three to five years. In shorr, 
BRAC's NfPEmodel s~ems to have tapped into a well-spring of demand for e ducation 
among the rural poor. The mothers of some NFPE students even hope that they will be 
able to learn to read and write from their children. 
6.54 The management of exPansion Ia tbe context of very r apid expansion over the 
last few years the management scrucrure of NFf'E is understandably not yet fully 
developed. The general s t rocture is similar to that of RDP and RCP, with a Programme 
0\recwr based in HO, Regional Managers (!UI-'1} and Area Managers {AM) with te:ams of 
typically 10 Pas assigned to them as field supervisors. At pr.esent there are iour 
Regional Managers (two of whom are designated as Assistant RMs) each covering an 
average of about L,SOO NFPE scb.ooh and 35 Area ~anagers each coverlng an avernge 
oi about 4 RDP/RCP/WHDP areas and an average of about 170 schools. 
6.55 Wi~ growing conJidence about the appropriateness and success of the basic 
NFPE model, BR.AC is already projecting forward the management structure needed for 
its target of 100,000 schools by 1997. lo doing so, it: is planning to increase the span of 
managerial responsibility at middle Md senior leve!s. For example; at full development, 
there are plans for 33 Regional Managers, each responsible for abour. 3,000 scl"!oots -
double the number covered by the current four R.\1s/ Assistant R.Ms. Under each R.\1! it 
is p!anned w assign 10 Area Managers (AM), each responsible "for 300 schools, agt-in 
nearly double the 110 schools covered by eac.~ or the cwrent. 35 Area Managern. Ar:. the 
next level down in the management structure NFPE will inQ"oduce a new position of 
Team Leader, each covering about 100 schools and responsible for the management of 
2 group of 5 or 6 POs aS fi~ld suQervisors. 
6.56 FindJ!l<! the staff The MT£ endorses we planned management structure for NFPE 
at full development. Fill ing the positions u1 the hierarchy, how.ever, including the 33 
R.\l!s, 333 A:'l<fs, !,000 Team LeaderS and bet:ween 5,000 and 6,o60 POs, will confront 
BRAC wit.h a formidable task over the ne.xt 5 years. Already, during the course of 1992, 
recruit:.rnent targets include increasing the number of NFPE POs by nearly 40%, from 
57o to 800, and the number of Are3 Manage.."S by more than 70')'o, from 35 to 60. ln 
fact, judging from recent exp·erience and in view of the etnbargo on recrujcnenr I>Y 
government, BRAC is probably better placed now than ever before to attrac: 
applications from young peo"l)le with masters degrees. The issue, therefore, is not w 
much recruitment as competence, experience and the preservation of quality during 
rapid expansion in stsff numbers. Inevitably, rapid expansion will me.an that the average 
!eogtb of specific job experience among sr;a.(f at all levels will drop, jncluding oot only 
freshly- recroited te~chers but also their supervising ?Os, new Ar ea Managers (who will 
probably be promoted from the ranks of e;d~ting PQs) anp Regional Managers. 
6.57 Training and the preservation of qual! tv There is nothing BRAC can do to change 
the effect that rapid· expansion of NFPE will have in reducing the length of specific job 
experience among staff at most levels in the managemenc structure, \Vhat it can do, 
to offset the impiied r isk o~ loss of quaHcy in programme management and service 
delivery, is to ensure the best poss.ible job preparation and induction training, both for 
new sraff as well as for those who will have w be rap1~ly promoted. The focus of 
attention in this respect is en BR.A..C's training capacit.y. 
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6.58 Por basic teacher train ing , NFPE reckons rhac 25% of TARC capaciry wi!l 
continue to be reserved for it. On rhis basis it has alre ady drawn up a programme with 
tl1e Training Division to accon1modare 6,219 new NFPE tea chers during the course of 
1992. All but about 4% of these are expected to be trained at the existing T ARCs, the 
remainder being schedule d for field-based training in Kutubdja and Anandapur-Sulla. 
'the. progr~e h.as been bz.:;ed tm a ~3-day \nduct1on ceurse, though now that the new 
policy is for a 15-day course, the cra ining workload will have to be reviewed against a 
bl!ckground of aJ rea dy int ense pressure on TARC capacity. Moreover, che 6,2 !9 places 
planned will only be sufficient for new reachers required in rJew schools to be opened 
to meet the targe t of 12,000 schools in operation by the end of 1992, including wastage 
of just under 4% immediately after training. But tl1e.re seems to be no provision in the 
nurni:>er oi places p lanned to respond to l\'FPE's rules of thumb based on experience (a ) 
thai:. new teachers will be. re~uire.d \~ about. tG% cf ex\st iO'S schools wh\ch re.-cpen, and 
(b} that there is a natural was.tage rate among serving teachers of just under 6%, as 
noted earlier. Moreover, there also seems to be no provision in the craioing schedule 
for 15-day refresher courses for KK (PEOC) teachers after two years - an area of 
training which will grow considerably ove r the next few ye ars. 
6.59 Scaff train ing, too, will place increasingly large demands on TA,RCs and on the 
Management Deve lopment. Prograrru:ne. All NFPE POs, for example, are expected tc 
undergo three training courses during tl1eir first year of service. These include going 
through the same 13-day (now 15-<lay) .reacher training course as the teachers 
t.IJemselves; a course of 8 days on the o-ainiog of NFPE teachers; and a further course 
of 6 days ill skills development training. Together, these courses are int ended to equip 
POs for their supervisory and support role, including field-based or ienca t ion and brief 
monthly refresher training of teachers. Givett the scale of t he recruionent of new POs 
reQuired if NFPE. adheres. to its 1997 target for 100,000 schools as well as the likely 
rapid promotion of existing POs to become Team Leaders and Area Managers, the 
retention or even extension of induction o-aining oi this sort will be vit al if BRAG's own 
high scandards of q_ua!ity and competence are m be maint ained. A furthe r compllcating 
factor is thru: the workload for st aff induc tion training is not simply a reflection of the 
nu.mbers o f ne w staif posit ions created. Natural wastage among new s.caff in me first 
one or two years after their recruitment also has to be taken ioto account. The NFPE 
?rogramme Director reports, for e,xarnple, tha~ if female POs are recruited. in the order 
of half will !eave witl1in t.wo yea..TS of joining the programme. 
6.60 Unfonunately, a backlog in P O training ha d already developed in 1991 and looks 
set to grow during 1992. Of the 375 NFP£ POs in December 1991 a ll had completed the 
13-day reacner training course but 82 had not been given the 8-day training of teachers 
course and 52 had not gone through the 6-day sldlls development course . Comparing the 
1992 recruitme nt schedule with the PO training programme indlcates c.'Jat the backlog 
in aaining of teachers is likely to grow to more tl1an 130 while for skills development 
jUSl: under 70 POs may not be acco.rrunodated. 
6.61 The early indicators of a staff training backlog outlined above put NFPE a!ld 
BR.A.C's Training Deparonent in a dif ficult pos ition. On the one hand, the training 
backlog ru: present is not of. an a larming scale . It coul d become so, however, if .SRAC 
adheres to its target ·ror NFPE expanSion, f rom the base of about 6,000 schools a r c.l-}e 
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end of 1991 to !00,000 by the end of 1997 - equivalent tO .an annual avenage rare of 
growth of nearly 60% in the numbers of operacing schools, and calling for a sinli!ar 
annual average rate of growth in numbers of servi.Pg POs. On the other hand, 8RAC is 
still far from certain of being abJe to mobilise the necessary external financial 
resources to push ahead towards the 100,000 school target. This is a difficulty which 
confronts BRAC as a whole. ldeal!y, tbc expansion of cap1lcity for upstream activities 
such as the training of tesc hers and super'tisory staff should precede the expansion of 
operational ac.:ivities. But to be able to do this, l3R.AC would need from its external 
sponsors much clearer si g1la\s over much longer periods of t\me than it has beer' ab\e 
to negotiate so far. 
6.62 In the circumstances, 1'-.'FPE seems to be hedging its bets. According to the 
target timetable for NFPE expansion, 1993 and I-994 will be critical years for training. 
But programme management is assuming ctiat in each of these years three -new mini-
TARCs will come into operation, adding co the capacity for teacher and stsff craioing. 
The!"e are no plans to rent additional accommodat ion exclusively for NF'PE training until 
1996. The difficulty will arise if (a} BRAC is successful in mobilising the resources 
necessary to adhere to its overall t<JTget, but (b) tllere are de lays (as seems hfghly likely) 
in completing and commissioning the planned ne w mini-TARCs. 
E. The Paralegal Programme 
Oril!ins, Rjltionale and Obiectives 
6.63 It was in 1984 in Manikgaaj that BRAC first recognised a lack of legal awareness 
among women group members as a perpetuating characteristic of poverty. Two years 
!ate.· a BRAC wnsultaut r epvrted uu <!!'<::<~£ uf wnfllcL w!Jich might foJ•m Lhe basis of 
legal awareness training for both men and women. The consult ant and t:ht'ee lawyers 
then developed and t ested a legal awareness training pilot programrne in Manikganj in 
August 1986. This led to a TARC-based training course in 1988 and in turn to the 
design of a mode1 for the ParalegaJ Programme in January 1989. 
6.64 The five-year per iod of rese<J.rch, experimentation and testing during the second 
half of the 1980s demonstra~:ed that legal awareness· training could be impaned 
effectively tbrough trained, vi\\age-9ased paralegals t.o illiterate men and women in the 
key a.reas of Muslim Family Law, Muslim. InheritanCe Law, Citizen's Rights, and Land 
Law. !t further demonstrated that: 
i} 
ii) 
there was a demand for legal-awareness, especially amo ng members of 
longer-est ablished, more mature groups; 
group members wowd be willing to pay Tk.lO each for legal awareness 
training; 
iii) after training, they felt an increased level of confidence in claim\ng their 
r ights; 
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iv) within the socio-political constraints of v!llage li fe they were enabled b 
spec ific instances to ac~ on the basis of the knowledge rhcy had acquirec; 
v) the training fees (of Tk.10 each in groups of 25 members collected by 
BRAC sr.ar'f and passed back · to the paralegal woc,ker) provided a 
worthwhile remuneradon and attrac ted good volunteers for the p~ralegat 
training. 
6.65 Based on the early field experience, the rationale for t he exf)aosion of che PLP 
was codifieC. as follows; 
f) legal awareness and empowerment is 1\n important complement co the 
social and ec:~oomic etnpowemlem of tbe poor; 
ii) the esotericism of the law mus1: be de-mystified; 
iii) access to !ega) informacion is a legal right of every citizen and should not 
depend on income status or gender; 
iv) litigation is bath time-consun:ling and expensive, wasting the scarce 
resources of the poor and increasing their indebcedness. 
6.66 Against this background, the objectives of rhe PLP are to conttibute w the 
empowerment of the poor; to demystify the law for those wbo are illiterate; co provide 
access to !ega! information as a right.; and w reduce the incidence of litigation among 
the !andl es.s. 
Ooerational PerforrT!ance 
6.67 The 1989 RDf-1!/RCP Appraisal recommended the exp3llSion of the PLP, but no 
specific cargecs were set and the rate of expansion was left for BRAC to decide within 
ics budgetary limitatiO!lS. By j une 1991 the programme was operating in 15 
Area/Branch Offices, as planned, while this had risen tO 30 Areas/Branches by February 
1992. The numhe~ of meml)e.rs trained as PLP Learners had reached ~n% of tne target 
for the year. By December 1991 the pmgramme had trained a cumulative total of 
25,202 PLP Learners. This represents significant expa.nsion during the course of 1991 
for the total of PLP Learners by the end of 1990 was only just over 5,000. Of the 1991 
cumulative -tot:al, about 80% .are women, as compared with about 62% female PLP 
Learners by the end of 1990. By we end of 1991 tile programme included !35 GS 
paralegals, of whom nearly twb thirds were women. Overall, the programme is 9% 
ahead of Its target in terms of numben>. of PLP L earners. 
6 .68 The under-achievement of targets for PLP Learners in 1991 was due to an 
unexpected level of drop-outs among paralegal workers during the first half of the year. 
Follow-up s&udies indicated that some paralegals who had been trained had not begun 
to give classes beca.use they had been too busy with their own income-generating 
acdvities, but that many of them still intended w s tart classes when they could find the 
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time. The higher proportion of women PLP learners than men could be due either to 
greater demand for legal awareness among women or a ~more qlrgeced approach ~o 
women by the paralegals, but the MT£ was unable r.o clarify this. 
?rommme Effectiveness 
6.69 >io maier problem~ have been \""e?l)nerl for the PLP, and nom~ wa$ o~e:"\!ed \n the 
field. A Knowledge Retention Study carried aut in 1991 suggests thac the training oi 
paralegal workers, the teaching of group members and the training mater ial used are 
all effective in transferring key information and awareness to BR.A.C members. 10 
There is a somewhat lower retention of knowledge of lnhe r itance l...aw, especially anong 
women. This is regarded as unsurprising in view of the complexities of this law, 
panicvlar!y its inherit ance shares aspects, which are oow be ing given special attention 
in refresher training. PLP managers and MTE field visits suggest that through informal 
communication legal a wareness also passes to a larger circle in the villages where 
classes have been held. 
10 A. Sattar and S. .1ahan: '!'lle Paralegal Programme - A Study oo 
Knowledge Rete.Y!tion. BAAC, !lhaka. June 1991 . 
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7 . SUPPORT SERV!CES 
Introduction 
7.! The rerms of refer ence for tlle MTE re{er to six support services within BRAC, 
including NFP£ and PLP. The MTE regards these as oper.atiooal pr.ogrammes and for 
<:his 'eason has included t hem in the S)revious section of this report . On the othe• harui, 
the terms of reference do noc include the Sectoral Programmes as support service$, 
perhaps because they are a ll specifically linked to operational credit programmes. The 
MTE has included the Sectoral Programmes as support s ervices, panly owing co the 
substance of their work in ·providing extension and advisory services and training, but 
also beca.use in the future, as RCP accounts for a steadily increasing share of BR.AC's 
credit activities, the Sectoral Programmes will be expected tO· pay their e>wn w~y as 
fee-charging suppor t services. The MTE has also added t he Construction Deparcmenr 
which, in the context of r apid e~pansion, p rovides an important service co the 
operational programmes. The support servfces treated he re, therefore, include: 
i) the Sectoral Programmes; 
ii) the Rural Enterprise Project; 
w.l the Management Deve1opment Programme; 
iv) tbe Rese aFch and Evaluation Department; 
v~ the Monitoring Department; 
vi) c.l-le ConstrUct ion Department. 
A. Sectoral Programmes 
Organisarional Structure and Aooroach 
7.2 BRAC's speclalised e;oetension services focus on the four sectors of poultry and 
Jivestoc~, irrigat ion, fisheries and serkuiture. Each of these· seccoral programmes 
provides a combinat ion of training, technical advice and support services to members. 
Their organisational structure comprises four tiers, in ~aral!el with the structure of 
l3RAC as a whole: 
i) Hea d Offiee specialist staff engaged in planning, administering and 
coordinating the services; 
ii) Regional Of fice specia lists (senior POs} providing tra ining and supervisory 
services; 
iii) field- level POs and GSs operating out of AOs/ Branches and working 
directly with VOs; 
iv) specially selected and trained BRAC members/bOtTowers providing a 
range of pracdcal s ervices, for example, parave ts in the livestock area 
and poultry workers providing vaccines (and vacc ina:ti<ms), treating 
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diseases, and giving a.dvice to VO members on better, rearing practices, 
includ ing key rearcrs in the poultry programme serving as role models lor 
their neighbours. 
7.3 A key character istic of this organisational scrucrw·e of the sectoral programmes 
- and one which de monstrates the sensitivity of the BRAC approach - is its inclusion of 
some of the members themselves. This represents a deliberate blurring of the 
boun<:Wries between t.l-te service dellverysystetn and its receiving mechanism a t the local 
level. It echoes some aspects of the Training and Visit sYSt em in agriculrur!ll extension 
services and bas been adopted by BRAC for tbree main reasons. First, the involvement 
of members of the VO peer group - who know all or most of those engaged in a 
particular sector at the village level, who tllem..-elves have probably experienced most 
of the difficulties likely to crop up, and who are always on hand- is expected co be 
more effective 'han relying. on visit5 by outsiders. Secondly, it permits both depth and 
spread or coverage without the be~vy overhead costs which would be incurred if all 
services were provided bY fu\1-<.ime BRAC staff. And thirdly, BRAC expects the 
incorporation of an extension mle within the village- le1fel membership to e.nhance the 
prospects for the full integration of the different sectoral activities into the village 
econO!Jly, hence to enhance their longer~term sustaioabili ty. 
Sr.affin,g 
7.4 By the end of December 1991 the four main sectOral programmes act;ounted for 
a total oi SIS BRAC staff. Of th~>..se, some 2~5 staH {43.5%}, by far the Iarges~; g>l)ujl, 
were engaged in the agricul ture and irrigation .sector. !n the other three programmes 
there were 149 staff (22%) in poultry and !ivescock, 119 (17.5'%-) in fisheries and 115 
(17 .0%) ln sencultw-e. It h.as not been possible co rrace comprehensively the growt:h of 
fuli-tix-ne sectoral staff \n r elation to the. growth or substantive s'!;cto..-al wo~k under 
RDP-U/RCP owing to lack of data on the numbers of GSs assigned in 1990 gnd earlier. 
Nevertheless, growth in the nwnbers of special.!s:t POs reveals some interesting trends. 
7.5 Overall, the number of spedai\st POs grew by nearly 2.8 times, {rom ?4 \n 
November 1990 co 204 by December 1991. Among the four sectors, however , growth 
in the numbe.."S of POs assigned was far from uniform. In the poultry and livescoc!( 
sector, for which BRAC has a wel!-estab!isbe.d model, the numl:iers of specialist POs 
grew by only three, from lB to 21. In fisheries, the number of POs rose from 12 to 1'3 
over me same period. In the agriculture and irrigation sector, on ~'le other hand, the 
number of POs assigned !Ose dramatically, from 30 .in November 1990 ro 138 b;' 
December 1991. This reflects not only growth in lending to DTWs but BRAC's 
reco~\tlon of the greater risks in t'.nese schem!!l> ~eri'licg from tech.nica.l/mechanlcat 
issues in their operation; questions of cohesiveness, hence credit discipline in the larger 
VOs required; and production relations between the VOs as suppliers of water and 
farmers in the command areas as users. In sericulture, where the BRAC production 
mode\ is still b e ing developed, the number or specialist POs mm·e than doubled, though 
from a smaller base of 14 ln November 1990 to 32 by the end of !991. 
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Service DeliverY 
7.6 The four programrnes differ from each other in the way they operate and deliver 
t:heir services. 1t is in the traditional, more f-amiliar sectors such as \ivescock, poultry 
and fisheries cha t the greatest numbers of members are invo lved because the services 
to be delivered are relatively s imple and they can be trained e3sily. Sericulture, too, 
is a traditional industry, at leaH in certain parts of t.l1e c.ountry. But ic is not nearly 
as broadly 1 ami\iar among the rural popu\~;~tion and there are some aspects of r.l1e 
production chain which are technically c·omp!ex. Moreover, BRAC is still developing 
the production model for sericu!ture . For these reasons, the number of BRAC members 
involved in providing services is smaller, t.l!ough there is scope for growth. Irrigation, 
as noted earl1er ln this report, presents a complex_ set of difficu1ttes rangingirom purely 
technical, mechanical issues in the operadoo of DTWs, through questions of group 
organ.isation, manage ment and credit dlscipUae, to the production relations between the 
BRAC VOs supplying wacer and the farmers in the command areas. Again, therefore, 
were is sornewhat: less scope for tbe involverr~nt ol' BR.t..C members In t 'ne exwnsion 
and support services. 
Financine the Sectoral ProgrammP.s 
7.7 At the lowest level, the practical support provided by trained BR.AC members 
is directly- financed by the membership at large through a predetermined scale of fees 
for different. services. This arrange,ment is now fully integrated ln the poultry mode!, 
has bacome well a ccepted by BRAC memberS and is another factcr stret)gt.hening the 
prospects. for suscainability . The fees themse.lves can be kept quite lpw as some of the 
inputs such as vaccines in the livestock and paultry sector are provided free by the 
govenunent. The full~time tlRAC scaff are p;nd partly from the J<.DP budget and partly 
[mm oifferent components of the overall training budget. For n>l).ture RCP Branches 
He. cwo years after the transition from RDP to RCP) the policy.is mat VOs s hould also 
pay fees for any further training and(or extension services provided by BRAC staff. 
This policy has not yet b een put into practice and questions remain abom; fee scales, 
their <>CCepubmty to members, and the effects they may ha·ve on .take-up rates. 
Tarws and Achievements in Sectoral Programme Exp@nsion 
7.8 Tcl>ie 7.1 shows selected indicators of tile baseline position pr ior to the 
commencement of RDP-Il/RCP, annual growth co December 1991, and a compar ison of 
incremental achievements against targets for c~~endar 1991 for each of the four main 
sector;'!! program.mes. On balance, the selected indicators demons trate excellenc 
adherence to ;::argets. The livestocl<. and poilltry ]:Ire-gramme, for example, snows very 
close adherence to tars;ecs probably because (a) it is already quite familiar to BR.o.C 
members, and (b) i t ls supported by a well-developed modeL 
7.9 ln com:rast, the main shortfa11s against targets He in areas which are wet!- ?mown 
to present difficulties or for which the BRAC model is not yet fully developed. In 
irrigation, for example, the 19% shonfall against the incremental target fa r irrigate«! 
area is the less sw·prising because experieQce in general shows that actual DTW 
command areas l'll!'ely r each their potential. In fisheries, the shOrtfall in the number 
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TAI}J ,f; 7.1: Sector Prognmnne~: CumulutJve Achlevernecits and Achleverraents Agalllst Tar·gets for HJ9 1 
Curnu laLl v•~ Addevc.:mcnLS 
December Decernuer Dccernlle r 1991 I 991 'l'ar·get Achievement 
19t\9 19~0 H)9l Incremental ~s% of 
Achievement Targe_t 
Livestock and Poultr·y 
Paravets 396 640 I 152 51 2 338 !51.5 
UvesLoc k Rear·ers 17848 42365 5852 1 16, !56 13,835 ne.s 
Poul Lry Rearers 40910 56664 95506 39,942 39,750 I 00.5 
Poultry Worlters 31?6 384'3 4999 l ,151) 1,258 :H.9 
Chick Rearing !Jnl ts 2·16 650 J359 . 709 707 I 00.3 
lrdgation 
J:\6 1 beep Tube wclls 136 305 169 200 84.5 
l r rlgal c<} Acreage . 5<\44 '61)35 p:m 7,292 9,000 !i l.O 
Fisheries 
Carp Culture (Ponds) 439 669 1181 512 (lG3 77.2 
Nilo tJca Culture (Ponds) 279 403 18072 1,404 3,163 <!4.4 
Fish Nurseries 115 165 277 112 286 39.2 
Sericulture 
' Silk Worm Rearers 1014 1667 2141 474 583 8 1.3 
Reelers !2 128 14~ 17 17 100.0 
Mulbury Trees Planted ('0.00) 6:>.53 2709.9 4, l4!.4 1,431.5 1, 560 91.8 
Other 
Apic ulture, boxes -
-
2038 -
- -
Apiculture , colonies -
-
57 1 - - -
l. No. of Ins Lulled 1 uhewells. 
2. N!lotlca pr(Jgrfl rnrnc: n lphlced hy SharpuLl. 
3. lncludfng HC I'. 
L 
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of nurseries established probably reflects teChnical and manag.e.rilll difficulties wh ile ::he 
under-achievement ln ponds for Nilotica refle_cts a shift away from this- species in 
favour of Thai Sarputi. F'or sericulture, adherence to targets has beeo closest in 
numbers of new .reelers established and mulberry crees planted - r.he lau:er of which 
being one of the simplest asf)ecrs of the programme and in which BRAC now h2S 
substantial e;xperience and a wel!-developed model. The rearing of silk worms is 
recboicaUy more complica~ed work for which the shortfall in adtievement is proi>ab!y 
mainly because BRAC is still building up both the comprehensive model for sericulru,-e 
as well as its training ana extension capacity. 
B. The Rural Entel]lr fse Project 
Context and Rationale 
1.10 ro Bangladesh, as in most least developed countries, the rural labour force !S 
e.'Cpandi'ng much faster than the abso'rptive .capac:cy of agriculture. The pressure Is on, 
therefore, w explore way.s and means of promOting new opportunities for growth in rural 
non-farm en1p!oyment opportU{lities. Yet in the context of an existing relatively non--
diversified rural economy and at bes t slow growth in disposable income from farming, 
the cask is formidable. In Bangladesh a number of projects, progTammes and agencies 
are active iu this search for new ideas in small awi micro-enterprise deve\opmem;, 
including the Bangladesh Small and Cottage Indust:ries Corporation (BSCIC}, the 
Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council (BARC), the USAID-sponsored MIDAS 
programme and the Grameen Bank. Achievements in this field ·have been at best 
patchy. On the one hand, there h<~s been considerable success in the provision of credit 
to the .rural poor. But t here have been no c!ear bre ak-throughs in tbe sense of new 
sectors or activities capable of being undertaken easily by tbe rural poor and capable 
also of the .sort of ex-pansion and spread that · could make a significant com.rlbution to 
satisfying the burgeoning demand for employment. 
7.11 REP represents BRAC's own 'think-tank and laboratory' for new uses of credit. 
Its rationale can be. traced back to the discussioo earlier in Section 6 of this report of 
the tendency towards concentration in the milisation of credit, particularly for low risk, 
low 1etwn acth•)tles. BRAC's concern about this tendency - and its motiv2>tion \'n 
setting up REP - was two- fold. First, from ao early stage in its involvement in credit 
semces, BRAC bas recognised the potential risk that a very narrow range o.f uses of 
credit could reach sat.w-atioo level, affecting the absorption rate for additional credit. 
Linked t{) dlis i.s a conceptual appreciation that the development process should 
incoTJ)orate increasing diversificatioo·of activicyin the rural economy. Secondly, within 
its operational policy of aiming for breadth rather than depth of coverage and 
assistance, BRAC nevertheless is keen to explore what higher order, higher value-added 
enterprises and activities could be open to its members. 
7.12 The role of REP, therefore, is to identify, investigate, 
disseminate new business ideas on behalf of BRAC members. 
models are then expected to be fed lnt:o RDP/RCP as part 
programmes. 
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Organisation. Staffing and Resources 
7.13 Organisation Within BR.'\C's ove!<lll structure, REP forr)1S pan. of che Rural 
Development Programme, wit.h the REP Manager reporting dil'ect~y to. the RDP 
DireCtor. ln the field, there a~e no REP sta(f above PO lev-el and r.his gives ri!>e to a 
dual arrangement whereby·(a) for administrative purposes they report 'hrough the RDP 
sl:nlcture of .Area and Regional Managers, while (b} on substantive technical mauers 
they report to the REP Manager at HO. These dual li nes of management a:1d 
ac!minisuat:ion converge at the rnecrings of RDP Regional Mana.gers which are convenec 
by the RDP D\rector and attended by the REP Ma11ager. 
7.14 Tile main apparent weakness in REP's organisational s1TtlCture lies in the 
managerial 'distance' between Head Office and the field. Area Managers and ever. 
Regional Managers seem, with some justification, to regard REP as having its own, 
separate mandate and work programme wbichh managed from HO and wit.!} which they 
are reluctant or feel ill-equipped to interfere on substantive matters. Besides, they are. 
fully occupied with their' mainstream RDPresponsibilities. This leaves the REP POs not 
only wicl1om an intermediate level of Lecllnical management but also, by implication, 
without an easily-accessible source of guidance and motivation. The MTE has not been 
able to idem.ify any specific REP shon.comings wbic!;t might be attril:luted ro t.lte length 
of these technical managerial linkages. It raises the issue merely as an observation and 
as a mat:t:er that BRAC should bear in mind in the future development of REP. 
7.15 Tbe 1990 Annual Review recorrunended merg-ing REP wich the Sectoral 
Programmes to form new technical supporr teams. BRAC has stopped short of such a 
f onnal merger , though ln practice there is close exchange of experience and ideas 
between REP and the Sectoral Programmes, at least at HO level. At the ~e t1me, 
there is now a clearer distinction of roles, with the Sectoral Programmes being 
~onsible for al\ aspects of work in theU: respective fields, including new exp<!r\mem:.a! 
work, while REP is responsible for pioneering work in fields not covered by the existing 
sectoral specialists. The MTE endorses this arrangement. 
7.16 Suffing In just over a year between the 199.0 Annual Review and September 
1991, REP staii st:Fength bas r isen from 14 to 26. By the beginning of 1992, this had 
grown to a total of :32, comprising the REP Manager and two economistS (with MBA 
qualiiicacions) at HO and 23 POs and 6 GSs in the field. 
7.17 REP r eports that it has had some difficulcy in recruiting and retaining staff - at 
least, staff of the sort it requires. Against tbe 'background of its management sl:nlcrure 
outlined above REP ideally needs staff witll practical experience in micro-enterprise 
development, who can think cre('ltively, with sound and objective analytical skills, and 
who can be 'self-starters', able to reiy on their own energy and initiative. It is not easy 
ro find such people willing to join BRAC as POs and to work in the. field. Even at HO 
level, there has been considerable turnover among the economist positions. 
7.18 Budget The total budget assigned to REP between january 1990 and December 
1991 was Tk.8.8 mi!)ion while actual expenditure was Tk.8.0 million. This under-
expendit:uremasks considernble variations between al\ocl\tions and actuals for individual 
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budget lines. The most notable variation was in the budget line for experimental 
?Tojecr. mateTials , whe;re expend\t:ure of T!-..'3.15 million exceeded the allocation \oi 
Tk.2!0,000) by 15 t imes. T his was mainly due tO problems wittl power tiller schemes 
which failed to live up co their lnitlal promise. REP bought; back a s-ubstantial numbej 
of the tll!ers cr\ginally \s:;ue<i, with the int~t\on of ·e;.:per\menting w\rn a\temative 
operating models for rhem. Elsewhere in the budget there was con:;iderable under-
expenditure, principally againSt allocations for foreign consultants am:! a 25% under-
expendkure on staff salaries. 
REP Achievements . 
7.19 Since its inception, REP has worked on 53. distinct projects or new ideas for small 
and micro-enterprise development. Of these, 12 have been judged as suitable to 
recornmend and promote among BR..<\C members and have been 'handed over' co RDP; 
13 have been abandoned as failures or unsuitable; unother two have been suspended~ and 
the remaining 26 are at differenc stages of development as experimem:al or pilot 
projects. 
7 .20 Amas of success 'fhere a:re two distinct and sequential levels at which the 
success of REP's work can be judged. F irst, within the 'laboratory' context: of REP 
itself, an activity can be judged as initial!y successful if !3RAC members have- or can 
easily be given - the necessary technical and man11geria! s kills; if there is a market for 
the output or services generated; and if the enterprise or activity is financially viable. 
The second level f or judging success is more critical and hinges on whether a new 
activicy can be tr;1nslated into the sort of model tbat, for example, has been developed 
for the poultry programme, e nabling RDP ro promote and replicate-pilot work on a wide 
scale as part of its mainstream work. 
7.21 At the first level of judging St!CCe5S, - the 12 projects handed over to RDP are 
ctirTent1y estimated to be providing employment to about 10,000 people - a considerable 
achievement. Tbe second level, of widespread replication, is rbe-more stringent. test 
of success in the real setting of organis~lonal llbilities and mill·kets, and here the 
record is more m b:ed. Vegetable production, nursery ponds and Thai Sarpoti fish 
produccion seem to have been introduced successfuUy into mainstream RDP letJding. 
But ~ ,Jlough the rice mill scheme and the two bri~ fields set up With REP backing are 
still in operation there is little confidence among RDP st aff that they can e<>.sily be 
replicated on a wider scale. From d1e RDP perspective, t hese schemes arc ambitious; 
they call for large groupings of BRAC menlbers to spread capital and operating COSts; 
mey make considerable demands on the organisational and managerial c apacities of the 
membership; and they represent encries by the rural poor - albeit with BRAC backing -
into complex market sectors within the rural economy. Jn t.i1e perspecdve of BRAC 
mem'oe..rs, these factors all represent different dimensions of risk. As yet it. is wo soon 
co tell whether this r isk can be or will be assessed as worthwhile in relation to the 
apparently limited flnand al returns in these ventures . 
7.22 Fa!lurP.s There are !liSa two levels at whicn REP's failure.s can be assessed -
enterprises which are abandoned at the experiment<J.! stage, and. those which are p:"Jssed 
on to mainstream lending but which subsequ~tly fall. Exafllp\es of failure at the 1\rst 
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level include REP's work witll pigeon rearing and mt!Shroom cultivation. The first of 
these schemes was abandoned owing to t.'le practical difficulty of controlling and 
keeping the pigeons on the homestead. Experiments with mushroom cultivation failed 
owing mainly to marketing difficulties. 
7.23 F'ailure at the second level is more serious (a) if it is due to error of judgement 
on the part of REP in handing over new ideas to mainstream lending without, say, 
rigorous tf'..Sting of a new activity or without fuJI development of the technical, 
r:~ancial, organisational and management model surrounding it, and (b) because if new 
ideas are adopted by significam:. numbers of BRAC members, their failure could cause 
cons!de..rable hardship. The most notable example of failure after hand-over is t.'1e case 
oi power rnlers . REP's own assessment is that the power tiller 'model' was handed over 
to RDP too early, before the managerial and operational dimensions had been fully tried 
and tested. As noted earlier, REP incurred major unforeseen expenditure in bl.!ytog back 
many of the power tillers and is now undertaking further experiments with four 
diiferent ownership and management models. 
7.24 CoDing with failure REP has fully regist:ered the power tiller experience, 
pardcular!y the way It has highlighted the importance of developing appropriate, 
workable management systems for new enterprises. In addition, however, there is 
another question arising from the experience of schemes which are developed by REP, 
handed over to RDP, but which subsequently fail. It is the question of who should bear 
the responsibility, Including the financial responsibility, for failure? In purely banking 
terrns, when entrepreneurs take out credit to set up enterprises of their own devising 
there will always be failures. The reasons for failures can range from fundamental 
wca-!rnesses in the design of diffuent enterprises to management ineptitude or even the 
out:rightmisuse of credit. In any such cases, it is the entrepreneurs who make their own 
decisions, who bear the risk, and who are responsible if their ventures fail. But when 
new enterprises are recommended by BRAC - which is acting not only in the ro1e of the 
bank, ne provider of credit, but also as the advocare and supporter of its membership-
the a..<;signacion of responsibility for failure becomes much more difficult.. 
7.25 The key issue is that at present BRAC does not have a clear policy for coping 
with REP models which are recommended as feasible and appropriate, passed over to 
mainscream lending, but then prove to be failures. In developing such a policy, an 
obvious:eference point should be the extent or proportion of failures. If, for example, 
a new REP model is taken up by a nwnber of individual borrowers or VOs and is run 
successfully by a large majority of them, then the minority of failures can probably be 
assigned as the responsibility of the borrowers concerned. On the other hand, as in the 
case of power tillers, if failure is widespread and can clearly be attributed tO some 
inadequacy or lack of development in the model itself, it is BRAC which must take the 
responsibility. 
7.26 ~ew schemes REP is pressing ahead with its innovative and creative work. 
Among it:S recent experimental activities t.ltere are several ideas which seem very 
promising, including carp hatcheries, apiculture and roadside restaurants owned and 
operated by women. Small scale carp hatcberies are a novel form of spawn production 
in Bangladesh and represent a potentially important alt:ernative to the Department of 
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Fisheries as a source.of supply to private fish cultivation enterprises. The main caveat 
is that experien.::e so far suggests that these schemes may need close technical support 
from the fisheries sector specialist staff for a period of rime chat cannot yet be 
L predicted. REP1s work in the field of apiculture is based on a simple model which seems 
we ll-suited for women at tlle homestead level and which c0uld open up further 
possibilities for downstream processing and marketing. Roadside restaurants a!so seem 
EO be very succe-ssful. Field visjts during the MTE have shown that the women involved 
bave responded eagerly and successfully co the idea and do not in general seem to neec 
intense or lengthy technical- cum-manageria1 support. The schemes are the mote 
interesting not just because of the apparently high financial returns they offer bur also 
because the .model itself incorporates an important element of social change bY 
involving women in a commercial activicy which would prob.ably be rnconcei,·ab!e 
w[Lhout the hacking of an organisation such as BRAC. 
L Anci.llarv Funm:ions of REP 
L 
7.27 REPllndertakes a number of ancillary items of work within BRAC fn addit!nn to 
its mai.n responsibilities in the field of developing new ideas on behalf or the 
membership. A.s n oted earlier, two of BRAe's thtee staff wi.tb MBA (tuaHficat.ion.s are 
assigned to REP and their skills in project and business analysjs are in hlgb demand. 
Th.ey are often called in by RDP and RCP to undertake feasibiliEY analyses on 
applications for credit in different fie!ds and enterprises. REP staff are also involved 
in :monitoring the profitability of different types of venture in the credit porcfolio. 
7.28 In addition, RDP is relying on REP staff co assist In developing oew projects in 
six different sectors ranging from agriculture co rural manufacturing industries. These 
are a11 interesting and useful areas of work. The concern of the MTE goes back to the 
earlier point in rhe discuss ion of REP's structure and man:~gement, namely that its HO 
staff team Is quite small whlle the manageriaL 'distance' between HO and field stafi iS 
considerable. In this setting, if too many ~ciliary assignments are given to the HO 
t eam, not only would they be .stretched toQ thinly but tlleir ability to supervise and 
guide experimental work in the Held would be reduced still further. ln short, and 
consistent with the recommendations of earlier reviews, REP needs to maincain a clear 
focus in the interests of the quality of its work on behalf of the BRAC membership. 
C. The Management Deve~opment Programme 
Backl!round 
7 .29 MOP was originally conceived in the first half ·of the 1980s to serve two quite 
diHerent ol>)ectives. lnternally, and to !)repare fur 1)lanned ex\)ansian of BRAC's 
operational activities, it was intended to provide mana.gement training to BRAC staff. 
Externally, and consistent with BRAC's aim of using Its own experience to bring the 
widest possible influence to bear on other rural development programmes, it was 
expect:ed to reserve a considerable portion of its capacity for management training for 
the staff of other government agencies and :-IGOs. Indeed. the original intention to set 
up such a facility with the stat!lS of an instlUJLe suggests that t.he second, ex.ternal role· 
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wns ~een ns the mere significant. In pursuif: 1:-f sen.\ng up an institute, however, BRAC 
was obliged to enter into negotia£ions v.'ith the government and this led ro considerable 
delays. Eventually BRAC lowered its sights and the rec-named 1vffi? was set up as an 
independent BRAC programme in january !990. 
Phvsical Facilities and Throughout 
7.30 MDP's main campus is the new Management Training Centre (MTC) a.c 
RajendTapur which opened in May 1991 wich a design capacity of nearly 10,000 
participant-days per annum. 'fhere is another training centre - a rented building in 
Dhaka Uttara - though the accommodat4on there is described by c~DP as being 
'cramped'. 
7 .31 Between May and December 199!, the throughput of trainees at the Rajendrapur 
MTC was in the order of 90% of pro-rata capacity for the period. i'tearly 70% of this 
throughput was BRA.C staff, though originally it had been expected that up to hal: of 
~TC capacity would. be used for traming outsiders. Of the BR..O.C throughput, neerly 
two- tllirds of the trainees in fact underrook TAl~C courSes, suggescing tha<: at present 
the MTC is acting more in the role of a TARC. 
1ssuesc in the Gearing-Up of MDP 
7.32 MOP is essentially still too new for its contribution to be fully evaluated. .1\s 
);fDP seeks to establish itself properly and to gear itse1f up to full operation, the MTE 
hns identified four main issues c onfronting it, namely staffing; development of the 
rrainiJ1g curriculwn; establishing recognition and a role for itself within BRAG; and 
clarifying lts prlorltles. 
7.33 Staffing As yet, MOP does not have a team of full-time training staff - or 
'faculcy members' . Instead it relies principally on serving senior managers from 
different departments to provide training in their own specialisms of finMCia! 
management, monitoring and the like. This is probably effective, at least for the 
category of management training that can be described as 'the BRAC system of doing 
things' . But it cannot be expecred to be effective in passing on pure management skiUs 
- the management: of people, the management: of time, establishing and observing the 
limits of managerial discretion and me like - which is a specialised field in its own 
right. 
7.34 The specialised nature of management. training presents a double difficulty in 
building up a team of faculty members. If MOP looks 'internally for the team it can 
guarantee familiarity with BRAC. But, these staff will probably themselves need to be 
trained as management trainers and this will take time, possib1y even . ca!!ing for 
overseas training. On the other hand, ii MD? recrui ts externally, i t may be possible to 
fmd good management trainers but they will obviously lack familiarity and experience 
with HRAC. MDP policy is to recruit its faculty members internally. 
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7.35 Curriculum developmens; MOP has set its $ights so far .on the middle nmks of 
BR..!\C sr:aff and bas identified three bread sreas for managemenr training: 
!) technical aspects of management, including planning, work scheduling, 
monitoring staff t;ime use and ~fie !ike; 
ii) qualitative management sk ills, including leadership, motivation and 
communication; 
iii) conceptual understanding and co!lliPJtment to apply both rechn!ca! and 
qualitative management skills, 
7.36 \-!DP bas defined the middle ranks of management in rerms of Area Managers and 
semor POs and has be:gun ro develop uruning material in these areas - but there is still 
some way to go. So far, however, it has not come to grips with the potent ially more 
sensitive issue of identifying trll.ining needs among senior BRAC managers. 
7 .Yl Establishing an accepted role MDP staff have the impression that so far chere 
is tittle interest in their programme among opetationar managers. This perception 
seems ro be based on a lack of articulation of demand for management training - and 
is perhe~ps somewhat simplistic. Precisely because MDP IS not yet fully operational and 
ha$ therefore n<l~ yet bee n able w demoa.; rrate wha1; it l:ias to offer to improve 
management it would be too much to expect spontaneous expressions of demand. !o this 
setting, MDP needs to establish the closest possible communication wit h operational 
staff, panicu!arly their senior managers. The rum should be to generate a sense of 
involvemenL and participation and, in the process, to prime the pump of dernand for 
what );!DP can offer. And this needs ro be a conscious effort, not lease because at 
present the fact that the MDP Head Office scaff are based in the ren ced annex building 
across the road from the main office increases the communication and interaction 
'distance' chat has to be overcome. 
7.38 C!ariiving priorities The most important policy issue in clari fying MDP 
priorities is m e question of balance in effort and throughput between internal and 
external training. There are two elements of the rationale for MDP offering training 
services for non-BR..t...C staff. First, as noted earlier, rraining outside!'S is a potentially 
powerfol way of bringLTJg the BRAC approach and experience to bear in illfluencing 
or:her people, other agencies and other rural development programmes. Secondly, by 
charginJr commer·cial fees for chese external training services, MDP could hold ouc the 
prospect of financial independence, covering all its costs, induding its internal training 
services, from its own income. 
7.39 The MTE recommends that for die present MDP should give top· pr iority ro 
imcema! u:ainlng ani! should not \:le eJC?ecte<:l w meet j)redeterrn\ned t~rrgets either for 
the throughput of external trainees or f1lr cost recovery. There is much work sti ll to 
be done on t.lle issues of staffing, curriculum development and estab!fshing a role and 
reputation for itself within BRAC, as noted above, before MDP can be expected to folfil 
an external t:raining role. The implication is tilat:'viDP will require full iu~ding for some 
time to come - and this should be understood and accepted by r.he Donor Consortium. 
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D. Research and Evaluation 
Overview 
7.40 The Research and Evaluation Division (RED) is staffed by competent <esearchers 
and has already gained an international reputation for lts work. Its Cllr!'ent share of less 
thM 1% of the RDf' budget is not excessive. Nevertheless, by the na•ure of its role, 
RED is in a difficult posicion because its work is not a direct and integral part of the 
operational activities 6f BRAC. This characteristic of RED is compounded and more 
noticeable because (a) the operational programmes have been growing so rapidly during 
the lase few years, while (b) RED, like MOP anlt the ConstrUction Department are 
'ourposted' - albeit only by a matter ef a few yards - in the annex: building "3-t He.ad 
Office. In sum, RED can easily be seen as a 'bac.k-room' part of the organisation both 
in cenns of its1:ole and its physical location. Conscious of this; t he MTE has identified 
three inter--related issues tha t need to be addressed in the further development of RED: 
i) ensuring the relevance of resesrch programme content to oper<~tionaJ 
issues; 
iiJ strengthening RED's relations with operational programmes; 
iii) improving the accessibility and usability of its output. 
Research Subject Matter 
? .4l Tne MTE has examined S<>me ~'5 scudies undertaken hy b'J::!J anQ. ha-s reviewed 
both the design and emerging results of its !argest commitment, the Village Studies 
Project (VSf'). It has also discussed RED ourpuc with senior operational managers. The 
conclusion is that some of t he work is clearly bOth useful and relevant , particularly such 
studies as those of the literacy and continuation rates of children completing their 
NFPE courses. These are essential building bloCks in the development of confidence in 
BRAC mode.!.$ for Jts operational pmgrammes as well as showing how they might be 
refined. 
7.42 Some other aspects of RED's researcb actJvttles are not so well geared t!l 
operational interests. A case in point is the very large, very ambitious VSP. The 
proposal for this undertaking reads like a p!Ee research exercise. The Objectives and 
the J)rojected outputs can be seen as having high-order relevance to the development 
of a comprehensive underst<!nding of rural poverty and the factors which perpewate it. 
But neither the ob)ectives nor the ou~:.puts have much direct retevance to any part.icu!a< 
operational .BRAC pro·gramme. Within the VSP, the work in studying perceptions of 
power and statuS at the village level way help BRAC to sharpen its own understanding 
of what empowerment means and how it can be achieved. Eveo so, there will st.ill be 
a long way to go. The results will not only have to be 'opera tiorialised' but will also 
have to show how empowerment can be monitored if they are to be useful to RDP/RCP. 
Of clearly dubious value among the research iostruments in VSP are the Village 
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Monographs which do little more than catalogue rural poverty. RED is aware of this 
and of the fact that one measure of the remoteness of any pay-off from VSP is that so 
far there have been no internal workshops to discuss emerging results. 
7..13 BRAC's policy for determining the content and scope of elements in t~e RED 
work programme is that all new proposals should be submitted to an incerna! workshop 
as a screening and approval mechanism. Thereafter, RED enjoys considerable autonomy 
in geu.ing on with·t.he agreed work. W'nen tile resu.l~ become avaUable the po\icy is to 
convene a further workshop to explore their implicatiOns for operational 3Ctivkies. The 
policy appears sound but the MTE was unable to obse.r.ve any such workshops or to fom1 
any conclusions about ·their effecf.iveness. Nevertheless, from discussions with 
operat.iona\ managers, there do ;eem t.o be shoncomings in the perceived relevance of 
some parts of RED work. 
7.44 In general, the MTE review of RED's recent work programme and output reveals 
!)erha?S t.~o much aeademi.c rigour and aOherence to TeSearch design S'W-1\dards. \here. 
Is little in the way of 'quick and dirty' studies or diagnost.ic analyses of known areas of 
success or failure on behalf of o!Jerational programmes. 
7.45 There i!Te two Interpretations of the role of RED which impose quite different 
requirements on its relations wjth operadonill pares of the OJ"ganisation. F'irsc, the strict 
in~er-pretatcioo of RED's role as an e'laluati,te unit calls fo> it t-o maim:.ain some distl!-nce 
berween itself and operiltional programmes in the interests of maintaining objectivity. 
On the other hand, RED'~ role as a research unit and support servic,e - developing better 
under:s~aoding,; uf poverty, ernpowe::rment, tJ•e:: process uf :social dJau;;e aod feediug the 
result;; int.o practical work at me fi.etd le.,.e.t - scgnals the need for dose collaboration 
with operational staff. 
7.46 The view of the MTE is t..l-tat RED can and should do more to screngthen its 
relaf.ions with operat.iona1 progl'ammes. In doing so there· will be Ht.tle r-isk of 
undermining its objectivity, not least because of the organisational 'distance' that 
separates it from the rest of BRAC. The response to such reconunendations is typically 
to think in cer:ms of regular meetings, subject-specific workshops and the like. In chis 
case, however, there is a more l)romising option of bllildLng closer co Uaboration into tile 
way in which RED draws up its work programme. For this it would be necessary to 
reserve a portion of che RED budget and staff time to serve in a custome.r-concracror 
relationship with operational :programmes. The operational programmes, in the ro!e of 
cuswmer, would be expected to identlfy issues for st.udy and analysis. RED, as 
contcactor, would then be responsible., in collaboration with its customers, for deciding 
the scope, focus and methodology of study. 
7.47 Fro.ra. RED's \)Oint of view ttle main diffi.culcy such an arrangement would present 
would probably be its inability to draw up a predetermined work prograrru:ne, including 
d1e a!!ocation of staff time, as far in adva~ce as it can Cl,liTently. To minimise chis 
difficulty RED would be motivated to approach senior operational managers regulaJiy 
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to find out what issues may be cropping up as candidates for diagnostiC study and to 
reach agreement on how to fit them with other work commitments. in the process, 
RED would amomatically develop closer working relations wi~b DP.erational managers. 
Accessibility of Results 
7.48 RED is fully"llware of the general problem in tl1e world of today that its research 
and evaluation rep.Orts - like so much other information committed to pape.r - is 
coml;)eting for the time and int-erest of its \)otem:Jai readersh\p. 1he fact. that BRAC's 
expansion places so many demands on senior operational managers means <cha t the 
competition for time and attention is the more severe. To be effective in reaching its 
target audience, RED mus1: sharpen its expertise in information techne logy and improve 
accessibility to the results of its work. And if it can do this it will automatically 
enhance the prospects for its work be ing used. 
7.49 As in the case of diagnostic or quick .and dirty s tudies, improving the accessibility 
of RED's output will call for some relaxation of academic rigour. The most importent 
aspeCts of a given study as far as operational staff are concern-ed are the conclusions 
and recommendations. Yet of the sample of RED reports reviewed by rbe MTE, mosr 
emphasised methodology, sampling techni"!Ues and tlle reporting of results. Only a few 
presented operational conclusions or identffied issues for management review. In 
academic research it \s im?or<.ant t.o g}ve an ac~ount of methodology in order to 
demonstrate the confidence and validitY tllat can be £Scribed to the resultS. In "the c<~Se 
of BRAC, howeve.r, it is not so important to give detailed accounts of methodology or 
data processing techniques - at least not initially. Once the attention and interest of 
operational staff have been captured it will always be poSSible to take stock of the level 
of confidence aLLa<.;hed to ll.1~ result:> !Jt:fore deeiuing what action to take either in 
carrying out follow-up studies if necessary or in taking direct operational decisions. 
Recom.me.odations 
7.50 The summary recommendations for RED are: 
i) review ·a.od clarify the role and mandate of RE.D; 
iil 
iii) 
modify tbe pr·ocedure:s by which RED proposes, justifies and gains 
approval for indivjdual elements in its work programme, with the aim of 
strengt~ening the relevance of research subject matter to operational and 
field issues; 
improve the dissemination and accessibility of research results by (a) 
presenting self-contained. abstracts giv.in,g conclusions, recornmendador.s 
and sufficient explanation of methodology and analysis to demons~te 
their validity, and (b) in coosultation With senior operation~t1 managers, 
identifying selected research abstracts for translation into Bangia a!ld 
dissemination among BRAC fie ld offices; 
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iv) reserve (inftially} a modest component of REO resources for a responsive 
researc h progTarnme based on a customer-contractor relationship with 
Prowamme Directors and the Monitoring Department, penni~:ting 
customers to identify issues for investigative work and to participate in 
the design of diagnostic, trouble-shooting or other studies chey need. 
The Monitoring Department 
L Backl!Tound 
1 7.51 BRAC had already. established a Monitoring Cell in 1988, prior to the inception 
L of RDP-11/RCP. It grew out of the Research and Ev<~luation Division, based on an 
expression by RDP of its need for a full- time direct se!>'ice to develop and refine irs 
management information system. In !990, following the commence)nent of RDP-
11/RCP, not only was it upgraded to full departmental status but itS priority was clearly 
to focus on the broad mainstream of work in expanding membership and savings ar-d 
c:edit activities through these programmes. 
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Organisation and Staffing 
7 .~2 The Monitor ing De?arunent. {MD} is showo io the BRAC organisation chart as 
being managed by the Commercial Director. This appears anomalous because the 
administration and ana1ysis of a management information system (MIS) would normally 
expected. to be a staff function attached to the management of the operational units 
concerned - in this case , RDP and RCP. In pn~ctice, however, the anomaly is no t 
scriou:. 35 the Depanmeuc is physically located on •he same floor as clle Dlreceors of 
RDP and RCP, with whom the Department has the closest o.f all workiog relations. 
7.53 The MD has its own staff located only at me top two leve1s of the overall BRAC 
scructure: at He~d Off ice and in 12 Regional Offices. At HO level there are two full-
time economistS and another two POs designated as 'ad hoc1, meaning that they are 
formally assigned to the operational jll"flgrammes at tile field level but have been 
assigned on secondment tO the MD. Since being upgraded to departmental status, the 
\ID has been steadily increasing its field staff strength- fi·om 12 in late 1990 to t6 at 
the beginnJng of 1992, witlt an agreed further increase to 22 in Maron 1992 - a ll of 
whom are :Jt PO level. 
7.54 For data collection purposes, however, the MD relies principally on RDP and RCP 
ile!d- !evel staff- a further practical indication both of the nature of monitoring work 
as a staff function and of the closeness of working relations. In the incere:sts of data 
quality, the MD's regional monitors spena much of theit time as supervisors of those 
responsible for data collection. 
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The Current Role nf the Monitoring Department 
7.55 The MD sees its role on behalf of RDP and RCP in tenns of two main fields of 
dsta collection and analysis: (a) monitoring credit activities, and (b) mon!toring progress 
in instittltion-building. It per forms a second role, helping other operational programmes 
in the design .of monitoring systems and data collection formats, but this is ancillary to 
its main responsibil ities to RPP/RCP. 
7.56 ~onitoring credit operations Credit activities are monitored by means of r..fJree 
main indicators: disbursements, outstandiogs and credit recovery according to the 
predetermined schedule. These data are collected on a monthly basis but so far have 
been aggregated and analysed only at quarterly intervals. The reason for the monthly 
data collection is to instill in RDP/RCP field staff a sense of urgency and discipline in 
keeping close uack of trends in the lendirtg progranune, especially in the context of 
Bf~C's exposure to risk in a rapidly expanding portfolio. There are no plans to relax 
the frequency of data collection. On r..r,e contrary, th.e intention is to replace the 
quarterly aggregat e reports with monthly analyses - staff and eomputer facilities 
pennirring. SimHarly, suppleroencary indicators such as the designation of overdue loans 
as doubt.ful, recoverable or had debts which was carried out at. quarterly ince.t"Ya!s in 
1991 will also now be done on a monthly basis. 
7.57 Monitoring institution-bui lding The system used for monitaring progress in 
institution-building relies on two main sets of inform~tion. The firs't involves a 
straightforward count of nurobers of VOs, nurobers of l!Ctive members and data on 
savings. Tbe second represents a more 3rtlbitious - anti stm essentially experimental -
· attempt to assemble-information capable of giving some indication of the robustness and 
ID3Ul!'ity or VOs. It comprises a scbedU!e of !ndtcators Including such Items as nwnl)en; 
of monthly issues meetings t\eld; the degree of comple tion of predetermined training 
schedules among VO m embers; attendance J'ates at meetings; school enrolment races; 
child immunisation rates; and frequency rates for the implementation of decisions taken 
by VOs. At IU'St, there were 25 indicators in the schedu1e, subsequently raised to 30, 
but now trimmed back to 20. All of the individual indicators can be expresserl 
nurne<icalJy. Through a system of weighting they can then be reduced to a single 
numerical indicator. 
7.58 The characterisation of the 20-indicator system as being still experimental is 
based on three considerations. First, it is still open to question whether the indicators 
themselves and the way in whic h they are numerically combined can yield a satisfactory 
aggregate indicator of institutional development. The problem here is that while BRAC 
is clear about the importance of creating well-rooted, sustainable rural institutions 
among its members, it has not definitively specified what this meilos in terms, for 
example, of expectations of V0s in takin€;·spontaneous initiatives on their own behalf 
or of their sustainabi.lity with or without continued access to credit, access to extension 
services, or even access to BRAC itself. This is not a criticism of BRAC, for the 
experience of institution-building among tl\e rural poor by means of outside 
interventions is Still in its infancy. Rather, it must be recognised that the lack of 
~efinidon surroUlldiog the concept means thar any attempt to monitor it will have co 
he accepted as at best j>artial and S?llro:timste. 
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7.59 Second~y, the MD is concernf;lil about;-the reliabHity of data returns from the 20-
in<licacor system. The Department relies on Area/Branch Managers co check the scores 
assigned by POs to individual VOs against VO monthly reports and by rnaking their own 
e~quiries into the reasons for particular!y low or high scores or scores which do not 
seem to reflect their own knowledge of the status of different VOs. As noted earlier , 
the Deparoneot als.o receives feedback from its own monitor ing staff at regional level 
who undertake spo~-checks as widely as possible. Nevertheless , in the view of the :-ITE, 
it will take more time yet for the Departrnent to satisfy itse lf that the 20-indicawr 
system is a sufficiently farnHiar part of the routine work of field staff and that scores 
are based on reliable da ta that can be easily co1!ected. 
1.60 1'hird!y, the MD is stm testing dlfferent methods of applying .,;he 2.{}-indicator 
system. The issue here mainly involves coverage of the system among the population 
of VOs, which already stands at more than 11,000. So far, the MP has decided to 
exclude all VOs 1ess than one year in existence, though strictly this removes a 'baseline' 
cor;dition irom any future time-serfe.S comparisoP.S that may be drawn. The next Step 
is to decide on a sampling system, choosingbecween Area Offices/Braoctres or VOs as 
the sampling frame. Current plans foF 1993 are to cover a sample of 20-25% of a ll 
Area Offices/Branches and to select an age-suuctured sample of 20- 25% ol all VOs in 
each of .them. What bas still to be decided is whether to retain a portion of this l<1rge 
saJ.Up!e for recurrent apptkat\on or the 2<HndlcatGr system, enabling trends wit.hin a 
fixed set of YOs to be observed. Ac the root of the difficult)' in taking sampling 
decisioP.S of this sort is the lack o£ advance knowledge about (a) the magnitUde and 
extent of variability, and (b) the factors likely to lead t.o variability in progress towards 
iostirutional development among VOs in the same Office/Branch; ameng Offices/ 
· Branches of the same age; among different geographical parts of the country; or through 
tia"te. 
7.61 Limitations of the auantftative approach There oare limitat ions and potential pit-
falls in relying on quantitative indicators of progress in what ts. essentially the 
qualitative process of Jnstitution- buildi.ng. Talting just two of the current indicators -
the atreodan.ce rate at monthly VO meetings and the numbers Of s,uch meetings held -
is sufficient to illustrat e the difficulty. High attendance rates may be due as much to 
c.he scrength of personatity and leadership qualities of the concerned POs as to r.~e 
cohesiveness and mutual commitment of VO members. Through tilne, and if some VOs 
do take greater responsibility for managing their affairs, they may dec ide to change .ne 
format, perhaps to reuuce the frequency o{ meetings, as they see fit, automatically 
reducing their score in the current monitoring system. In both cases, the numerica l 
information set a gaidst each indicator woutd give a miSleading picture of the !eve I of 
institutional development acrually attained. Suggestions for the introduction nf a 
qualitative dimension in the monitoring process are put I orward below under issues for 
the further deve1opment of the management information SYstem. 
Relations with the Research and Evaluation Division 
7.62 1'here is potential scoj)e for some bllli!lng of responsibilities between t.">e MD 
and RED, not lease because in many agencies and programmes the monitoring and 
evaluation funetions are commonly combined in a s ingle organisational unit. 1n the case 
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of BRAC, however, ~he qrganisaeional separation of the ~wo functions is bejng handled 
quite successfuHy and the two units seem to have clear .understandings of where their 
responsibilities lle . Of the two, the Monitoring Department, with its c!ea> focus on the 
development of a management information system, toge ther with its physical location 
at the hub of RDP/RCP in the HO building, has a more straightforward rote to justify 
and w J>}ay . 
7.63 The working relationship between the two units a lso seems quite close. In the 
MD's perspective, if m<lnitoring data or field visits throw up issues whicn cannot easi!y 
be explained the next steP is ro approach RED and, if necess.ary, to collaborate in the 
design of special studies. As an example of bow this works, studies of overdue loans in 
cwo RDP Are as and one RCP Branch have been undertaken by RED during 1991 at the 
request of the MD. 11 The MD also reports that when monitoring indicatOrs are being 
designed or reviewed it is standard practice to involve RED, as for example, in 
December 1991 when indicators for DTW schemes, IGVGD and Sericu!ture were under 
discussion. It is also standard practice for the MD to copy all significant reports to 
RED in draft form Jor review and comment. 
lssucs \n the F'urt.her Developmo;,nt of t.ne Management lnf1)rmat\on System 
7,64 The Monitoring Department is doing an excellent job in developing BRAC's 
management i nformation system. The MTE was unable to find any evidence of 
Ul'.necessary proliferation of data collection. Rather, whenever ide.as for new indicators 
or data collection schedules are reviewed, the Deparonent is guided by such objective 
questions as for what purpose information should be collected; how and by whom will 
it be used; and can i t be reliably coHected? Against this background there are just 
t..hree issues that the MTE raises for consideration, namely changes in the indicators and 
formats in data collection; the implications for monitoring of the recommended 
Lmprovements ln credit portfolio m anagement; and adding a qualitacjve dimension to the 
monitoring of institution-building. 
? .Sa Frequency of format changm Tne cnmhination of me s.tm re.cenc creacion of the 
Monitoring Department and the rapi'd expansion of the range . and coverage of RDP-
II/RCP has led to fairly frequent cbange;; ill the formats and standard schedules for dac.a 
collection, This is unders~andable. But we· Introduction of improvements must itself 
be carefully managed. If changes are made too frequently, field-level staff rnay become 
confused and the reliabUity of information collected may be affected. In addition, 
changes in indicators and in the d'ata from which they are derived can affecc. 
comparability, hence the ability to observe trends through time. The Monicori.ng 
Department is fully aware of the need to avoid tbe pursuit of the best becoming the 
enemy of the good. Perhaps what is needed is the articulation of an explicit policy on 
this matter, including fixing the frequency oi periodic reviews of dHfereotmonirorlng 
schedules and categorising propose d changes according to whether they are unmediar.e!y 
essential or desirable but not pressing. 
11 !\£!:>: Causes of Ove:cdue Loans in :<t>l'/RCJ?. BRAC, i ~9i. 
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7.66 Implications of a revised credit pon.folio management system SecrJ.on 5 of this 
>eport n<)S already sugges~ed that improvements are needed in BRAC's c redit portfolio 
management syscem. lf accepted, rnos~; of the work in designing the new sysrem 
(including, in this case, ess.encial changes in data collection schedules) will devo lve onro 
the ~fonitoring Department. Initially, it will also be the MD that will have ro develop 
its own familiarity with the 'power' of the system to reveal more acCl.U'ately and more 
clearly the quality of the cr.edit por rfolio. From there it will be necessary to explore 
how the new sys[em m ight be used as the basis for taking management decisions co 
sustain good performance; to undertake early corrective action against possible 
deteriorating- trends; or to overcome outright poor perfonnance. Even then, the process 
of introducing the new s)fstem will have only just begun. Tne largest, most t\me-
consuming task will then be to train the crediL programme managers- from Programme 
Directors down (at !east) to the level of Area/Branch Managers - ln bow to u;,--e i~; as a 
management roo!. RED, coo, will have to be made familiar with the system and what 
it can do. In this process the Moniroring Depanmem will have to work very closely 
with RDP and RCP as well as with t!le Training Deparrment and .RED. 
7 .fS7 Introducing a oualitative dimension in monitoring institution-building In adding 
a qualitative dimension to the monitoring of institution- building, the probtems for the 
Monitoring Deparrment are that the indicatorS of qualitative progress are more difficu!r 
to design; the information itself is more difficult and usually more expensive tO collect; 
while anoJysing and presenting the results can be currrbersorne. ln tlie cirCUIIlStaoces, 
w'le conclusion of the MTE is that the Department bas made a sound and rational choice 
of indicators. Tbe approach being taken, given the numbers and grades of stllff at its 
disposal, should permit satiSfactory coverage in the monitoring process, albeit. at some 
- cost to t:be definitiveness of the ccmdusions that can be dr:>wn. What is \mp<:m:ant is 
for the Department to condone co remind the users of the information of its 
I !mi tatior>.s. 
7.68 The n ext stage will be to use the results of the cWTent quantitative assessments 
to select categ ories of VOs (apparently good, average or poor) for further in-depth, 
qualitative studies. This will achieve two p~es. The studies will be useful in 
Lbe..rnselves, showing how the le vel of maturity and development of VOs as institutions 
is reflected in the initiatives tbey take, in t.lJe artirudes of their members, and in social 
change. At the same tilne, the studies will serve as tests - calibrations - of t..lJe 
reliability of the wider-scale quantitative monitoring system. This is a specific area for 
collaboration between the Department and RED, for under current arrange.ments only 
RED has the capacity to undertake such studies. 
F. The Construction Deparanent 
Background and RaLionale 
7.69 BRAG's Construction Department (CD) was set up in late 1984 witb a siog!e civil 
engineer who is now still its head as Senior Construction Manager reporting co rbe 
Directcr oi Programmes. At that time, BRAC was relying exclusively on exterm!l 
professiooal services for design and supervision and on pr ivate contractors for building 
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7. 75 The principal difficulty reported bY the CD iS in the are~ of planning am! 
programming, focusing parti<:ularly on t~e procedures and timing for land acquisition for 
new buildings. The responsibilitY for !and acquisition rests with the concerned 
operational departments. In Bang'ladesn at. the best of times land acquisition can be a 
high!y complex arld time-consuming business. For BR. .. ~C. now that it has become so 
large and well known, there is a particular risk of artificial inflation in the price at 
which !and is {)ffered for sale. In this setting, the CD reports three main problems with 
rbe current arrangements: 
i) delays in acquiring sites for planned new buildings, implying that rhe CD 
cannot: adhere to planned C:OIJIP1etion dates; 
ii) acquisition of irregular plots on which it is difficult co lay out st2ndard 
buildings with the correct orientatU>n; 
iii) acq>.liSition of !ow-lying sices requiring e:aensive land-fill, hence adding 
to cotal coP.sc.ruction costs. 
7. 76 Proposed improvements In the view of the MTE, the shortcomings outlined above 
do not call for any f~mdarnenta.l cnanges in the disposition of res\}oosibilicles hecween 
the CD and its client departm~nts. As r-ile users of new facilities it is understaodab!e 
that the operational departments should be responsible for selecting sites on which they 
should be built. At the same rime, provided that the CD (a) fully informs its clients of 
~ miPirnum site requirements for diffe!"ent categories of building, and (b) adheres to its 
predictions of construction durat:ion and cost once work ha:s begun, it should noc be held 
responsible for cost overruns owing to unusual si.te preparation work or time overruns 
owing to the late procurement of land. The underlying !SStie instead c.onfirms the need 
for the closest possible collaboration, communication and coordination between rile CD 
and its clients. And in view of the difficulty of acquiring suitable building sites, 
experience shows ~hat if operational departments want building work to be completed 
on time they must begin the land acquisition process considerably earlier than they do 
at present. 
91 
L 
-
Plamling and Programming J.ssues 
7 .75 The principal difficulty reported by the CD is in the area of planning and 
programming, focusing particularly on the procedures and timing for land acquisic.ion for 
new buildings. The responsibility for lan_d ac.quis ition rests with the concerned 
oper<!tionaJ deparunents. In Bangladesh at the best oi times land acquisition ctn be a 
highly complex and time-consuming business. For BRAC, now that it has become so 
large and well known, there is a particular risk of artificial inflation in the price at 
which land is offered for sale. fn this settiflg, the CD reports three main problen1S with 
the current arrange.ments: 
i) delays in acquiring s ites for planned new buildings, implying that the CD 
cantlot adhere to planned completion dates; 
ii) acquisition of irregular plots 011 which it is difficult to lay out standard 
buildings with the correct orientation; 
iii) acquisition of low- lying sites requiring extensive land- fill, hence adding 
co rota! construction costs. 
7.76 Prooosed improvements In the view of the MTE, the shortcomrngs outlined above 
do not caU fQr any fundamen~;.al changes in m e disposition of res'Ponsibilides between 
the CD and its client departments. As the users of new facilities ir. is understandable 
that the operational departments should be responsible for selecting sites on which they 
should be built. At the same tlme, provided thaE the CD (a) fully informs its clients of 
. mir>.iJllu;n s ite requirements for different categories of building, and (b) adheres to its 
predictions of coD$tructi'On duration nnd c~ once work has bcgun;icshould not be held 
responsible for cost overruns owing to unusua1 sfte prep·aration work or time overruns 
owing to the !ate procurement of land. The underlying iSSue instead confirms the need 
for the c losest possible collaboration, communication and coordination be~ween tbe CD 
and its clients. And in view of the difficulty of acquiring .suitable building sites, 
experience shows that if operation;ll departments want building work to be completed 
on t!me they must begin the land acquisition process considerably earlier than they do 
at present. 
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8. SOCIO-EC0NOM1C EFFECTS,. TMPACT AND SUSTAINA8£UTY 
Disti.Jlguishiog Effe cts from lmo.:~c·t 
8.! The renns of reference for t..I-Je MT£ refer in nine differe nt placeS to a concern 
about the impact of 'BRAC's work. lt is impor.r.anr., however, to distinguish - both in 
su!Jstl!nce and time frames - between effects and 1mpact. The effects of rural 
developmenc interve ntions, in terms of err1ployment, income and con$umpcion, can be 
expected to appear in the relatively short term. The natur e of impact, on the other 
band, is usually underst ood in t erri>S of lnnger-u:rm change, including su-uctural changes 
in the economy, in institu t loP.s, in production relations, and e ve n in social and cultural 
relations. In progressing from immediate effects to longer-term impact, the concept 
of sustatnabilitY also pl1!YS a part. If, for example, short-term beneficial effects are 
temporary- if they are not s ust3ined - they are unlikely to be transformed ioto real 
impact. 
8.2 The distinction can be illustrated by refere nce to se lected BRAC programmes. 
In N.FPE, for e xample., thC\ main effect of successful comple~ion of a two or rhree year 
primary school course iS already clear in the high ra tes o f li teracy and nwneracy 
achieved. Supplementary qualita t-ive effects- which may be equally important, though 
more difficult to measure - c"n be e."<l)ec~ 1:o tnvolve ch~nges in attitudes among 
students~ including greater optimism, higher percepc,ioos of s e lf-worth, more ambitious 
expectations of themselves and weir socio-economic surroundings, and the perception 
of wider opportunities for further personal development. F or these direct, imroediat:e 
eH ects to 'oe u ansf orrned into real impact brings mto qu e-.stion wbetller literacy and 
oumerocywill actually enable the children e vcm:u a lly ·to ente r the labour force a~ higher 
levels than would otherwise have been possible. It. a lso brings into account the 
sustainability of a t titudinal c hanges and whether higher expect ations can in fact be mer.. 
8.3 In the c-ase of rural s avings and credit activities, t he s implest and most 
immediate effe cts can be expecte d to be higher incomes, hence higher teve!s of living 
among the targe t group peing reached. In time~ these effects should work their way 
through in terms of bett er standards of health and nutrition. Aga in, qualita tive effects 
may also be expected, includin:g, for example, improvements in the way in which women 
with access to credit are r.egarded and treated by men a t the household !eve! and withL'l 
the rm-a! community. l.f these effec~ can he S$tained - with ·or without continuing 
access w credit and support services - their impact may be traced in terms of lasting 
social change, including change passed on to the attitudes and v3lues of furore 
generations. 
8.4 The realiSation of impact The aChievement of real impact depends not. just on 
time but a range of other factors - some beyond the control of the origina l intervention. 
The realisation of the full potential impact of the literacy effect of primary education 
depends on the opportunities be ing available to meet: the expectations. that are creared. 
And this in turn depends on growth and diversity in the rural economy as a whole. 
Trends .in the wider environment will also play a part in realising bot h the economic and 
social change impact of credit services. This is where BRAC's strate gy of sc aling up 
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its work and coverage l)ecomes importanc, for if its· benefi.::iaries W'ere co remain small 
isolated pockets in an esseocialiy hostile cultural and economic environment they would 
remain the more vutnerable to being ctrcumvenc.ed or uodermined by the prevaiHng 
order. 
8.5 The tranSformation of VOs from organisar.ions of the rural poor instigated by 
BRAC to become well- rooted rural iP.stitUt.ions in their own right is another i!lusuauon 
of the process of moving from effects co impacr.. And the issues raised above wir..IJ 
respect to the time it will take and the exogenous fac tors that may affect the 
reaHsatlon of impact a';)ply as much. tn BRAC's insdtutional develo9ment obiectives as 
to the impact of its work in helping individuals and groups to set up successful new 
income-generating enterprises. In both respects, the view .of the MTE is that it is still 
far roo soon to examine RDP-11/RCP for impact or to hold BRAC accountable for it. 
Overview of BRAC's Performance on Ge!lder Issues 
8.6 f>RA.C's record over the \)ast ten years on gender \~ues has heen one of 
continuing advance. On grounds of need, equity and effectiveness, BRAC has responded 
to 1:he logic of its own experience by Increasing the participation of women - both in 
absolute terms and in relation to men- in all programme areas. It has made strong ar!d 
largely successful efforts to support both group activities and individual entrepreurship 
among women, iocludiog their move into non-traditional occupations. The benefits, both 
po&entil31 and actual, are positive across a broad spectrUlll of social and economic 
effects. 
8.7 Women account for about 70% of tocalmembership at present. This will probably 
!ncrease, though at a slower rate than over the Jast decade and is unlikely to exceed 
80%. !3RAC has considered om: rejected the possibility of focusing exclusively on 
women members. Though entirely feasible, prevailing stn.rctural and oormative 
conditions in Bangladesh suggest thacsucn a move would have been counter-productive. 
Besides, B'RAC's compreher-.s\ve tar.gets for· social and economic cMnge have \ed \t ~o 
pursue the more challenging task of transforming the establisbed oppressive pll.triarcbzl 
system at: all levels, from the Individual household, through village organisations to its 
own strUcture and working relations within BRAC itself. This is fully consistent with 
its general aim of 'influencing the system as a whole'. 
A. EcotlOmiC E.ffects 
The Context for Economic Effects 
8.8 Specific economic effects attributai;Jte to BRAC programmes are occurring in the 
conce.-.:t of c..l-tangjng norms, production relations and participation rates in the rural 
economy - particularly with respect to t..lJe position of women. The common 
understanding of t.~ese cb>mges is that povercy - growing both in breadth and depth - \;, 
accelerating t..he pace of family break-up i!Ild forcing women to seek their own income~ 
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earning opportun ities both within and beyond the household level. 12 This growth in 
economic activity among women is viewed with some ambiva!enee. On the positive 
side, it appears to represent a llberalisatioi1 of traditional closed and repressive 
atc!tudes. Yet it is fuelled more by necessfty than by socia l reconsideration of women's 
rights and is accompanied by severe downward trends it'l women's health, their 
nucrh::ional status and their chances of survival. Poverty has increased the proportion 
of female- headed households to an estimllted 15% of all rural househo lds and as much 
as 25% of landless households. One in four women in the age range of 40- 50 years are 
wia'owed or d~vorced (compared with only one in a hundred men), and the majori ty of 
these women are responsible for generating the en~:ire household income. Even in 
landless ho.useholds where husbands are present and able to work, rese2rch shows tbar 
women conuibute a minimum of 15% of EOtal income. 11 
Generallncome Effects 
8.9 Over the years, RED has carried out a .number of stu dies of the income effects 
of specific 3Ctivities undertaken by its members drawing on cr.edit from RDP/RCP. 
~osr of these have shown that gross and net returns for both me n and women are 
positive. Mos£ recently, RED bas undertaken a more gene•al study of bausehotd income 
on a wkh- and without-BRAG basis.l'~ This study covered 50 male and 50 female RDP 
groups with access co credit and drew comparisons with control groups without access 
to such institut ional credit services. A .key conclusion of thiS st udy was "that average 
individual incomes among. the BRAC-assist.ed groups were some 26% higher than among L the control groups. 
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· 8.10 Whether these inc.oroe effects are 'worthwhile', measured against some 
developmem:al yardstick as a net increase in security of livelihood, is more difficult to 
determine. One approach to answering this question Js to point to the eagerness with 
which people want to join BRAC and to gain access to credit, even for such low-risk, 
low-return activities as paddy lmsking and rural trading, suggesting that tbey do 
cor>.sider the benefits to be significant in the conrext of thei-r survival strategies. On 
the other hand, it could be argued that even if :BRA.C members do not regard the 
benefits from such activities as being significant or secure they are still motivared to 
undertake them as the means of gaining access to the wider protect ion of the BRAC 
'umbrella ' and of becoming memoel:S of BRAC as a benign patron. In either case, BR-AC 
is already aware of - and must cont inue to b e seASitive to - the risk of reaching a \eve) 
of saturation of credit for a limited number of activities at t!Je local level, especially 
13 
14 
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in the growing number of areas in which there i& overlap with other agencies and 
programmes providing credit to the rural poor. 
Specific E."Xamplt>-~ of Income Effecl.S 
8 . ! 1 It would b.e beyond the scope of the ~ITE to analyse tbe income effectS of every 
rype of act ivity underr.aken witll credit. by BRAC members. The MTE has instead 
exarnined the poultry and sericu!ture prognunmes as selected examples. The approach 
taken has been tO draw partly on the suppositions of the relevant BRAC models and 
partlY on analytical material based on e>.:perience and avaifab1e within BRAC, in each 
case referring -also to the resultS of the :<.fff'~ own field investigations. The results are 
summarised in Table 8.1 below. 
8.12 Returns to loans for poulro activirJes There are three principal opportunities 
in the BR.AC poultry programme: 
i) key rearers - who, according to the model, cypicaHy raise 10' hens and ooe 
cockerel and sell the eggs produced; 
ii) chick rearers - who receive day-<>ld c hicks and r-aise them until they are 
two months old, selling t:hem on to key rearers; 
iii) poultry workers - who provide vaccination services and a limited amounc 
of extension advice, reeeiving fee income from key rearers. 
8.!3 The first par~ of Table 8.1 shows that in each case the return on investment 
exceeds the interest rate being charged, justifying the investment. In the perspective 
of the rural poor, however, it is not so much the return on investment; that counts 
(provided it is positive) but the absolute contribution of net income to the household and 
the equivalent net daily wage that can be derived. In these terms, to take part in the 
programme as 'a combined poultry worker and key rearer can be characterised as a safe 
an<i satisfactory option. It yield$ an equivalent: net daily wage of bet. ween Tk.22.2 and 
Tk.30.6. Here, the steady income from vaccination services actS as a buffer against the 
low equivalent net daily wage of a key rearer alone at the lower range of income, shown 
at the top of :the table as be fog as low as Tk.12. 5. A succe&Sful chick rearer does bes_!: 
of an, with an equivalert net daily wage of 1'k.50.0 ror only o days work per month. b 
But. owing to the higher investment costs in-chick rearing there is a keener risk to 
rerurns and to net income if le&S than maximwn success is achieved, as re\'ealed by the 
steep drop in eQuivalent net daily wage to only Tk.l6.7 at the lower range of income. 
15 The conversi on of 12 work-days per month of 4 hours d~ation inzo 
the equivalent of 6 full - time days is recognised as bei:'lg 
a:!:bitrary 'flher._ tha ~crkin~ day fox: -the ~"Q.l ~r is ilSuall)l far 
longer than the international standard of 8 hours. 
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TABLE 1!.1: Selected Examples of ReturnS in Poulqy and Sericulture 
. CQsts and Benefits 
Activity I Lower Range 1 Upper Range 
A. Poultry 
Kev Rearer 
Assumptions: 
-1oan of Tk.1,000 ® 20% 
-6 work days/mth 
Total investment cost Tk.l,200 
Monthly gross income Tk. 175 Tk. 250 
Annual gross income Tk.2,100 Tk.3,000 
1\nnual net income 1~. 900 1\t.l,MO 
Retw"o on investment 15% 150% 
Equivalent groSS daily wage Tk. 29.2 Tk. 41.7 
Equivalent ne t daily wage Tk. 12.5 Tk. 25.0 
Chick Rearer 
i\ssumptions: 
-loan of Tk.2,000 ® 20% 
- 12 work-days/mth ® 41=/day 
Tot.al investment cost 1'k.2,400 
.l\1onr31y gross income Tk. 300 Tk. 500 
Annual gross income Tk.3,600 Tk.6,000 
Annual net income Tk.1,200 Tk.3,600 
Rerum on investment 50% 150% 
Equivalent gross daily wage Tk::. 50.0 Tl<. 83.3 
Equivalent net daily wage Tk. J.6.7 Tk. 50.0 
~· 
95 
~. 
CostS and BenefitS 
Activicy Lower Range l Upper Range I 
Poultry Worker 
Assumptions: 
-loan of Tk.I,OOO ® 20% 
-also works as key rearer 
-3 work-{iays/mth as poultry 
worker (PW} 
-6 work-days/roth as key 
rearer (J<R) 
Total Investment cost Tk. I,200 
Monthly gross income - PW Tk. 125 Tk. 125 
~onthly gross income - KR Tk. 175 Tk. 250 
I 
Total monthly income Tk. 300 Tk. 375 
Annual gross income Tk. 3,600 Tk. 4,500 
Annual net income Tk. 2,400 Tk. 3,300 
Return on investment 200% 27S% 
Equivalent gross daJly wage Tk. 33.3 Tk. 41.7 
Equivalent net daily wage Tk. 22.2 Tk. 30.6 
B. Sericulture 
Chawki Rearer 
, Assumptions: 
• 
- loan of Tk.2,000 ® 20% 
-10 work-{!ays/mth 
I Total investment cost Tk.2,400 
I Monthly gross income Tk. 400 Tk. 500 
Annual gross income Tk. 4,800 Tk. 6,000 
Annual oet income Tk. 2,400 Tk. 3,600 
Return on investment 100% !50% 
Equivalent gross daily wage Tk. 40.0 Tk. 50.0 
Equivalent net daily wage Tk. 20.0 Tk. 30.0 
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Costs and Benefits 
' 
Activicy Lower Range T Upper Range 
N~!:Ct: ~edling Rearer 
A$Sumptions: 
-loan of Tk.6,000 4!1 20% 
-full-time employment 
(assume 300 days/yr) j -l.O ''"""""' 
-yield 8-12,000 seedlings/acre 
-price/seedling Tk.l .25 
1'k.7,200 
1 Total iovestmeoc cost Tk. 833 Tk. 1,250 
Monthly gross Income Tk.!O,OOO Tk.l5,000 
Annual gross Income Tk. 2,800 Tk. 7,800 
Annual net income 38.9% 108.3% 
Return on invesonent 
Equivalent gross daily wage Tk. 33.3 Tk. 50.0 
Equivalent net daily wage Tk. 9.3 Tk. 26.0 
8.14 Returns to 1oans for sericulture ln seticulture the amounts that bave to be 
invested (borrowed) are relatively large, especially for establishing a mulberry nursery. 
As iD the case of chic..!( rearing in the poultry programme, to be a successful nw-sery 
operator seems to be an eminently satiSfactory option. The equivalent net daily wage, 
of Tk.26.0, is considerably less than the agricultural casual wage rate (of about Tk.35 
per day reported at the time of the MTE) and less, too, than the equivalent net daily 
wage as a successful chawki rearer. But it is the more attractive because it is based 
on full-time employment, obviating the need to look elsewhere for seasonal and/or part-
time employment or other income-earning opportunities. Again, however, there Is an 
element of risk. To be an unsuccessful nw-sery operator, wim a seedling yield one-third 
less than a successful operator, means being tied up on a full-time basis but earning the 
equivalent of as little as Tk.9.3 per day. 
Emplo~ment Effects 
8.15 So far, BRAC studies of the employment effects of its programmes have 
concenc-ated on the small enterprises developed under the Ayesha Abed Foundation 
(AAF). A study undertaken in 1990 of the Betila Production Centre, for e.~ample, 
reached three main conclusion.s: 
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i) there were high drop-out. rates among employees, but this reflected life 
changes such as marriage and maternity rather than dissatisfaction with 
the terms and cond.itioris of employment; 
ii) wage rates were lower than seasonal peaks in other activities, but this 
must be offset ag·aJnst the security and higher total annual income offered 
by year-round employment <:lther than the patchwork of shon-terrn 
seasonal jobs; 
iii} the Centre offered a preferential increase· in wage employment 
opportunities for poor women. 16 
8 .16 From recor<ls of the t:,}le of activities unde.nal<.en by the rural poor using credic 
supplied by BRAC, it is clear that the great majority of employment generated is self-
employment. Moreover, with some exceptions such as roadside restaurants, the self-
employment is rarely' on a full-tlme basis. Instead it is yet another conuibmion to the 
mosaic oi acrivit:ies undertaken by the rural poor as pan: of their survival strategies. 
And Ll1is is as crue of the simplest activities such as paddy husking as it is of the more 
coll'lPlex undertakings such as deep tubewell schemes. Unfortunately, little research has 
been done on the incr.emental employment created by access w BRAC credit or oi 
comparative returns tO labour in BRAC-assisted and other types of employment. ThiS 
is an area w!lic.b RED eould usefully pm: on itS future research agenda, including direct 
studies with beneficiaries of their perceptions of the returns and secwity of returns 
from credit-assisted activities in relation to other, more customary sources of iocome 
from, for example, agriculture, food-for- wor.k and other casual employment. 
8.17 Some acti¥ities supported by credit from BRAC seeril to have a multiplier effect 
on employment opportunities. Perhaps the c.learest examples of this are represented 
by DTW scbemes. Not surprisingly, whe.-e irrigation water increases cropping intensity 
it also generates more demand for casual labour in crop cultivation as well as in post-
harvest operations, including paddy-husking. Indeed, some estimates of the magnitude 
of these employment opp-ortunities sur7est that they are an essential conuibuti.on to the 
eco!lomic viability of DTW schemes. However, agaio there is a dearth of field data 
quatltifying these downstream employment effw..s .and the share of them taken up by 
DTW YO group members or their relatives. 
16 
17 
M. R. Khan: Production and EmploY"!ent Aspects of Small Enterprises 
for Women - A Case Study of Betila Production Centre. BRAC/RED, 
Dhaka. 1990 
.Matt l'.acOcnald: Issues M:iosinq f:t:Ol!l. the l?roposed Rapid Expans!.~n 
of the DTW Programme. Dhaka·. 1992. 
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Effecrs on Assets 
8.18 LittJe is knowrl about how BRAC's interventions may affect the composition and 
value of assets among ics beneficiaries. There could be at !east four Categories of 
assets - and means of acquiring rhem - aS a result. of particlpatioo in BRAC 
programmes: 
i) self-acquisi tion - A portion of higher incomes and savings among BRAC 
members might be expected to he devoted to acquiring more household 
assecs. Some studies suggest a high propensity to invest in land, with 
housing and housing improvements also being very popular. One estimate 
suggestS an increase of nearly 7Q% in the value of household assets as a 
result of ~uccessful participation in BRAC programmes. 18 
ii) built- in acquisition among individuals - Some of the activities set up by 
BRAC members with loans irom BRAC automatically include acquiring 
different ~ypes of assecs with different values and different ecooom!c 
lives. To the rural poor, the acquisition of cows and poultry represents 
a significant increase in asset 'Value, albeit ass~ts which will have to be 
renewed over a relatively shan period. More lasting assets include 
rickshaws, poultry cages and sheds, simple box-hives in apiculture , 
sericulture sheds and similar ancillaries. ln the case of the se:r\cultu:eo 
programme, the mulberry trees that are planted represent assets with 2 
potential productive llfe In t!Je order of 25 years. 
Hi) 
iv) 
18 
collective assets ~ Co!lecUve lending s.cbemes such as for DTWs and 
power tillers also include the aucomatic acquisition of additional assets 
which are shared bY the participatio~r YO memberS. While t,he financie~l 
value of such assets can be quire high, it is too early to judge what the 
effects of group ownership of them may be either for the group as a 
whole or for individual group members. 
negotiated assets - There is some anecdotal evidence that one effect of 
the Paralegal Programme has been that BRAC members who are more 
a ware of their legal rights have been successful in claims on inherited 
assets which they might otherwise have lost chrough ignorance or 
diffidence. 
M. Hossain and R. A£sar: Credit for Women ' s Involvement: in 
Economic. Activities in Rural Bangladesh . BIE>S 1 Dhaka . 1988. 
Z. Ahmad : Group Approach to Empowering Women - An Emerging 
Development Paradigm from South Asia. Report to the Workshop on 
Group Approach to Development of women in Rural Are a s. oang1adesb 
Academy f or Rural Development, Camilla. November 1991. 
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Entrep<:eneurshlp Development 
8.19 If, as noted earlier, che majority of uses of credit are in part- time self-employed 
activities there c an be only limited expect,11£ioos of the e ffect of BRAC credit in 
stimulating the e mergence of a new class of rural entrepreoew-s from the ranks of tele 
rur-al j)OOL Inde ed, if entse"!)reneuria\ talent and dri••e are normally distributed, on\)' 
limited numbers of BRAC members will ever progress to higher investment, higher risk, 
higher return enterprises. Even among those who try, it cannot be expected that a!l will 
succeed. !9. In t.he c ircumstances, BRAC must continue - as it is - to be caut ious (a) 
ln its expectations of entrepreneurship development among its membership, and (b) io 
how jc reacts to fa,ilure without being over- prm;eccive or otherwise interfering in the 
operac:oo of market forces. 
S.20 Against this background there are, oevert.he le.ss, succe.ss.es as reponed by BR..-\C 
field sr.a(i and cotlfirmed dw-ing the .'v!TE. One recent example of apparent success is 
the woric of REP in helpiog women to set UJ> roadside restaurants. This is the more 
interesting because it is wholly non-traditional. Indeed, REP reports chat at first these 
restaurants met c onsiderable local hostility even in such a re latively cosmopolitan 
border area as J essore. On the other hand, t.he model is a simple one, the women 
tnvolved have had to learn few, if any, new skins, and the results so far show very 
healthy cash flow and returns. Ot.her examples· encountered dw-ing the :\liTE included 
women's groups cultivatiog mulberry saplings in sufficient numbers co generate a 
prospective annual net r-eturn of Tk.20,000 and more, and poultry wor-kers-cum-chick 
rearers with intensive units of over 200 chlc.'<s. 
8. 21 BRAC has correctly not allowed individual succ ess stories to generate unrealistic 
e)(j)ectatiDl'.s of its mainstream memben. BRAC 's strat egy Is stm based on brearlth 
ra ther tha.n depth of effect. In the process, lt does what. it can to provide opportunities 
for the emergence of genuine e ntrepreneurial flair and ability (and to respond c:o it 
whenever possible ) without forcing the pace. As time goes on and as probability 
suggesES t.'l.at me number of real entrepreneurs among its growing membership will rise, 
a valid area for monitoring and for researc h by RED will be to keep track of success as 
we!! as of failw-es, including the preparation of individual case histories, their aggregate 
returns and fac'wrs affecting success or failure. 
Unolanned Effects of Access to Credit 
8.22 Intervening ln t.he comple." rural e<;onomy of Bangladesh is bound to be attended 
by a variety of unp~anned - if not wholly unexpected - effects. Research has clearly 
shown, and 8RAC fully recogr~ises, that. there are at least three phenomena which do 
not aOhe:re to programme speci.ficatiat)S in providing !!Ccess to credit to me TUral poor: 
'9 The rate of failw:-e of small businesses in induscr1alised 
CO\L~tr~es is typically in tha o rder of ~0-4Q% within one yeCI of 
s tart -up and 60-65% within three years . 
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il both men and women bo!TOw from a variety of sources, including 
relatives, neighbours and money- lenders - and juggle their repayment 
oblig~tions among them - even when they have access to lnsr.Jcutiona1 
credit from BRAC or some other agency at lower financial cost; 
ii) a portion of fimds borrowed nominally for some specified income-
generating activitY is actually used to relieve existing debt and/or for 
cor>.swnptioil P!lrJloses; 
ll\) some of the funds borrowed are on-lent in informal money markets.20 
8.Z3 t!RAC is fully aware of all these issues and ta.~<.es a: properly sanguine view of 
them. No agency providing rural Credit can expect to intervenE) In a local economy 
under 'dean slate' conditions. BRAC recognises that it is one among several actors in 
the rural credit scene and that it: will ca.~e cime,.if ever, to become the main actor or 
even to replace entirely the dependence of rhe rural poor on iflformal credit sources. 
One reason rot th\s \s that the two principal reasoos for seeking credit among the rura1 
poor (namely, {a) for corlsurnption purposes during cb.e h¥dest times of cbe year 
{SeprembedOctober in most. parts of the country), and (b) for rites of 11assage ac the 
householo level, pril'lcipa!ly marriage) are generally not seen as legitimate areas for 
!ending by development-oriented credit programmes. 
8.24 Evidence from the field A recent study in Jarnalpur linked with BRAC's Village 
St•..!dies Proje{:t has found tbat even where BRAC \s active there is $till a high 
propensitv among women to refer to local money-lenders, especially when flexibilicy is 
req.uirerl. 21 The stUdy has also confirmed that women with access to crediG from 
BRAC at: an annual interest rate of 16% {now 20%) the!llSe1ves act as money- lenders. 
The amounts involved are ge!lerally small, typically in the order of Tk,lOO, but can yield 
'Tk.20 per week. 'This return is similar tO the weekly repayment obligation on a one-year 
loan of Tk.l,OOO from BR.LI.C. Looked at io this way, the attraction of on-lending a 
por:tion of BRAC credtt must be .s.trong if it means that oLlter portlot\S can be used for 
consumpt.ion purposes as well as for the stated reasons in the application for credit 
(albeit perhaps on a reduced scale) without jeopardising the ability to repay. 
21 
See, for example, C. Maloney a.'1d A.B. Sharfuddin r.hmed: Row 
People in Bangladesh save and ao=ow Money. University P,;ess, 
Dhaka. 1986 . 
C. Ma1oney and A.B. Sharluddin .'lhmed: Rural Savings and Credit in 
Bangladesh. !Jni versity Press, Dhai<a. HISS . 
J. Ji9gins' Wc.men in Bangladesh - An Economic St:I:ategjl ?a?er. 
world sank/IDA, washington ec. 1987 . 
M. Hossain and R. Afsar: 1988 (op.cit .) 
K . ~. Casper: A Case Study on the Impact of Group Formation and 
Credit on • 5¢.cial Se.c.u=it.:y' Net•,ork.s and £xchange Rel.~ticns of 
Women . Jamalpur Village Studies Project. BR~C/UCLA. 1992 (dra£t ) . 
t()Q 
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8.25 The study place.s chis behaviour !n the context of socio-ecpnomic relatiorJShips 
in which money-lending is a 'highly valued economic institution among women' . lt is a 
means of 'saving' su.rplus cash in other individuals, thereby spreading risk, incre.as :ng 
security, maintaining the network of relationships which are part of the fabric of rural 
survival - quite apart from representing ~ bJghly profitable activity in ics own right. 
Moreover, the sr.rong demand among large numbers of womeri for such very small loans 
at such high interest nltes is an aspect of the rural economy w which agencies such as 
BR."-C cannot possibly rel>-pond. Equally, it is an aspect of the rural economy that 
cannot feasibly be circumvented by mean$ of credit regulat-ions. 
8.26 Other important conclusions of the jamalpur case study include: 
l) the savings discipline among BR.l1.C members is motivat-ed principally by 
the desire to gain, and co preserve, access to cr.edit, white among non-
BRAC members the reasons for savings are more varied, including lending 
to oGhers and to prepare for possible crises; 
ii:l there is significan~ly greater ·group participation in BRAC areas, again 
because it is a condition for gaining access to credit; 
iiil but credit plays a much more important role in aJfecting relationships 
than does group forma tion; 
\v) BRAC'.s development initiatives are providing women with a\ternat.ive 
resources which they value - mostly credit - and are encouraging 
investment over conswnpdoo as !:he reason to borrow, in turn promoting 
group participatfon though not a sense of solidarity. 
B. Social Effects 
The Context for AssessiM Sopal Effect:s 
8.27 Both tl'!e recording and the interpretation of social effects of rural development 
interventions can be hazardous, especially in societies ln which family li(e is secluded; 
women's stat\IS is derived; \if e-cyde tral'.Sitions a:re strong; there is consiueral>\e 
diversity and variability in social structureS and re!CJtionships; while the methods and 
tools of study do not lend themselves to generalisation. fn addition, it is also clear that 
the context for assessing social change is not itself wholly static, as revealed by earlier 
references ro the-rate and extent of fa..rnily break-up affectit•g the gre<n:er visibilit.y oi 
women in t..he rural economy. In turn, this raises Jlotential difficul ties in attributing 
observable changes to a particular project. or programme. No.-wichscanding tbese 
caveats, there have bee n numerous studies of the social effects of targeted credit and 
women's programmes, both by BRAC and others, and wblle m;).ny have used different 
methods their results tend in the same posltive dlrecl;ions . There is, for example, an 
emerging consensus that participation in savings and credlt programmes increases the 
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awareness of rignt.s and the desire of the rural1)oor - particularly women.- to control 
their own lives and enterprises, and turther, that they actually exercise these rightS 
more often and to a greater degree chan ooo-bene fic>ar ies. 
Difficulrtes of Interpretation 
8.28 Tbe interpretaticn cf social effects can alsc be difficult, deJ>ending on what 
expectatioos they are judged against. For exan1ple, an unmarried girl may accrue 
savings from employment or from her own incoli'.e-generating activity set up with 
credit. 1l:a turn this purely economic effect may give her rnore self -assurance, perhaps 
more self-assertiveness and control over her own resources- a positive social effect. 
YecJf men she were co exercise that concrol by deciding t;O use her savings to fund her 
own dowry there would be grounds to conclude that the process of social change had nor 
gone nearly far enough. 
8.29 lnterpretat ion becomes the rnore difficult the more it relies on references to 
general statistical trends rather then direct investigatioos. As noted in the earlier 
discussion of economic effects, BRAC's support and assisc~nce enables its members to 
acquire new assets, including land. Again, this can be judged as having a positive 
qualitative effect on $ecutity of livelihood. Yet studies large enough in scope to have 
$orne statistical validity show that we degree of female seclusion is .closely correlated 
with landholding size, Putting the two conclusions together is to suggest that the 
successful intervention of BRAG ca.u!d have negative coosequences for women. On the 
or.her hand, the causality of the correlation between female seclusion and landholding 
could be changed if it is women's access to and successful us.e of credit which makes 
it feasi!Jie to acquire land and other assets. 
Evidence of Effects in Decisioo-M.akiog and Control 
8.30 An issue which. bas been frequently raised and which also occupied the MTE is the 
composite question of the extent to which women (a) actually initiate ideas for the use 
of credit, and (b) sub$equently retain control over the loans they take out afl.d the 
iocome derived from using loaD.s. One exam!lle i.s cite popular use of credit for paddy-
husking. This t$ clearly women's work in rural Bangladesh, yet in many ci!Ses it is men 
who must procure the paddy and who eventually sell the rice, possibly - perhaps 
probab1y- retaining the \ncome derived from yet anod:mr demand j)\aced on t-he time 
and effort of women. MTE field studies showed that women often Cite their rei!Sof'.S for 
handing over their earnings to men or allowing men to retain the sale proceeds of 
paddy-husking \n terms of t..'rJe need to preserve the marriage. If this is correct (if, for 
example, men can pay off their debts instead of opting to escape from both creditors 
atld Weir family responsibilities) it can be considered as having a positive social effect-
especially against the background outlined earlier of the break-up of families under 
e,ctreme poverty, leaving women worse off chan ever. On the other hand, again$t the 
wider social targets of greater recognition of women, greater control and freedom of 
discretion, it must he judged negatively. 
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8.31 !3RAC's own data confirm the fragility of marriage under the pre..'Sure of 
povercy.22 They. also reveal that Lhere are many different dimensions of 'family 
mana~emenc' which might be affected by participadon in BRi\C prograntmes. But the 
complexity and variability of this muiti-diinensional issue probably cannot be measured 
by a single indicator of 'control over a loan'. Nevertheless, there is encouraging 
evidence that within the household women do play a decisive role in their own credit-
:;upponed enterprises, though r..ltis is eroded among !louseholds wittllar.ger land holdings. 
£qually, men tend to t ak.e autonomous decisions ill the en terprises which they set up, 
consulting their wives in only about a fift-lt of cases. 23 In sum, the control-related 
effects of access to BRAG credit atnong women include: 
i) greater financial independence; 
ii) higher status within the household and vil1age society; 
iH\ greater awareness and asseTtion C>i i.he\r rights as individual<.; $!\d as 
groups; 
i") better famlly hea\tl:J care, including pregnancy m.anagement; 
v) better standards of education among children; 
vil better marriage prospects for their daughters. 
Emoowennent Effects 
8.32 Probl~ of defin ition and measurement BRAG's objective of empowering its 
rural poor membership is bold, ambitious, simply stated and appealing. But the term 
empowerment has not yet been satisfactorily defined, nor have any of the st:udies in this 
field been able co estabUsh a satisfactory method of measuring it. The prol>lem extends 
w the wider target of social change for which there is as yet no firm ground ro 
determille what progress t.bere might be, how rapidly, on what scale, or with what 
expectations of permanen,ce. 
8.33 A variety of different indicators of empowerment have been tested by BRAC and 
other Tesearchers at different times over the past decade.. As early as !983 BRAG 
distinguished between (a) power through group interaction, leading to changes in self-
esteem, individual and group action, courage and l"eferr.al of complaims; (b) power 
thrOugh illcome, including. control over income, reduction in polygamy, and the 
acquisition of new assets; and (c) increased po'wer ill society, including reduced 
incidence of begging,. the ability to bor:row from each other, money-lending by the rural 
! . Ara : lntervention and Change in Rural Bangladesh - Impact on 
Selected Socio-Economic Indicators . !!AAC - REO, Dhaka. l99i . 
REO: Gender Differences and tlte Role of women in th.e Households -
The Case of Fe~le Loanees of a~c. Dhaka. 1990 . 
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poor, the application of new koow!edg_e and skills, and resistance to intimidation by 
landlords and officials. SOme of these ind.icators, however, are scrictly messures of 
!"inancial benefits, with imputed effects on empowerment. 
8.34 A more recent approach has been co focus on (a) behavioural change in terms oi 
decision-making roles and sending children to school, and (b) changes brought about by 
organisa~onal development, including freedom of mov~ent, self-confidence ln speaking 
up at. meetings, self- respect and winning the respect of others, awareness of rights, and 
again aniculacing protests and complaints.24 Another recent s tudy has actually 
attempted to measure empowerment a!Jlong women in t erms of a variety of 
anthropological and soc iological indices, including ino·a-household conflica, decision-
making, family planning, childbearing, oreference for male chilctren, divorce, polygamy, 
do'"TY, purdah, a.nd sexual violence.-25 A.s noted earlier, RED has also embarked on 
c.lle ambitious, long- term Village Studies Project which includes a study of perceptions 
of t.he attribures of power and starus at the village level. 
8.35 Conceivably, even if an accepted definition of empowerment can be devised, i~ 
might evenwally prove to be unmeasurable in the dynamic system of the llousellold, the 
'11\!age wd the rura\ political econorny, in which the parameters_ move and redefine 
themselves over tirne. Indeed, it·is open to questionwllether the rural poor wiU at-some 
point in time become fully 'empowered', wlth no further struggles ahead in achieving 
fair returns to labour, in freedom from exploit.ation, in gender re lations or in rne wider 
deve lopment of Bangladeshi society. The elimination of alienation and oppression poses 
a challenge 1.0 i.merlocking and deep1y-rooted systems of exploitacion wil.h norma--cive, 
economic, cultural and ideological dirnensior:>.s which it may be unrealistic to expect any 
one organisation, programme or project co take on. This is not to suggest that BRAC 
should abandon ,empowerment as one of its centra! Objectives but rather to suggest that 
both BRAC a.nd the Donor Consortium should (lOt expect roo much in the medium term. 
C. &!stainability 
8.36 From the terms of reference for the MTE, and from briefing meetiogs with 
represent:!tlves of the Donor Consortium, it is clear that questions of sustainabilicy are 
close to the surface of concern. Unfortunately, the concept of sustainabilicy bas many 
different dimensions, including institutional, financial, managerial, environmental and 
technological sustainability. This opens the concept. to different interpret.atioos a.nd 
under&a.nding in diffe-rent specific settings. lt is heyond the scope of the MTE to reach 
agreement with all members of the Donor CO!'JSortium on a definitioo of su.~tainability 
applied co BR.A,.C and what. expectations there should be over wbat period of time. 
Neve.'"the less, what c~n be done is to sugges' a framework for assessing sustaioabilicy, 
as outlined below. 
2• 
25 
Z. Ahmad: Group Approach to Empowering Women . (op.cit. ) 
A.~. van Swinderen: BR>\C and Social Change - Impact of 
Development tnt.e~ention on Wom.e-'1 in Bangladesh. 'iiRAC/RZt>, Dhaka. 
1991. 
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Levels of Smaina·bi\it;v in the Context. of BRAC 
8.37 Within BRAC there are four main !eve1s that need to be taken inm accouM in 
establishing a rational hierarchy of expectations of sustainability: 
il sustalC\abUity at the !eve! of individual BRAC members - This level raises 
questio.ns of the sustainabilicy cf income-genera ting activities set. up by 
indi-viduals and sub-groups using BRAC credit; the sustainabi lit.y of 
benefits as well as c redit discipline in larger, co!leetive Joan schemes; the 
sustaioability of interest' in seodi·ng children to NFPE schools; and the 
sustainability of social and attitudinal changes. 
ii) sustaioabi!ity of VOs - BRAC expects VOs to be sustained by their 
membership, t he acid test of sustainability being whether, at some point, 
they can become suffidently well-rooted to be regarded as permanent 
iastitutions - with or without the continuation of BRAC support.. 
iii) su~tainabili r;y of BRAC programmes- The principal focus here is on RCP -
the BRAC Bank Project - wb.ich, from its inception, has been surrounded 
with expectations of financial sustainabiUty. 
i"} sust.ainab\llt.y of 'BRAC - 1'be sUStainabiHt:y of 'BRAC as an organisat.\cn 
is of ~merest to tile donor Consonh.un because of t.Pe l;;trge amounts of 
development assistMce being channelled through it. 
· Sustainability at the Level of Individual BRAC Members 
8 .38 The majority of activities financed in roe. current Joan portfolio are profitable, 
viable, hence sustainable. Most are familiar, traditional activitie.~ with proven positions 
in the rural economy. BRAC members generally have suff icient sk.ills and market 
knowledge to operate the activities and to adapt to changing circumstances. The most 
prevalent activities are also the simplest, requl!'ing !iule in the WaY of technical support 
or exter>..sion services, and can therefore be carried out successfully w:itbout undue 
reliance on continuing BRAC staff inputs. The main cave.at is that rural trading - the 
most popular use of credit - offers such !ow retW'llS that it cannot be expected to help 
BRAC members to lift their levels of living much above what they were before gaining 
access to credit. BRAC is aware of this and field staff character ise rural trading. as an 
'apprentice' type activity for first- time borrowers, with the expectation that after 
gaining c.onfidence they will branch out lnto more rewarding activities. 
8.39 Among the non-traditional uses of credit, the greatest risk of unsustainab ility 
surround DTW scllemes, as noted earlier in Section 6 of this report. Not only are DTWs 
surrounded by technical, organisational and credit discipline problems but they also 
require rela~:ively high subsidies aod close suppon: serviees to operate profitably. This 
further underlines the need to consolidate rather than. to expand le nding in this sector. 
Sericulture, on the other ha nd, is an equally uniamiliar sector for most .BRAC members 
bu1: appears 1:0 hold good prospects for sustaloability. At present, since tbe model for 
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individual activities and their vertical integration in the product ion·chaio is not yet fully 
developed, seriC:ulwre requires close support: services from BRAC and will continue to 
do so for some years to come. But. the potential for sustainable, profitable growth is 
good. 
Susraina"l>illtv of VOs 
8.40 Mair>.stream VOs bave shown themselves to be sustaina ble in terms of their use 
and repayment of credit. Because of their responsiveness to credit and to the work of 
GSs and POs, they are a lso judged to be sostainable as organisations of the rural poor. 
(1\gt>.in, we main reservations are w~th respecr to VOs involved i!\ collecdve le!tding, 
principally for DTWs.) But VOs cannot yet be seen as institutions ln their own righr. 
In this respect, BRAG's work is still very new. The socio-economic changes that 
RDP/RCP and other BRAC programmes have started to br ing about are as yet not fully 
developed. It is still too soon to show or to predict whether even the changes which 
have been achieved so far will be sustained by thP. VOs and their members. 
Financial Sustainabilitv and the RDP-RCP Transition 
8.41 Clearly, RDP ls sustainable as long as there are sufficiem resources available 
from BRAC itSelf and its external suppon.ers. The key question is ~he sustainability of 
RCP on the prindple t hat individual Branches should become self - financing. According 
to the 4•2 model for the RDP-RCP 1:\.lnsition, for cwo years after conversion tO RCP, 
the coscs of training in institution-building and skills support at the Branch level 
continue to be pai<L for by RDP. Thereafter, each RCP Branch is e:,cpected to cover a!! 
costs, including the delivery and supervision of credit as well as institutional support, 
skms training and e.xtension services through a combination 6f interest income from 
lending and fees charged to VOs. 
8.42 General ipdicators of RCP sustainabilitv Three internationally common 
indicators of the 'health' of banking institutianssbow that at present RCP is financially 
sound. First, the ratio of ~nv~tments/Net Deposits of 0 .4 at the end of December lSSl 
shows that the investment portfolio is well below the deposit base. Secondly, the return 
on assets (ROA) in RCP (the ratio Net 1Pcome/T0ta1 Assets - the most relevant of 
several indicators of profitability) is a relatively high 2.6% owing to the front-end 
loacllilg provided by the Donor Consortillill which give& RCP a proportionately much 
larger investment portfolio tho.n mas~: COC!l!tli¥"Cial banks (where: an ROA of l.O% or less 
is common). As its lending operations continue to expand the R.OA wi11 fall back, with 
predictions that it will dip below l.O% for the first time in 1994. Thirdly, the current 
ratio (CR) of Curre.nt AssetS/Current Liabilities signals the ability to meet liabilities 
that will soon become due our of assetS invested in the short t enn, and should e.xceed 
unity for healthy operations. At the end of 1991, RCP's CR was high, at 2.7, indicating 
strong liquidity and a comfor:table capacity to meet sbort- tenn obligations - again, a 
refleetion of front-end loading by the Consortium. The main caveaL attached to these 
excellent signs of financial health Js that RCP is still very new an·d has nowhere near 
reacheD a steady state of le nding. It will be necessary to monitor these indicators for 
some years to come before being able ro assess properly their implications for RCP's 
longer-term sustainability. 
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8.43 The ! 99l review of credit and savings reponed that RCP is covering the 
operating costS of delivering credit. This only occurred in 1991, as shown in Tsble 8.2 
below. In 1990, with only 10 Branches, RCP was unable to cover irs operating costs, 
recording a defic it of Tk.5.1 mil!ion. Adding in the cost of support -services provided 
by RDP, the total net cost of RCP amounted to Tk.7.7 million. The following year, 
however, RCP itse lf showed a net positive income of Tk. l7 .9 million. With 30 Branches 
in O?eration by the end of the year, the cost of RDP services had also risen to Tk.S.? 
million. This s~:ill left .a positive balance of Income over ~o·ral programme costs of 
Tk.9.2 million. 
TABLE 8.2: RCP Net Income and Support. Costs: 1990- 1991 
(Taka million) 
1990 
RCP Net Income ('5.1} 
RDP Institutional Support Services (1.2) 
RDP Skill Training Support {1.4) 
Adjusted Net: Income (7.7) 
~umber of RCP Branches (by year end) 10 
Adjusted Net Income per Branch (0.8) 
SOURCE: RCP 
1991 
1'1 -~ 
(3.9) 
(4.8) 
9.2 
30 
0.3 
8.44 Procedures for ch~ging all costs ro RCP are not yet fully in place. It is not e asy, 
for ex1lmple, to determine the exact cost ~f supervisory and Consultancy services 
_provided by RDP technical POs, while BRAC managers do not helieve that all these 
co= could in any case· currently be borne by RCP alone or in combination with direct 
paymenLS from its members. One reason for tilis is said to be that the first batch of 
RCP Branches created are not as well-disciplined as i:bose now coming. to the transition, 
not. least because RDP sectoral training has improved. I:n addition, the esttmates for 
the number of fee-payers needed to cover the cost of technical support bave increased. 
Beyond. this will come the acid te;>t of ~.llingness among VOs and their members 
suddenlY to _pay for services they have become accustomed to receiving free of c!large. 
In the circumstances there is a need for BR.-'\C to develop a specific timetable for the 
real traP$ition - not from RDP to RCP but from the first two years of RCP status to 
full financial self-sufficiency at the Branch level. All Branches should then be 
monitored against this timetable, though the first batch may require longer, with 
fun..IJer u-aining and support. 
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8.45 One exce9t.ion to the above suggestion is the c~e of DTWs. The ?lan is chat fees 
for technical support to DTWs will be borne by the farmer-customers of the water 
supplied, not by the VO members in the collective loan schemes. This arrangement bas 
not been adeqm1te ly tested, however, and ""'hetiler tlle fees are passed on explicitly or 
through adjustmenES in rhe crop shares taken by the VOs could affect r:.be financial 
viability oi the schemes. Another issue is the imroducrion of new sec tor.al accivit ies 
\n ma~ure RCP Brancnes. If such activ\~ies a.e, as likely, uniami\la:r- to 'the members, 
it may be unrealistic to expect them to pay - or to pay in fun - for the cost of the 
relatively intensive basic training they would require. In such cases, external financial 
support would be required. 
8.46 In sum, the MTE endorse.~ BRAC's policy of making RCP Branches fully self-
financing. But. the transition is not yet !uUy planned, nor is there a monitoring system 
in place: at :present the mgnltoring system is still heing designed. rndeed, tmtil tl1e 
progression to full self - f inancing status is fully defined, it will not b e possible to finalise 
the monitoring system and make it operational. There Is also more work to be done in 
set:ting up comprehensive accountiog systems at the Branch level, Including the 
specification of detailed costs of services provided by RPP. 
Evolution Towards a BRAC Bank. 
8.47 RCP currently operates as a part of BRAC, an NGO without a bank charter. !n 
the nea. fum:re, consistent with t.he existing plao, BRAC intends ro apply for a bank 
cherter. The MTE endorses chis .Intention and recommends that BR.A.C should move as 
expeditiously as the political environment permits. A properly chartered bank, 
fol!owiog generally accepted norms for safe and prudent management, will help to 
er>.sure t.he maintenance of a permanent savings- and credit institution 
8.48 Issues and recommendations Nevertheless, the MTE has some notewortby 
coocerns about the adequacy of BRAC1s current loan administration and financi:al 
management systems which are not yet. sufficiently well-developed, as noted in Section 
5 of this repon. This is no reflection on me abilities of BAAC staff, who are generally 
very competent, open to new ideas, and diligent in adhering to systems and procedures. 
But it is important to ensure that the financial management systems used are adequate 
for a banking operation. Meanwhile, BRAC should take- further st eps to segregate 
l>aoking activities while it operates RCP wil;hin BRAC and to utilise additional system-
wide procedures to manage risk and to protect member deposits. A list of issues and 
probl em areas, rogether with recommended action, is outlined in Tabte 8.3 below. ft is 
based on the experience of other rural credit agencies, observations during the course 
of the ~TE, and concerns raised in tile 1989 Appraisal, the 1990 Annual Review and the 
1991 review of credit and banking activities. 
The Sustainability of BRAC 
8.49 Donor concern about the sustainability of BRAC derives from (a) the magnitude 
of the Consortium's financial contribution since 1990, leading to significant expansion 
in BRAC staff strength, physical facilities and operations, yet (b) the relatively short 
period of time over which t his financial commitment has been made. Both BR.AC and 
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TABLE 8.3: Financial Management and Conu-ol: Issues and Proposed Solu~:ions 
!ssve I Prooosed So h.~~ 'on 
loan pericnt"Sr.oe data aro ~tt~.ted 1n an "OVerly aAAC should sel~ an in:tef"'na.t:lonaHy accepteo. 
o;r:ltlis-::ic .J;)y 1n extet'na 1 r"CI)O~ i ng. aoo:ra~ at'ld co,.,servat.i'vo sw.()da("(! for "trM 
'iepor-t.1ng dllhnq~errr paymet~l:S as a per'Cetltase ~ir..;~ oi defaults. 
of tcq ) ~fl$ ~ssved genera:::e s l!:he lo..-est 
OOS~lble dei~l~ pe~tage. 
~~.c:rc;:.-':.1>-yl,;m 'N!:~~n<:) '~ '\S"!a.d~Q.;";~. <:rea~ i-""IC"':J.?.'\ '?1a{l.s, anct ~+;;\~\~ ~}:Ci-&"ta ... '\'ton 
Held fOl"'easts. l"ornt.cr performaoce .,a()ain$~ 
,xti) tneaSur:es. 
E.xpar.dtazre ~O'ting 
•• 
imprecise . ~ a.nnual bud9ets i n ~he li9nt of pric~ year 
pericnoarce; llold line mana~e!'"S ~-spon:sib-le fC!f"'-
=xpendi.:uro· 1 ine i~. 
~re aod ana l yse RCP· and JWP branch-
prOH'=/los.s- s~~emehts and prepare. COO!pa.rauve 
=~l)"Se:S ~-ross the sys~~n. 
AnalySis c~ tne 9~h pa~~e~s in -.:he loan .Gi'>'e ~ition.al attention -w bvdQOt. O!nalysi s 
"""" 
>s iowfflC\ Cflt., given ~he proposed s12e {a~ra.ge l oan si:z_C; number of bo~rs; l oans ~ 
of tho ~"ll"!<) opcr.n.ion. bofTO..ooer- .age' b,v branch age, af'ld by sec-~r). 
Pro.;e...-tions of loans owtsundfr:t9 are H:;tc.ly•eo ~e l 1oa,"'' <()c)t.Standing pat'tel"'nS and de .... 'S lop 
oa vrcog 9iv~ tho- CCO!Ple>tity of a mixt;;Jr"EJ- o~ de~i\ed ~J~Ons wi th sens1t1vfty runs until 
sher::-. t:Jed1urooo a.r.d l ooo- te:nn loans in- a pa~-A;!"~S arod~. 
O!U!lg'H'9 .and 9T'O'Wiflg branch portfo 110. 
Rat:io ana l ys.ts- and trend r"e'POrt. ing is not used. ~io a."\aly.s1s a..-w::! trend repol""t1()1). must be us.&a 
1 .r ~errent. is w u~orstand what act1-ons ar-e 
recr.;'ired w sus~i.rl sccce.<::Sfu l .gr"'''>o'tb. 
!t tta:1 be useful U> both SRAC oJ>d donors to 
C0(1t.TaC't. with a ~11-qualified na~1onal 
ac::;oom"fnq f1n21 w undertake add \ t1onal ~..cdies 
..-4 P"""'de tcchnic;q 1 a.ss, st.anc::e in s.t;~ 1~...c-o 
.,..,as. 
r 
!r.a-aeqvate repcr-t:1(.)Q and aoni t.or"ing of !nstall a La.~ L()an Aging syswn to iderrti fy 
dehl'lQVe."'i:; a;::c:o..Jnts .:lt ~he J-iO 1ovol. l a--:::e-paying loans ~t the e.lrhcst .ttage so that: 
' cr. underlyi~ causes can ba identifiAd aJ'Id 
addressed. 
Adcfi'!olQOa 1 li'l8a.Sur:es should be tried to rec!ue>' 
'<)SSe$ 9.Jd\ as~ 
"' 
staff 'i I"'Ceflt i w systems to insur<t pt"Onp't 
loan collection; 
" 
-a problem. assert cocrm1t:tee to ove~ 
liqu-idation and other 'lo!Or'k;outs oi probl EJII 
s iu,ations, especially with la"rger loans; 
0 loan revie.' s'yst.a'lls which rronito,... the 
l:l.v"H~y of l.Ondi~ deci s ions afto_r- the (=<. 
The~~ o-..e!"':Uo loaf') c1assificat.'i0t1 ar~ )(,.., the t.ne \.oan A9i 09 Repor; of l are-.pa,y'i ,;o 
anal ysi s are t-oodequate to draw aocura't.e oco>unts f s rou1;.ioely preoan:ld and tends ove:t' 
.cooclusioos ~b::>Jt U\e ad.;:q.l.facy of the resei"'Ve ti~ are a.oa lysed, a pol1cy can be deve foped so 
icr )()(1.., "')asS($. An <tncreasod expenOitur'e to ':ha'?:.· t.oo l oan -,oss provl s \ on 1 s <1) \ro'a,ys a.d equa'U:. 
i ncraase -:.r.o loan loss- res~rve cou 1d be 
fX'Ce'Ssary . 
. 
Lc.-~ are~ W!it-t.en off. 8aO 1031'S should Pe charged off ro.n:i~iy to 
ensure "'that the ~lance s~t. accur<)te ly refl ec-.._s 
assfl~ va.lues. Af<er charge-off. loans shou1o 
<:en't; inua b) be. ~ -...¢r'oted." t-4 oo\l()ct l:)..t.l:} ?a~__n~s. 
111 
I {S$1Je I ?rc~ 'SQ.\IJ~t()n 
' 
&x-.e c:oncr-s "'1'0""$ do. no~ fo llOw g eoora 1 !y 8!>$ ar.oc;ra.nre repo:-r;s should include 3.ll-a~ 
.ac----sp~ ~n:t- f 09 s~and.;:.rds. SRt..C pr"eoares i~and expense and confom to gene.-ally 
~...s t.ai icred to prograrrma1:.1c CO."lCe.rtlS and ~~ ac::::oy(l~ll)il standat'ds. 
~ d i -i.bu(""SPo_:eet\t- ~tedu l e.s . A'S. a. ~'t.-3\t. 
SO"'(t; n!';Jar"~ 3re "'I"'CC:ltt!P l e't.e Ql" st-c..t a tl'll )(Wre 
of i~/Wt.oenso ~nd fund f1¢'of ~tatemantsr 
f~ers of a bank;n1 operation ~st ic:oJs 0t1 
ovor"all f1naQCi~1 v1abi1i't)' and a l so r?•dev 
BR:C''$ fu)anci a l condition ff"Ctn time to tine. 
cent-ral cash e\lttagsmen't u-chn.i -Ques ~Y be- SAAC o:ay have rtoeently begu~ to assess ~ cnan;re-
lnadequate ior ~ ~raphica lly d i s buf"'Sed to bra;.ch offiO(:S for usa of funds. Th"1S 3 nd 
oper.at.'\on. ttlcam-ives Vloly be necessary to o"tner efforu tO a liocaU! cc:sts fu l1 y a('ld provide 
~~r--aQtt !:rra..nc:1, a rea aod nlg i """ 1 r."..ln.agets to i~·wes ~ max~mise i nvestmont inc~ 01'1 
ma,xt:;;l~ ;~ i nccme by ll'P:V;.,9 cash to excess .:ut'ds aro need&d. 
lr:'t:e~ earn"u'l9 accou'O"Cs:' .as qui"O\::Iy as 
pcr~ible. 
W.r i ttal pol~es and ~adure-s .0)~ 
tO asst:ro Ufll f-onn ouaHt:y. ccrrtrOls . 
ioo.dequa~e An Ac:::ot.tnt-11'19 Manual should be CQ:npleted and 
cont.inua lly updated. !t should be r-evi(r>oi'ed' to 
en:scre ~ adeqt!ate dua l control prtx;edunas have 
~ i:r$~::\t.st:::ed to acJ\'i.~te ttffP.:Ct\ve <::!sh. 
 . 
. 
ll\o i m.e:r-na l audft manual sl"*.sld be con;."'nuall:y 
upci:r.:od and s hould also be available i .n EogHsh 
for donor'" revifbo'· 
M 1fN'&$.b:oen~ po11cy shou1d be wri tten and 
a~ to govcrr~ pnrdent f" i-Sk m:a.n.agarerre of 
~it:er fut')El.s. 
c.~ B.sp 1.; ... i ll •-.! tale-1 1~ .::>erJiur lll<l.tlag-enc::n; . 1h= e;w;; &nlc W1,, n.-qu1re f~..X.;~Jt-00 mana{;.c~.•:m~ 
c:::x;u:it:ce::i ~ BRAC's obJect-.i ves aod c:xcel hng io 
bar.:C e-~. BAAC e.xec11teS a cor..p'nihens 'SYO 
strat-egy of vhicll banl<ir~ i s j ust ooo ~. 
-bank r""E!C:t..it"'$ su~rior"", speciaH sed managet'l':ent. 
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the Donor Consortium expect further assistance to be provided for the further expansion 
of RDP, NFPE, PLP, WHDP and other programmes representing BRAC's social and 
SUp\)ot<> services on behalf of the rural poor. But the members of the present 
Consortium cannot provide guarantees while they recognise that in the short- term the 
RDP-II funding package has made BRAC dependent on external assistance - at least in 
the short to medium tenn. RCP, on the ather hand, was de.signed to be self sufficient, 
fuelled by the fr-ont-end loading of capital deposits from the Consortium, leading w 
growth in interest income as lending activities grow. 
8.50 The nar;,ional context for sustainabilitv Any assessment of the sustainabiUr;y of 
BR..-\C must be set against a background of heavy dependence on international financial 
suppon on the part of government as we!l as non-government development initiatives 
in Bangladesh. At an aggregate governr!lent level, the national development budget 
reHes on external resources ro the exteru. of more than 90%. Even some of the 
coun~:erpart Taka resow-ces required as inputs to internationally-financed development 
projects are derived from the sale of oilier sources of assistance such as food and 
commodity aid. This dependence a1so applies to implementation capacity among 
government agencies.26 The quasi-government organisation, the Grameen Bar.k, and 
other large NGOs such as Pr~shika and Swarnivar also rely on external IP"aots and 
credits, if n·oc for the design of their rural development programmes, at least for their 
gearing up to scale. In this context, oRAC is in some resp~cts actually less dependent 
on external financial assistance than many other agencies owing to its proven ability co 
generat:e its own income, as discussed below. 
8.51 Capacity to mobilise funher external SUPPOrt To the extent that concern about 
the suscaioability of BRAC in the present Donor Consortium is motivated by lack of 
guarantees of continuity of funding or lack of Commitment among individual Consortium 
members, BRAC's abilicy to substirure other sources of external support is an important 
consideration. The two key inter- related issues in forming a judgement about BRAC's 
capacity in this .respect are (a) the quality of design and implemeot:acion of its 
operational program.rnes, and (b) coofidence in BRAC among the donor community. 
8.52 On the fiff.t of these couni:S, the jUdgement. nf the MTE is that the quality of 
8RAC's operational programmes puts them in the very top rank of rural development 
initiatives in Bangladesh. This is reflected in the high level of confidence wit.l:l which 
BRAC is regarded by the international donor community. Indeed, BRAC is already 
receiving assist=ce from other bi!!lteral donor agencies - :lnd from some members of 
the current RDP-II/RCP Consortium - for other components of its operational work, 
such as WIIDP. In addition, BRAC is negotiating for the largest single block of financial 
resow-ces under the NGO component of the General Education Project, funded by t.'le 
World Bank/IDA and a number of other bilateral donors. Ic is also seeking even more 
funding to support the targec of 100,000 NFPEschools by 1997. And while it iS far from 
In 1989, for example, the salaries of some 55% of the staff of 
the E<mgladesh Rural Development Board were financed as pa;::~ of 
the budgets of internationally-financed development prQjects it 
was responsible for im;;>leiOenting. (CIDA/DANIOA/IBRD/UNOP: Scuey 
on Cooperatives in Bangladesh. Dhaka . 1989.) 
113 
certain that: BRAC will be able to mobilise all ihe resources it will need ro pursue it:s 
ambitious expansion plans, its prospects ofbeing ab le to mobilise further assistance ar-e 
excellent. 
8.53 Caoacity to generate. own income Among NGOs; in Bangladesh or anywhere, 
BR.,>.C has shown a rare ability to generate it:s own income and this augurs well for it:s 
sustaioabiJicy - on a larger or smaller scale, with or without external financial supporr. 
For 1990, BRAC's own income accounted for just under one third of its reported total 
inflow of resources. Not only this, but from 1986 to projected figures for 1991, it will 
have recorded an average annual rate ef growth of own income of 43.3%. This is faster 
than the rate of growth of external financial assistance over the same period (just under 
42% per annwn), a lbeit from a smaller base le vel in 1986. In other words, though 
wit.IJdrawal ef donor support would mean severe retrenchment, BRAC would still be a 
ma)or NCO in its own r ight. Beyond this is m e question of BRAC's abUicy to sus£ain 
it:s r ecent performance in own income. Here again, the prospects are encouraging 
because BRAC has sufficient experience i:tot only to sustain its existing business 
activkies but most likely to expand them and to diversify still further ks business 
activities. 
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9. ~l.>,.:-.:AGE\1ENT Al'\D ORGA,1SATIO:-.:AL CAPACITY FOR fURTHER GRO\\'TH 
Overview 
9.! The positive conclusions presented in this report about the effectiveness of 
BRAC's operational programmes and their socio-economic effects among its 
membe..rshi? prov ide a good proxy indication that BR..<>,:C's organisational scrucrure and 
management system are themselves sound and efficiem. Indeed, the MTE nored that 
in most of its work BRAC is as eager to ensure professional efficiency in whar ir does 
as ic is to help and support the rural poor. The key issue, as reflected in the MTE terms 
of reference, is whether BRAC's structure, management system and internal support 
services are sufficient to pursue the further growth which is pl:lnned during the 
remainder of the RDP-fl/RCP funding period and beyond without risking loss of quality 
and eif ectiveness. 
9.2 The conclusion of the WTE is that BR.>\C does bas sufficient experience, 
mome.>1rum and flexibility to give it a positive capaciry for further growth. The vert 
rapid expansion that has already caken place since the beginning of RDP- U!RCP bas, 
nevertheless, produced some signs of strain - of which BRAC's senior managers are fully 
aware. The strain manifests itself in BRAC's training services and in issues of housing 
and other conditions of service; the integration of female staff; the criteria for 
promotion as between qualific ations and experience; uncertainty about ensuring the 
application of initiative and personal discretion among field staff; and different work 
schedules required in different programmes. 
9.3 While r.be MTE r"gi~lt:r,; tht: strain of expansion based partly on reportS from 
BRAC staif and managers and partly on its own observations, there is no explicit 
evidence. so far of penalties being paid in termS of staff losses or the efficiency of fie!!! 
operations. Among regular sraff in 1990 there was a Joss of just under 11.5%. During 
1991 the number of regu lar staff grew by nearly 27% to a total of more than 3,000, of 
whom only 4% were lost. Moreover, with the embargo oo recruitment by government 
and given the generally poor employment prospects for university graduates in 
Bangladesh, BRAC is better placed than ever to attract and retain able new staff. On 
the other hand, following the 1991 level of recruitment, more than a quarter of BRAC 
staff had less than one year e.cq~erience of rhe organisation, its programmes and 
procedures. And it is their lack of experience rather than their innate abilities which 
could threaten their eff ectiveoess. 
A. Organisational Structure 
Recent Structural Changes 
9.4 Since 1990, adjustments in BRAC's organisational structure have increased the 
number of Directors and have slighr.ly extended the Executive Director's span of direct 
managerial authority. In 1990 there were only three full Directors, responsible for 
colT'..mercial activities, programmes (in effect, internal support services such as training, 
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constr:ucrion, comm~Jnication and logist.ics - ClOt operational field prograrrunes), atld 
BRAC Primers respec tively. The beads of field programmes such as NFPE, RDP <!Jld 
RCP were designated as Programme Coordirtators on a par wit.h tile General Manager 
of Aaroog, the Head of RED, the Flnance ·Manager, the Head of the Ayesha Abed 
FoundaJ;ion and the Manager of Publications, all of whom were a lso accountable directly 
to the Executive Director (ED). Together wlthtbe Head of Personnel, occ-upying a staff 
position, t-IJe ED's span of direct autilorit.y covered a total of 12 senior managers. 
Changes introduced in early 1992 promoted the Pro_granune Coordinators of RDP and 
RCP as well as the Head o.f RED to fu!! Director status, giving a total of six Directors. 
At the next level down, the management. of WHDP, previously under the RCP 
Programme Coordinator, is now shown as a separate programme with a Manager 
accountable directly to the ED. Thus, the number of senior managers now directly 
acrountab1e to the ED has increased to 1:'., as shown in Figure ~ - l below. 
9.5 There are four aspects of BRAC's current organisational structure which could 
be quest:ioned - at least on the basis of norms and practices outside Bangladesh: 
i) the wide span of direct rnanagerial authority of the ED, rather than introducing 
an iatennediate level of two or three positions equivalent to Deputy ED, each 
responsible for programme clusters and functional categories such as finance and 
administration; 
i.i)i) the location of the Personnel Deparrment as a staff function co the ED when it 
more usually occupies a line management position; 
ili)ii} the locat ion of the Monitoring Department unde1: the Commercial 
Director rather than as a si!llultaneous staff function to RDP and RCP, 
the pr.ogranunes i~ principally serves; 
iv)iii} the location of REP under the RDP Director alone instead of being jointly 
managed by and/or accountable w RCP and RDP, both of which it serves; 
v) the location of the Internal Audit unit under the Commercial Director rather 
than as a staff function to the ED or some oilier positieo outside the line 
management structure. 
9 .6 The conclusion of the MTE is that none of these unusual feaUJres of BRAC's 
strucUJre requires immediate action. The-reason is that whatever is shown or suggeste d 
by t.he organisational chart, the \;;ey issue is how ~ple see their p0$itions as managers 
or managed, how they behave, and how different organisational units accually operate 
and interact. And against these yardsticks tbe management relati·ons work welL All 
of the senior managers occupying ilie wide field of direct control of the ED value the 
a,ccess that this gives them tO the organisation's chief conceptual aod practical 
strategist. It would probably be impossible to find outsiders - _difficult even w find 
existing BRA.C staff - who· could occupy in\:ennediate levels of management and serve 
as acceptable substitutes for the current ED. The location of the Personnel Peparonent 
seems in no way to affect its work as an administrative and recruitment ~upporr unit 
to t.l1e orgaaisation as a who1e. The location of the Monitoring Deparone!lt, as noted 
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detrimental eff~t on itl> objectivity and wide-ranging powers. 
9.7 The imgortance of proximilyJ)nd inrcmction More important tlt~n the form~l location 
of BRAC' s lluieren~ orgao\~tional units is ~he :l'bility of their managers and smff to inte~ct 
easi!y with ~eh other. This is particularly imporl:!.nt because of the opconess :utd personal 
COnt:!ct that sti!J characterises BRAC's management system and culture. ,\nd here, as noted 
in the discussion of RED and the Construction Department in Section 7 of til is report, it is 
the remed an~.e.~ buildtng at HO !eve! which ~pears to 1>e a problem. BR1\C recognises this 
issue and the !'vfl'E understands that tllcre are plans to construct a new, larger office building 
curing RDP-III . The MT£ fully endorses this proposal and would recommend that any new 
building is designed with sufficient flexibility For expansion to avoid the need for any 
physical SC!JWl.tlon of HO units exce9t, perhaps, those el\g;aged for BRAC's own commercia! 
interests. 
n. Gender l 'i.SUCS in BRAC's Staffing Structure. 
R~cmitmcnt Policy 
9.8 Since before L'Je commencement of RDP-ll/RCP, BRAC has vecn m:tking special 
efforts to recruit more women and has been successful in attracting women applicams. 
Initially, however, the drop-out rate for women bt!lween induction and confirmation as 
members of the regular staff was around SO% - in ot~.er. words, double the number of women 
had to be recruited to fill the target number of regular staff positions allocated to them. In 
the view of BRAC mMagers this high clrop·out ~tc was due to four main fuctors, including 
(a) motiv;:,tion only \o see-k a job ru<r ~ Illlh(;r than to pursue a genuine personal commitmcut 
to the rural poor; (b) mi.sa9prehension of tnc demands "mar. a job with BRAC would place on 
them; (c) negative reactions among women's families when tlle type of work became clear, 
and (c) t!le unsuitable background of some w.omen recruits, particularly middle cl::tSS urban 
women. 
9.9 For the most recent recruitment round during the ftrst two months oi 1992, the 
Personnel Depanment expects a drop-out rate of !ess than 5% between induction and 
conlirmation. This is a\\ributed 10 the d\ffus\01\ among women's networks of b.mer 
information on what is enr:~iled in working with BRAC, reducing the number of npplications 
(rom women wiL'!ou! genuine commitment. for !ts part, too, BRAC is learning from its own 
experience, adjusting the pattern of deployment of women staff and ttying to adapt the 
nw.nage1nen1 cut•.ure \o accomn1odate "'nd use tllem effectively. Won,cn I'Os arc now more 
frequently clcp!oyee in clusters, for example, having fotJnd that women posted alone to all-
male Area Offices wete highly likely to drop out. A new in-service staff training module 
has also been introduced - 1>artnership and Development - in which, for exanlple, male 
co!l.~gues are being insl.tliCted to be neither tOO protet:tivc nor too i!1SCI\Sitive 10 fcmal<:. st(\[f. 
,Staffing P;mems 
9.10 BRAC's recruitment policy is already beginning (O show results. An analysis of 
stafflng patterns {a) by programme and grade among regu:ar s!aff for 1990 and 199 J, and 
(!>)by progr.lmme and by categories of regular, pro_;ect and service staff for 1991, reveals 
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that: 
I 
i) the share of female reg4Jar staff has increased by two-thirds during calendar 199!, 
now comprising 20.4% of all regular staff; 
ii)i) but \.he highest rate of increase ·has been in \he very junior level of suppon staff 
(grades 1A and H); 
iii)ii) L!Je increase of regular female staff in g.r.ades ill-VI (which includes .POs) in 
1990/91 to a total of209 has been 'l_uitc small, though taking into account new 
female re.crui ts as POs still on probation brings r.he total up significantly to 
459; 
iv)ili) 
.. 
the major expansion in female s!affmg has occurred in RDP which added !02 
women in grades IV and V during 1990 and a further ?3 in 1991, together 
representing nearly 84% of the 209 regular staff addi tions. mentioned in item 
(iii) above; · ' 
.· 
v) women accounted for just11nder 6% of middte and senior managers (g-rades V1I-VJI1 
and IX-XU respectively) by Deceiuber t99t; 
.. 
vi)i) overa!1, women comprise 17% of.al\ BRAC s\;-.ff, uerivcd from shares of 20.4% of 
regular staff, 8% of project staff-and 1% of service s!;~ff. 
Promotion Policy 
9. Ll BRAC's poli,cy is !\Ot jusl to increase i\S share of female staff but ~o bring women in\o 
managerial positions as soon as possible. Accordingly, there is a 'high-flier' policy of rapid 
promouon prospec1s for \ne most able of i\S fe~1ale. s\aff and \his has -alteady led to the 
appoin~ment of ~he first two women Area Managers in 1991/92. Yet, as t11e data outlined 
above show, the share of women in the midd!e anc senior nmks of management is still low. 
This is because the current cohort of women simply do not have the length of experience and 
track record that characterises the majority of (mostly male) staff in positions o f Area/ Branch 
manage-r and above. In other words, even with the high-flier policy and with the generally 
good promotion prospects tha~ rapid expansion 11-eneaues, it will take time for womCil to 
work ilieir way llp \"l\e hierarchy. ·. . 
.. 
9 .12 The alternative wou1d be for IlRAC to look externally for women candidates for 
middle and senior management po$itio!}S. But this would go against its long-established 
policy of promoting from within w ensure Lluit senior managers have their own direct 
experier.ce of and commitment to field operations with the rural p()o.r, TJ1e MTE see no 
reason to abandorl this policy for the sake of meeting some target quota of women in senio{ 
OQera\tona! -oosi\iol\S. Wne:re women can-be and have been bro•.tg,!\t in from \he oms~de is in new opc.rarional programmes such as NFPE, i.n strictly administrative poslt.ions such as 
Aceoums, and in \echnical •uppon services such as RED, wl·rere specialised experience 
counts for more than experience of BRAC as such. 
9. !3 At junior levels, BRAC must take care in the approach it takes to promotions among 
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two broad categories of female sL'lff - those recruited some time ago with gene rally low 
academic qualifications and those more recent recruits who arc mainly graduates. Entry 
levels C)'.p\ain much of l he female S\a(fmg p\\\\em Summarised al)ove. Tl\e. increase at tile 
lower end js lhe result of the (ransfer of women fie!d wor~'ers I rom th~ project staff category 
to PO f\u1ctions under the WHD1'. . ¥ost hold only .school-leaving or intermcc!iate 
qualifications and are in grades 'II and III. Though carrying out co!llparable work to new BA 
or :MA entrants recruited at levels lV and V, their salaries are mucl1 lower. Many or them 
have also been with BRAG for 10 years or more yet face barriers to further promotion now 
that more graduates are being recruited. This is a specific illustration of one aspect of the 
strain noted at the beginning of this section - 1he need to recognise experience and track 
record as well as academic qualifications in promotion policy. 
Conditions of Service 
9.14 For two maio reasons, BRAC has so· far been fortunate in experiencing few practical 
difficulties over lhe conditions of service for its female staff. Fi rst, most of the recent 
ro."nlits have been single. Secondly, the willingness of women to join BRAC c!esigtlates 
them as social pioneers prepared to Jive th rougll the type of cuHutal, social and attitudinal 
changes they wjs-h tq see in their country. ~everthe!ess, as noted at the. beginning of this 
section, there are already sig>lS of potential issues ·in conditions of service. These include 
how to retain women a fter marriage; how to respond to caree r breHkS as they have children; 
how to respond if !lleir husbands are transferred; and how to provide accommodation to 
permit husbands .and wl ves to spend time together .even if tl1ey are prepared to work apart 
from each other. 
9.!5 Attillldinal issues in the integrar.ion' of female staff Two other issues a ffecting the 
conditions of service for women in BRAC are (a) attitudes and behaviour towards them in 
whar is still a predomi nantly male organisational ~u!ture, and (b) the integrarion of new 
female recruits against the background of a strong institutional memory among those women 
who have worked with B'RAC in mucll earlier days. Problems raised wit!l !he MTE by 
female staff on the tirst of these issues iQc!ucfe.d poor communication between men and 
women coll.eag,ue~; (estrictlons on <l\ei( mobility; the role of Acca Ma11agcrs' w~vcs as 
guardians/comrollcrs of female staff; Jack ·of leadership and supporr from AreMBranch 
Managers in confronting gender op-pression among the membership; and sexual harassment . 
It would be surprising in Bangladesh for any orga-nisation willing to make the sort of policy 
comm~\ment of BRAC not to e:&j)erience ))ro'o\~ms of \:hl> tyj)e. For however sttong 111\gl\\ 
be !.!1e intellectual commitment to social change it isanoLIJcr matter e!11irely to Jive it through. 
BRAC is fully aware of this and is counteracting it as, for example, through the training 
module on Partnership and 
Development. More.over, the willingness of. female -staff to articulate and discuss such 
'l}ro-'alems w\\h outsitlers in the M'TE is a heal\l\y imlication of \heir sc\f-con!i<lencc. an<l 
preparedness to con front them openly. 
, 
9.!6 The second issue of the relations becwe-.en longer-serving and recently-recruited 
women within :BRAC is a specific illustration of how the pace of change can lead to 
differences in expectations of further change. The problems confronted by the new cohons 
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of fema!e staff are no doubt far less traumatic than those encountered by women who joined 
BRAC and worked L'l the field 10 years ago. In wm, 10 years from now the expectations 
of newly-recruited women probably will be - prroably should be - greater than those who 
may now be given the impression t~at they expec! too muclt. 
The Women's Advisorv Committee (WAC) 
9.17 The !990 Annual Review identified many of the issues raised above by the MTE and 
recommended the creation of a Women's Advisory Unit as a full-time professional team to 
(a) advise senior management on gender issues in programming and management, and (b) 
provide professional suppon to female employees. BRAC did not go this far but in January 
199! convened the WAC as an ru1 h2!; body comprising 10 women selected by the ED, to 
whom the Committee reports. WAC membership was later expanded to 15. including 
mem!>ers from each of the main programmes, with at least half the members representing 
Area/Branch Offices and the TARCs. 
9.18 The WAC interprets its mandate as fo!lows: 
'With a view to look closely into the diriicultics..BRAC's increasingly female workforce 
might be facing in a predominantly male-run society ... to watch, identify and address 
mauers relating to 'gender adjustment' especially at BRAC camp offices in the rural areas. 
WAC's major task is to try and address the wrong and implement positive changes to make 
working relationship congenial bctween ma'e and female colleagues .. ., 
9.19 The ED has stressed two important questions he expects the WAC to ask repeatedly: 
i) how programmes can better understand and improve the lives of rural women and 
keep Programme Heads abreast of the ~hortfall< in 'gender performance''?; 
ii)i) in what ways can working conditions ofBRAC female employees be furrher improved 
so that they have equal scope for ~eve!opment as their male counterparts'? 
WAC: Progress Report. BAAC, Dhaka. November 1991. 
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9.20 Prorress so far The WAC held elght meetings between January and Septcember 
1991, two of which were co discuss l:be results of a first workshop with female field 
staif in M<lllikganj and to plan a furmer series of similar Workshops in different partS 
of the country. These Workshops ru-e designed to obtain feedback on the acwal 
difficulties encountered by femal e staff, as well as their pos itive experiences. The 
WAC relies on the resul ts as the basis for developing an action plan including 
recommendations for the establlst>.me nt of appropriate organisational and procedural 
mechanisms for ensw·ing progress ln the 'gender adjustment' process. WAC members 
report that in the three Workshops held so far there has beerl a trend in the points 
raised by field staff away from their personal problems and more towards programme-
related issues. This could be a tentative indication t hat pro&>Tess is being made in the 
<idjusonent and integration process itself and that women are learning what co 
chaHenge, and how t.o go about it, whea tn compromise, and \low to define and priorh\se 
what they see as necessary progr-amme adjustments. 
C. Management Issues 
Donor Concerns 
9.21 F'ro111 br iefing sessions and individual discussions with representatives of the 
Donor Consortium the main concerns about the management of &RAC are related to (a) 
~;..lJe rate of recent and planned future growth, and (b) the absolute size of BRAC. In 
agreeing to fund the RDP-11/RC? pac.Jcage, the Consortium was clearly confident both 
in the models BRAC had developed for its operational progranunes and io the 
· >nanagemem:. e fficiency with wmch they were being a??lied. 1he first !eg\tima~:e 
question chen became whether BRAC would be able to sustain the same manageriul 
efficiency during rapid growth? Related co this is the question of whether, in eying to 
preserve efficiency, BRAG's abso lute size may lead it to become over -bureaucratic in 
its work - delivering its services and assistance as 'products', as it were, rather than 
through close interaction w'ith and r esponsiveness to che participating membership? In 
sum, the donor concei"ns have to do with the possibility of sacrificing various dimensions 
of the quality of BRAC's work as a result of the rate and scale of growth. 
9.22 The summary conclusion of the MTE is that there is no major cause for concern 
about the efficiency and quality of BRAC's work. COnsistent with the indication of 
signs of strain mentioned at the beginning of this section, however, BRAG must take 
guard not so much to prevent bureaucratisation but to avoid tendencies towards a 
me.Chanisti.c appro?,ch - l)ar.ticuiar1y in the de.!\very of credit. 
Mana~?ement Culture and Approach 
9 .23 Management by contact To its great credit, J3RAC has retained much of the 
ope nness and personal contact wjtb which it began in the early 1970s. And it is this 
which constitutes its greatest prorection against becoming bureaucr<Jtic in itS 
management system. ln comparison with other organisations ln Bangladesh -
parr.icularly government agencies - BRAG managers at all levels are accessible to their 
subordinat es. They derive their authority f rom their experience rather than from rhe 
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exercise of hierarchical distinctions and behaviour or from J'lhysical isolat:ion. This 
emphasis on personal contact ~soften informal - hence the MTE's endorsement of plans 
to construct -a new HO building large enough to accommodate all HO staff under -..he 
same roof. But BRAC has also been able to fonna!ise the personal contact tr..roug~ <-
hie,archy of mee ting schedules, many of which include not just two adjacem 
mansgement tiers but three. for RDP/!~CP, for example, the hierarchy of meecmgs 
includes: 
i) weekly meetings between POs and GSs at Area/Branch le,•el to review and 
discuss savings ;md loan performance and ocher routine matters; 
ii) weekly meel;ings of GS$, POs and .Area/Branch Managers (AM) for weekly 
planning, new instructions or guidelines, and discussion of oew ideas or problem 
issues; 
iii) monthly meetings of POs, A\-ls and their respective Regional Manager (R.M) for 
work planning, oew instruc£lons/guidelines and general discussions (some R:Vfs 
arrange these meetings to include clusters of Area/Branch Offices in tl-•eir 
region, depending on transport .and !ogistie3l considerations); 
iv) monthly meet ings of AMs, R.'vls and Programme Directors (or Coordinators} wirh 
a simililr agenda to those for (ii} and (iii) above; 
v) monthly mee tings of RMs, Senior Managers and Programme 
Directors/Coordinators co report on fie,ld plans and progress, inter-programme 
coordination and exchange of information, a.nd <Uscussion of critie31 issues; 
vi) annual meettngs of a!! staff levels from ?Os to the Executive Director to 
corn.rn\1{\icate COt1\0!'ate plws, discuss targets -and ra\w issues; 
vii} recently a new type of meeting w~.s held in the foml of a Senior Man01gement 
Workshop to discuss strategic issues and new ideas -and there are iinn plans to 
make such workshops regclar annual events. 
9.24 It mi,ght appear that a schedule of sUch frequent meetings could leave field stafi 
in particular with 1ittle ti~:ne for their operational work with the membership. The !.:lTE 
raised this issue with staff at al!leve.ls boch in Dhaka and in the field. The conclusion 
is to confirm tha t these meetings are quite tiJ:De-consurn1ng but. do nor detract 
·- significantly from the intensity of work wji:h the membership. In addition, time spent 
in meetings substitutt>.S for time that would otherwise have to be spent in writing and 
reading reports, circulars, memoranda and other paperwork manifestations of a more 
bureaucratic approach. Field scilff also mentioned. two further beneficial effeas of 
frequem meetings. First, when new instructions, guidelines, data collection fonnats and 
tn~ !ike are explained to them persc~al\y, with cppcnun1ties fer them to ask questions, 
it avoids the misunderst andings and misinterpretations that r.hey feel would be 
inevitable in a system of 'management by memorandum'. Secondly, their regular 
meetiJ1gs with managers two or more seeps above them in the hierarchy gives them a 
sense oi belonging to a hwnan network rather than an impersonal machine. 
ll9 
9.25 The main cavea t to this positive conclusion attaches to the monthly meetings of 
AMs, RMs and Programme Direcrors/Coordi!latOrs in Dhaka. For some A.lvfs in less 
accessible parts or the count-ry these rneet"ings can cake up to three days out of cheir 
working month, including travel time. The meetings are important: co Programme 
Directors/Co.ordina tors, who rety 1ln rhem to keep in close touch with field issues 
throughout the countrY without having w spend nearly all their time traveH!ng to 
achieve the same informat ion flow. But there is already call( of incre<~Sing the time 
intervals between these meetings, initially co rwo momhs. This would be be~eficial 
without Directors/Coor-dinators having to sacrifice much in the currency of their 
in: ormation. Moreover, some Area/Brandt Managers have begun to keep 'issues books' 
in which they log important quescioos, uncenaintieS and other matters to raise with 
R.Ms and above. li this initiative were to be formally extended to all Area/Branch 
Offices it could help in setting the agenda fm· less irequent meetings in Dhaka. 
Exnansion. Promotion Prospects and Their Effects ort Management 
9.26 Organisational expansion brings with it a sense of confidence and opcfmism whic!1 
provides a positive fra!llework for good management. In the case of .BRAC, the ra!)id 
expansion of recent years seems to have acted like e sustained flow of orgaoisaciona! 
adrenalin. Individual members of staff have also been aware of the promotion prospecrs 
ctlat expansion brings with it. They have been encouraged, therefore, to think that good 
periormaoce in their current grades and postings will be rewarded with rapid promotion. 
9.27 There is, however, a downside ta this through a c ombination of two main factors. 
First, expansion has obviously meant extensive new recnJitrnent leading to an 
· increasingly loexpt>.rienced team of field staff. Moreover, until J uly 1991 BRAC had 
been recruiting new Masters graduates at Level VI, just belbw the level w be an 
Area/Branch Manager. ln parallel, t.IJe expansion of membersh ip, savings and credit 
services, NFPE and other programmes has been surrounded bY plans and targers to 
adhere ro the predetermined growth path. The efiect seems tO have bee.n a tendency 
among both managers and field staff to interpret performance more in terms of 
achieving targets than in relation to such qualitative issues as responding co a genuinely 
participarory process of group formation, the building UP' of group identicy or the 
definition of group aspir:;tioos and priorities. In sum, one sign of strain from expansion 
has been a tendency towards a prescriptive, somewhat mechanistic approach to the 
ap!)lication of the RDP/RCP·mndeL 
9.28 6RAC's senior managers are aware of the risk of loss of quality and 
responsiveness through the pursuit of growth. Fortunately also the majoritY of current 
senior managers have served with BRAC for many years and themselves represent lrs 
institutional memory aoout the importance of initiative, flexibility and the exercise oi 
managerial discretion at the field level. And there i$ already evidence of promotion 
being denied to staff who may be models of adherence to targets but who iack initiative 
and responsiveness . Y ec rather than just blockiag the promotion of unsuitable s~afi, 
BRAC knows that it must be more pro-active in developing the skills and confidence of 
its existing and future managers at different levels. For this the onus fs on the cw-re nt 
Regional Managers on a day- to-day basis and on the Management Development 
Programme for more formal training. 
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Sunolv of future Managers 
9.29 Ag<linst the bac"'kground given above about the tendency towards a prescriptive 
approach in fo!Jowiog models and adhering to targets in che pursuit of growth, it is 
impon:ant to assess BRAC's supply position for fm:ure managers - especially the crit.ical 
role of Area/Branch Man·agers. Table 9.1 below compares l!RAC's s taf fing situation at 
the end of each of the first two years of RDP-UlRCP impleme ntation. 
TABLE S.l : BRAC Staffing S\:f\lcwre.- l 990 and 199l 
Level 
W/L 
lA 
l 
II 
Ill 
IV 
v 
VI 
V11 
vm 
IX 
X 
X! 
Xl! 
TOTAL 
NOTE: 
SOURCE: 
December 1990 December 1991 
Number % Number % 
204 8.6 550 18.3 
-24 !.0 26 0.9 
12 ().~ 19 o.s 
94 4.0 294 9.8 
357 !S.l . 357 11.9 
194 8.1 286 9.5 
409 17.2 353 11.7 
792 33.4 803 26.7 
197 8.3 215 7.1 
44 L.8 56 1.9 
27 1.1 31 l .O 
!1 0.5 13 0.4 
5 0.2 4 0.1 
" !!. 0.1 1 u 
2.372 100.0 3.010 100.0 
W /L ,. Wit..l]out Level, including new POs serving probationary terms prior 
to confirmat.lcn on the. regUtar staff 
BRAC - Personnel Departn:lent 
9.30 Table 9.1 permits only a vezypartial assessment. of the prospective supply of new 
Area/Branch J4anagers. The large number of POs in Level V! appears to give BRAC a 
strong cohort of staff with the potential ior promotion to Level VII as Area/Branch 
:Managers. On the other hand, as noted above, BRAC has until recently been recruiting 
significan t numbers of graduates directly into Level VI, many of whom still have limired 
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experierlce of BRAC and its programmes. The very large increase in probatioaary staff 
shown In the table shows that there could soon be an even larger number of middle and 
senior ran.\ing POs. BR.A.C itself estimates that it could increase the number oi 
Regional \1anage;-s to 60 and of Area/Branch Managers to 395. The MT£ has nor been 
able to review BAAC's criteria and assumptions in making these estimates or to carry 
out an analys is of the length of exper ience of Level VI POs. Nevertheless, the sheer 
number of L evel VI POs suggests that it: should be possible to supply an adequate number 
of Area/ Branch Managers uo sustain the current rare of expansion. 
D. Training 
Planning and Performance 
9.31 BRAC's training activities have grown significantly in both scope and throughput 
in recent years. Owing to the variecy of training clients, types and fields of tra ining 
and physical settings in which training can be undertaken, the training programme is the 
most difficult to analyse in terms of what it pla'lS to do and what its achievements are . 
Each TARC is responsible f<lt drawing up itS own annual training plan based on targets 
and guidelines iss1]ed from HO. The t wo TARCs visited during the MTE (~t J~ore and 
Pabna) had submitted their 1992 training plans to HO by February 1992 and expected 
all other T ARCs to have dune the s~e. But liy the end of February HO had not been 
ab le to aggregate a BRAC-wide programme. One illfficulty - which affects both the 
aggregadon of pll!.ns as weJI as regular reports on performance to p lan seems to be in 
vuo.:ing the infot:roation into BRAC's computer system and subsequently analysing i;:. 
The Training Department receives a variecy of print-outs which they find difficult to 
collate and summarise. At the end of each year SlliiUTlary tables are also prepared on 
computer. But these can be difficult (a) to recooci!e and compare with eriginal plans, 
(b} ~o verify through cross-checking, and lc} to analyse for an indication of performance 
against targets. The difficulty iS compounded by apparent mid-course changes 
introduced in the plans in terms of E..lte nwnber and duration of courses and their 
location. An example of this is the way in which adaptations !lave been made in the 
schedules for skills training. 
Training Caoacity 
9.32 Phvsical facilities At an early stage after the commencement of RDP-ll BRAC 
realised that It would have to increase training capacity to keep pace with demand from 
its expanding activities - demand deriving principally from the need to train new 
members, new staff and teachers for the overalL e:<lpansion of NI'"PE. But physical 
facilities do oot represent a hard deterntirulnt of training capacity. In 1990, for 
example, a backlog in physical facilities was already apparent. But training througbput 
far that year in fact exceeded the target: because some courses were held in field 
ofHces and rented premises to relieve congestion in the TARCs. There are also 
~idaptations made to training schedules from time ro time, as noted above. But it is 
difficult to discern the extent to which these are plann~d changes based on experience 
or motivated ar least partly by the need to cope with the capacity consrrarm;. 
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9.33 The 1991 review of training noted the backlog in capac icy but was <>Ptimistic that 
it could be e liminated by the end of that year. Yet BRAC has still not been able to 
eradicaLe the backlog in expanding training capacity and the view of che ~TE is that-
we back log could grow. The problem is not just the lengthy delay in starting work on 
t.}}e Camilla T ARC. This has been mainly a technical difficulty in building design. More 
fundamentally the problem is one of planning, programming and inter-departmental 
co!!aboracion, as noted io section 7 dealing wich the Construction Department. 
)deanwhile, the Rajendrapur MTC which was intended specifically for the MDP has been 
used partially in the role of a T ARC. ln the short run It can continue to contribute co 
e<!Sing the capacity limitations in existingTARCs, especially because lvfDP itself is far 
from being fully geared-up. 
9.34 Scaff capacit:V The number of full- time training staff rose by over 30% in 1991, 
from 51 to o7 - considerably faster than the increase in physical capacity. The 
selection process - involving four stages o( (a) desk screening of cvs, (b) an assessment 
workshop, (c) a writt:en examination in Bangia and English, and (d) a final selection from 
a short: lise - is commendably rigorous and works welL But there are: signs of strain in 
the over-utilisation of training staff capacity. First, it seems that some TARCs are 
cutting corners in the standard probationary/ induction arrangement-S. Instead of being 
assigned to senior trainers for a period of three months before being given sole 
responsibility for training members and for six months before delivering courses t.o 
BR"'-C staff, some trainers are being given sole responsibility after as little as one 
month. Secondly, trainers are being asked to take en increasingly heavy workloads. 
During 1990, capacity utilisation of training st:aff time was 102%. For 1991 -
n01::withstandlng the increase in numbers of training staff mentioned above, the training 
depar-cment estimates 11n even higher rate of capacity utilisation. 
9.35 The MTE has not been able to trace any immediate effects of the strain on 
training capacity on the quality of training or, in turn, on the effectiveoess of 
operational Jlrogrammes. On the other band, some senior managers point to the ease 
with which rented properties can be used and the beneficial effect-S of keeping training 
and ocher staff at full stretch as positive factors. Nevert:heless, the point is t hat BRAC 
has sec its own schedules, norms, expectations and budgets for training. ln respecc of 
physical facilities and staff utilisation, it is neither adhering to its norms nor keeping 
up with demand - and, without remedial action, sooner or later this will take a roll on 
quality. ln the view of the MTE, the most pressing issue Is to do all possible to catch 
up with targets to expand the physical capacity for training, in line with the 
recommendations for the ConstrUction Deparonent in Section 7 of this report. There 
is also a need c-o select and train new training staff much earlier - in anticipation of 
need - to ensure that the workload imposed on them does not run the risk of fatigue and 
loss of quality. 
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notwithstanding the increase in numbers of training staff mentioned above, the training 
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9.35 The MTE has n,ot been able to trace any immediate effects of the strain on 
training capacicy oo the ctuality of training or, in turn, on the effectiveness oi 
operational programmes. On the other hand, some senior managers paine to me ease 
with which rented properties can be used and the beneOcial effects of keeping training 
and other staff at full stretch as positive factors. Nevertheless, the point is that BRAC 
has set its own schedules, norms, expectations and budgets for training. In respect of 
physical facilities and staff utilisation, it is neithe~ adhering to its nonns nor keeping 
up with demand - and, wi t;hout remedial action, sooner or later this will take a toll on 
quality. In the view of the MTE, the most pressing issue is w do all possible to catch 
up with targets to ~and the physical capacity fo.r training, in line with the 
recommendations for the Construction Department in Section 7 of this report. There 
is also a need to select and train new training staff much earlier - in anticipation af 
need - to ensure that the workload impased on them does not run the risk 6f fatigue and 
loss of quality. 
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ANNEX I 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
1. 0 
J3RAC f!URAL DEVELOPHENT PROGRAMME ( ROP} II 
AND RURAL CREDIT PROJECT (RCP) 
HID- TERM EVALUATION 
PROPOSED S{;OPE OF WOHK 
INTRODVCT toN 
1.01 BR,~C' s Ru r al Dev-elopment Programme {RDP) II and Rural 
Credit Project (RCP) received financial suppor t from a Donor 
Consortium (DC) comprising! NOVIB, ODA, NORAD, DA NIDA, AKr/CIDA, 
SIDA, EZE and Ford Foundation to continue J ts programme of 
e><pansion. As per the Project Documents si<5ned in Hay, 1990, the 
total amount of project funding is USS 49 million, for the period, 
January, 1990 throug h December 1993. 
l. <12 'i'be ~!embers of the l:>onor Ccnscr•~i.um ha:ve. agreed, in M,a:;, 
1991, to eliminate the 1991 Annual Review and to undertake a jolnt 
Hid- term e valuation to review the status of project imp lementation 
and to assess BRAC operations. 
1.1 EACKGROUN'D 
1. 1. 1 An Annual Review of RDP 11 and RC P I was conduc ted in 
November 1990 . The· majority of t.he recommendations was endorsed I>~· 
the DC and BRAC i n the areas of financial reporting and accoun~ing 
practices and proce dures . Consideration of other recommendations 
relating to institution buildi ng, the Non- Formal Primary Education 
Programme (NFPE) and BRAG's training capacity were the s ubject of 
s pecial reviews carr~ed out in February and April 1~~1. ln 
addition, in. Novenlber !.991, a financial consultant was contrac-t-ed 
to conduct a study t o rev iew the banking· system. This consul tancy 
is expected to be completed l:iy December 4, ·1991 and the findings 
will provide additional useful information for the Hid-term 
evaluation . 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE HID- TERM EVALUATION 
:!. • 2.1 The purpose of the ~lid-Term Evaluation is to assess the 
e-ffectiveness and e ffi ciency of BRAG in managin~ the Project, 
review BRAC's rate of expansion and recommend changes in the 
expansion strategy, if r~qu ired. 
1 .2.2 It i s spe.cified in paragl"aph 52 of the Project Document 
that a Mid- tentt ev-aluation «ill be cart-ied out in the first ~uart-er 
of 1992. The main objectives of th~ evaluation a re t o undertake an 
i n -dept.h i nvestigation of the BRAC Bank Project, assess.ing its 
e:fectiveness in lending to the poor and financi al viability and, 
to evaluate RDP II and make recommendations for t he implementation 
of RDP II I. 
1.2.3 The evaluat ion team wil l review BRAG's performance with 
respect. to achieving t he objectives and specifi.ed targets set cut 
in the Pro j ect Document and the Project Appra isal Report dated 
April, 1989 . The tea~ will assess the extent to which the 
recomme-ndations of t,he 1990 Annual Review Mission and the fcttr 
sectoral reviews, endorsed by the DC, have been implemented. 
1.2.-' The Eva luators will review BRAC',; plans for the 
developmen t. of its var ious prog::-ammes and the resulting demands 
Lhis will put o n t heir management systems and li kely impact. on the 
prog ramme quality. This will include, but not be l1mited to, an 
assessment of the sustainabi:i:y and replicabilit.y of 3RAC's 
app::-cach and comments on possib!e lon~-term w1thdrawal st~ategies 
on the part of t.he Donors. 
1.2.5 To this end, Evaluat.ors will also revie~o.· BRAC's 
perceptions of the pol itical, social and economic climate of 
Bangladesh, BRAC 's ab ility to identify the needs and capRcities of 
the rural poor with whom they are l<orkin~ and the deve lopmental 
role BRAC sees for itself ·,.:thin the broader community oi 
Government and other NCO's. 
1.2.6 Recommendations .-il l be prepared concerning adjustments 
in programme plans, including BRAC' s targe ts a nd goals, felt 
necessary to balance economic and social proj e ct conside r ations. 
1 . 2. 7 As stat.ed in poragraph 50 of the Project Documem:., and as 
requi~ed under individual Donor agreements signed with BRAC, ~he 
objeccives of the Mid- Term Evaluation are to : 
1) Establish the achiev~ments of each programme over t i me; 
2) Analyze the ir ach levements in the context of the original 
objectives; 
3 ) Assess whether inputs were sufficient and appropriate in 
re!ation to the objectives and achievements of the programme; 
4) Make recommendat ions for t he planning of future pro~rammes . 
1 .2.8 These f our object ives will have to be followed up since 
they all play a n important role in terms of measuring the progress 
and status of project activities in relation to overall targets, 
such as the alleviation of poverty and empowerment of the target 
group, the landless poor. 
1.3 SCOPE OF WORK 
1 .31 The evaluation team wi ll cover, but not be limited to, 
the following six major areas: 
BRAC Bank Operations and Financial Performance 
:ncome Generating Activit~es & Socia Economic Impact. 
Xanagement and Training (staff and VO members) 
Organization and Institu t ion Building 
Gender Speciali~a tion 
Education and othe r Support Service Programmes 
1.32 The evaluati on team, as such, will cover these six areas 
through eight members appoint.ed by the Donor Consortium. It is 
estimated that. eac h mission member ~o.·ill require four ~<eeks in 
Bangladesh, during the month of February, to carry out the 
assignment and to complete he r/his cont r ibu tion to the draft 
repor "t.. The 1.eam l eade r will require an additional two weeks to 
coordinate t.he work and prepare the final repor t . 
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2. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED 
2.1 "FINANCIAL ANJ\LYSI.S AND BRAC BANK OPERATIONS 
1'he team will : 
2.2 
.".sses-s the extent to whi.ch cecommendat. i.ons from the p-::-e,· i.o~ts 
Annual Review Mission ( 1990} relating to finan<:i. al management 
practices hav e been implementea; 
Review the audit reports, annual financial statements 
past two years and e''aluate the 6perations 
per-fo rmance, financ ial viabilit:: and soundness; 
fo;:- t:he 
overall 
Prepare financial projections for the n ext ten years and 
determine BRAG's potential for self- sustai nabilit~; 
Review Donor disbursement procedures and a ssess the overall 
utiUzation o f Donor funds for RDP II and RCP; 
Revie•• and analyze the financial reporting, new record keeping 
and accoun tancy control systems of RDP and RCP and make 
recommendations for qualitative and quantitativ.e imp:rovemenl:.s; 
Re,·iew the classification system of l -ong-term loans t<ith 
special reference to collective schemes and the efficiency of 
BRAC's credit policies; 
Analyze BRAC' s f inancial management systems, i.e., how 
l. nvesl:.ment dec i s ions are made and how group members' funds are 
and will be uti lized; 
Review the institutional and legal basis of the RCP and BRAC's 
plans in this regard; 
Evaluate the e f"fec tiveness of BRAC' s management information 
system in relation to the above . 
INCOME GENERATING ACT!VITIES & SOC.IO- ECONOHIC IMPACT 
1'1:\e t.eam "ill: 
Examine the 
and asse-,ss 
activitie s; 
portfolio of· economic activities unoer RDP/RC? 
the profita bility and viability of these 
Examine the actual record repayme nt of group members 
especially wi th respe·ct to lang - term loan and the economic 
impact for group members partic i pating in group activities 
compared to individual loan activities; 
Examine the economic impact on group members, paying 
!='articular attent i on to the impact on ••ome·n a nd "'omen's 
groups. Partic ular attention should be paid to whether the 
projects signi ficantly improved employment opportunities and 
income l~vel~ for women; 
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2.3 
Analyze the profile oC income earn in~ act.ivities with respect 
to rural econOmY. develo].>l1lent, and assess the r-o le of BRAC in 
transferring new and relevant technology to it~ members. 
OPER;\TTON'AL PERFORMANCE 
2. 3. l 
ilRAC's 
tartet 
IH thin th.e con text of t.he exp,.os i on of the programme, 
pf'rform?n·ce i n providing credit and sttVt?6rt serv i ce s to ir.s 
group will be reviewed. The team members wi ll : 
2.4 
R~e>view BRAC' s achievem~e>nts wit.h respe·c\:. to op.erational and 
physical tar-gets for the period under review; 
AsSe·ss the effect of the expansion p r ·ogramme of RCP on BRAC's 
ability to de;iiver serv ices to members, tho qual ity of the 
services and on branch profitahi1ityi 
Review the l.endi.ng p't'ogramme in the c ·onte:ct <> f Loan 
disbursement, loan ut i lizat ion, loan structure (short-, 
ruedium- and long- ter.fll) and group ( col.l ective) loan ac tivities ; 
Compare the pe r f ormance of males and females in employment and 
income ge~erating projects in a~eas such ~s access Lo credit, 
!o~n ~~rpose & size a~d recovery rates; 
MANAGEMENT AND TRAIN!NG 
2 . 4.1 A general concern i. s ehat .BRAC maint-ains a 'oalance 
beDween institution building (including a~ea expansion ), its 
o r.g:ani~ot..i.ora1l manag'~m~n L ::o-ys t;.em und pro~.ramme cJ~l i ver y to l t-s 
client grou p. 
2.4.2 1\sse"ss tl;le i mpact of the transfer fr01n RDP t o RCP on BRAC 
staff i . e. t-heir abi lity to cope with the changes and thei r need 
for further tra i nint. 
Z.4.2 Within t he context of the BRAC expansion programme the 
evaluation team 1vill assess the s.ustainabil i ty of BRAC's 
institutional capabi l ities in terms of operating perfo:rmance (i.e . 
organioz.at.ior., management , staf fing and training). The follo-..ing 
aspects will be a(jd-ress·ed: i) overall man<~ogement capabil ity ; ii} 
exist..ing organizat ional structures at headquarters and at regional, 
<~;nd area offices; iii) staffi ng activities i.e. recruitment and 
p!'Qmotion policies with sp.ec±al at.t.e n.tion on women staff members, 
and; iv~ ~raining needs and capac ities. 
To this end, the team will: 
Analyze the quality of the management stn>cture at the field 
level ancl head office with respect to the rapid e~pans lon in 
bo~b staff and project activities; 
Analyze mana gement implications f or any add i tional pro jects 
planned or .under di.scu ss ior), and BRAC' s capacity; 
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2 .'5 
Examine Lhe decislon - maldng process and personne l policies , 
including performance pevie_., . p romot. ion·s, ~t'lff de.ve·lopmen:. 
deciiions and g ene ral poinLs such as cl~centralisaLi6n, 
deleg-ationJ }Htr~.tcipatjon, supervisi-On and ;1.ccount.abilit:•; 
Assess BRAC ' s pro·grP.ss to••ards pt·ovi d ing gender-sens~tive 
personne1 and sound career pla nning ,,. i th pi.lrti.cular emphasis 
on revi<~ 1vi ng BRAC' s str-a~egies · for p romot ing ''omen within the 
~hole organizati on i n part icular Lhe fo rma tion and s tatus o ! 
Lhe newly consti t uted \~omen Advi sory Committee (IYACJ; 
S:xamine Ute st.a ff ing situation with reference t c the staff 
composition, stru.cture, turnover and succession al al l levecls: 
Assess the presen t train ing programme i n terms of strateg~· , 
lnethodolog)·, impact and r elevance t o BRAC' s pr.esent operating 
environment ; 
Assess the impact on the quality and efficiency of the 
training programme l training and t ra i ners) assoc iated with the 
increas-e in the "olume of training under•~ay and planned; 
Determine the probable demand for in-hous .. e training for both 
SRAC slaCC and VO membe<-S, req~lire.d t o f1.1 lfil E.Ri\C' s programme 
targets; 
Assess the adequacy or phys ical training facil ities !existing 
and planned ) through the end of 1993 (in terms of cop ing •d th 
tl"aining of an increased number oi BRAG staff members, VO 
group membe rs, etc.) with respect t o p rogramme targets and 
objec tives; ' 
lNS~ITUTlON BUILDING 
The team will: 
£xami.ne t-he l!;rou-p i dentifica;:..ion, fol:mat.ion and develo'Pment. 
processes and a s sess the extent to which l3.RAC covers and 
penetrates i ts target groups and the extent to which soc ial 
mobiliza tion and empoNe rment of the landles s poor conLinue to 
receive high priority; 
Asse ss the state of maturit~ and the process of self-
snstainability of the Village Organizations (VOs) by t"eviewi ng 
t.he se.t of indicators th·a t have been d.evelor>ed and point out 
any constraints wit.'n regard to the formc.tion of s t rong , 
independent VOs ; 
Review the status· of the federation p rocess, its structure and 
the role of the federat i ons in RDP and RCP ; 
Assess the impact of the institution building activities 
as the monthly-issu.e meeting, the SPS'c ial meetings 
workshops on the institution building process; 
such 
and 
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2 . 6 
2 . 6.1 
Examine t he surv i val ra t es of o ld g.r -oups and factors affecting 
the s_ur vival; 
Examine t.he social c han g e s gene rall:r oc cu rr i ng i n the project 
areas l \;ag e le,·e l s. , house hold income' i: n deot.e d ne ss ano 
migrati on ) , and im-provement-s in part-i c ipaL i on. PCSltion anC 
stat-u s of women; 
Assess c h e balance be t ween t he pursui t of e c onomic and socia l 
_g_oals . 
SUPPORT SERVICES PROGRAMMES 
Non~ Fo rmal Pri.ma l'Y Education P r o gl"amme ( NFP.E) 
Re vie" t h e management a nd logis tic al ef fi ci..ency o f the l'<FPE 
Programme and assess .... •he the r the r apid e x pansion 1;ill have any 
neg-ative impact o.n t he quality o f the programme (t r ough t.he 
endof1993 ) ; 
For the NFPE programme , r e v iew the stru c t ure and e~£ icie ncy of 
the NFPE p rogramme pers o nnel (tr aine rs, Pos , FOs ) a nd identify 
.any problems/bottlene c ks associated wi t h staff i ng ; 
Examine and comment o n t h e inter - c y c l e cont i nuat i o n r ates of 
the NFPE s chools ; 
2 . 6.2 Rural Enterpri se Pr<>jec t (REP) 
Examine the port fo l io of e c onomic a ctivitles und er REP and 
asse ss the prof i tabili t y and viability of these activities; 
Revie<,. the experi mental "p r oje cts u nder t aken by REP a nd the 
mar keti ng cap abil i t y o f the REP and the mechani s Jil for 
transfer of t echnolog y; 
Hanag ement. and Dev elo p ment. £>.-ogramme { ~lDP} 
Asses s t h e past tra ini ng performance of HDP a nd TARC in 
relation to targets; 
2.S.4 
Assess the role of HDP in d e veloping the managemen t capacity 
of .BRAC and non B RAC ' s s tat f . 
Assess t he effic i ency, effect i v e n ess and sust.ainability of 
this -p r o gramme; 
Paral egal Programme ( PLP) 
Assess the efficiency , e ffec tive ne ss and sus t.a i nab.ility of 
this !>rog r a mme. 
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2.6.5 Monitoring 
AsseSs ~he r-o le of the monitorin~ depa!" trnent. i n i fil pt'o,· ing the 
L manag·ement con~ro:. :1 :' t h e prog·rammcs: 
Review the c a,p·a:c i -r. ;,t o f the existing m<>nitoring s:;st~m t.o 
ret·rieve facts o n social aJ'ld economic impacts of the 
pro~rrammes and poi nt out the necessa ry irtdicat(>r-s fc r-
analysis; 
2-o.G Resea"J:-c h and Evaluat ion (RED) 
Assess the work performed by the Research and Evalu3.tion L Depactment -w ith respec t to programme tar g e t s ·and obj e c tives; 
3 . 0 
Assess the efficiency , effe ctiveness and sus t ai n,.bi l i t:; of all 
secto~al programmes. 
ME'l'liODOLOGY 
3 . 1 Al though the evaluation t e am 1<ill b·e respons ible for the 
select~on of t he eval uation methodo logy , i t is suggested that the 
s tttdy ap-pz.-oach include t he fo.llo\'iing : 
L Review of project reports: 
Annual b udge ts 
Project Document s and Apprais~l report. 
BRAG' s Annual <J.nd quarterly ·pt'O!P'ess l:'epor ts 
Annua l Review Report of 1990 
BRAC Audit Repor~s 
Revi ew report on 'IFPE 
Review report on BRAC's training capacity 
Re vie" ·report on the banking system 
RED' s studies 
Interviews/di.scussions ·..rit.h BRAC Head Office management st>aff, 
Dono r Consortium ~!embers and the DLO ; 
Field work at BRAC area a nd regional o ffices including 
interviews wi th members; 
Interviews/discussions 
Government Departments, 
nece-ssary. 
wi th 
UN 
other o r gan i zations 
.agenc i es, NGOs and 
including 
others as 
3 . 2 After approval of the TORs by the DC, t he teall\ leader 
will be provided with various d<:>cumen t s and c:lata which w-ill a ssist 
the team in s t arting its field work timel y . 
3 . 3 I mme.diately after a rrival of al l team members, there wi ll 
be- a formal b r iefing S·e ss i on wl.th BRAC and the ~!embers of <.he DC. 
Upon compl et i on o f the mission's work the r e will be· a debr i e fing 
session wi t.h BRAC and the DC Members scheduled fo r ~larch l st, 1992, 
at which the Team wil l submiL its draf~ report, anc:l present its 
major findi ngs and recommendat ions. 
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3 . ~ Aft.er re<Oeipt and re,·ie-..· of the draft report , and wi t htn 
a t"•o te> three "eel< pe r iod the DC •dll p r <:>v i de t he Team !,eader with 
comments a-"nd r ecommend a t ions \.thlch are lo bE"" La ke n i.n t.o account in 
L the final report. Thf' t e ar. ::c.;icr tdll bt> Tesponsible for 
coordinrtLing t h e lnpn t s f[·om c.:eam members Lo ~·n $ure the- timr-1_:; 
submission of a professic.nal-<Jualitr report. . 
4 . 0 RF.PORTING REQUTRF.HE NTS 
+.1 The ev:1 l uation t e a m will provide a dr,\fl re port of it.s 
findit\g..;, u sing the follo·tving eutline : 
5.0 
StatemP.nt o f findings, conclusions ·and recommenda tions 
Indicate key i ssues for the attention of t he ~nd of p roject 
evaluation in 19 9 4 
The repot· t as such including evidence and analrsis which 
support findings, conclus ions and reco111mendations 
Appendices: inc l ud i ng descript.io·ns of methodologies used t.o 
carry 011t t he stud~·. bibliography, lists of persons/agenc i es 
vi:sit.ed and intervie .-ed, and data. 
TIMING AND LENGTH OF HJSSION 
The mission tdll t ake place in February, 1 9.9 2. The team members are 
expected t;o arrive i n Dhaka on February lst 1 99.2 for a period of 
four wee!<s e xcludin·g t rave l time . During thi s J?eri od they wLll 
carry out t he fi eld t•ork and c omp-lete the draft report . 
6 . 0 LOGISTICS 
6 . 1 Al t.hough the evaluat.ion t eaiD will be respon sible for 
carrying out i t s work programme, the Donor Liaison Office will 
provide assistance on various logistical aspect s· includin-g 
.___ transporLat.ion~ offi ce and secretaria l/support servi ces and 
accommodation . The DLO wi l l also assist in t h e sche dul ing of all 
visits, brie fi ngs and fie ld tr'ips as req u i red. 
7 . 0 TEAM COMPOSITION 
7.1 A.s agreed a t the Donor Consortium Neeting o f Hay and 
November, 1991, the evaluation team wil l consis t. o f a tot.al of 
eight professionals as follows: 
Team Leade r 
Financial Analyst 
Institu tional Spec i a lis t 
Credit/Small Scale Enterp r ise Specialist 
Manage ment and Training Speci.alist 
Educat.i on Spec i a list 
Ge nde r Special ist 
Economic S pecialist 
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7.:! !':ach member, including the team li>ader, ••ill fulfil the 
follo~in~ responsibilities: 
RPview and assess his/her nssigned topic/area nnd complete a 
wr it ::.en report coverins; this t.opic/are,a for inclusion in t.he 
O\'~rn!l r eport; 
genernJ. secti-ons of the reporl through 
i n group me~tings and Lhrous;h written reports ns 
Contribute to 
participati o n 
t"'P.Cjtl ir-e-d; 
7.3 The team leader will require an additional two weeks and 
~il! hnve the following add1tional responsibilities: 
PrPpar£> a draft evaluation workplan and suggested methodology 
pr1or t¢ the arr ival of the team; 
T!w workplan shou ld include, but not be limit.ed to, the 
fo! loh·i ng: 
!>ocumentation requirements 
A list of people to be interviewed 
Data collec tion methods 
Oescript io t1 of how the issues contai ned 1n the TORs will 
be addressed 
Tasks i nvolved in conducting the evaluation and asslcned 
respons ib ility 
Final schedule for completion of tasl;s 
Rc•l~w the evaluation workplan and me~hodology 
~embers and BRAC following consultations •dth 
members; 
Wlth the DC 
other Leam 
Ensure that the TORs are fully addressed and that gender 
issues are covered comprehensively throughout the report; 
Edit the final report ; 
Ensure timely trans•nission of the report to BRAC and the DC 
Hembers. 
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